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The number of international migrants continues to grow throughout all world regions,
reaching 272 million people (3.5 percent of the global population) at the end of 2019
(UN DESA 2019). Migration flows are highly asymmetrical: While some countries are
undergoing high emigration, others are experiencing mass immigration. Europe has
been a major destination for migration in recent years and currently hosts the largest
number of migrants worldwide (82 million). The majority of these migrants moved
for economic or family reasons, benefiting from the free movement of labor within the
European Union. Yet due to ongoing and violent conflicts, forced migration has almost
doubled over the last decade,1 and roughly 3.3 million asylum seekers entered Europe
between 2015 and 2017 (Eurostat 2020).
This thesis analyzes the economic, political, and social consequences of migration
in countries of destination and origin. The first three chapters focus on refugee migra-
tion to Germany and investigate the determinants of refugees’ social and structural
integration, i.e., language acquisition and participation in education and labor markets.
The last chapter investigates the political effects of emigration in Poland, which has
seen large rates of emigration since its accession to the European Union, resulting in
4.4 million Polish citizens currently living abroad (11.4 percent of the total population
according to UN DESA (2019)).
The four chapters are linked by the use of identification strategies that focus on
the estimation of causal effects. Decisions about migration are made based on careful
consideration of costs and benefits and are thus endogenous (Borjas 1987; Sjaastad
1962). It is therefore essential to use methodologies that overcome these challenges
and provide consistent estimates. In this thesis, three distinct empirical strategies are
used to estimate causal effects. In the first two chapters, a centralized placement policy
of refugees is used as a quasi-natural experiment. The third chapter uses temporal
variation to implement a regression-discontinuity-in-time design. In the last chapter,
we use distance to the border or an international airport as an instrumental variable
1The number of displaced people has increased from 43.3 million in 2009 to 79.5 million people
in 2019 (UNHCR 2020).
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to account for endogenous migration decisions. In the following, I briefly describe the
content and contribution of each chapter in more detail.
Chapter 1: Initial residence restrictions and refugees’ language acquisition
Immigrants’ decisions on where to take up residence in their destination country
are generally selective, based on expected labor market outcomes (Card 1990) or pre-
existing intra-ethnic networks (Edin et al. 2003). In Germany, however, a distribution
mechanism known as Königsstein Key is used to ensure a proportional distribution
of asylum seekers across German states based on states’ tax revenues and population
size. Since states and refugees are required to participate, the mechanism minimizes
concerns related to endogenous sorting of refugees and ensures their random allocation
across Germany.
In 2016, the German federal government introduced the so-called “residence rule”,
which limits refugees’ ability to choose their place of residence freely after they have
been granted a permanent residence permit. Unless legal exemption criteria apply,
refugees who received their asylum decision after August 2016 must live in their state
of first residence for a period of at least three years. The act also allowed states to pass
additional and more restrictive regulations to effectively determine refugees’ county of
residence, and five out of 16 German states decided to do so. The first chapter of this
thesis analyzes the effect of the residence rule on language learning, which may be
considered a first essential step towards successful integration.
To identify a causal relationship, the chapter exploits (i) temporal variation in
the timing of the asylum decision and (ii) regional variation based on refugees’ as-
signment to states and the varying implementation of the residence rule across states
in a difference-in-differences design. Using unique, representative survey data from
the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, I show that the residence rule had no sub-
stantial impact on refugees’ participation in integration courses or on their German
language proficiency levels. While there exist small positive effects for refugees with
certain characteristics (e.g., female refugees) in the medium-run, the estimated effects
tend to fade out in the long-run and do not translate into higher self-assessed Ger-
man language skills. This result holds when considering participation in any language
course. Complementing our analyses with administrative information on the availabil-
ity of integration courses at the county level, survival analyses suggest that treatment
2
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states failing to place refugees in counties with a sufficient supply of integration courses
may at least partially explain this result.
The analysis focuses on participation in language courses and refugees’ language
proficiency levels, which have been established as an important predictor of integration
processes in the economic literature (Bleakley and Chin 2004; Chiswick 1991; Chiswick
and Miller 1995; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003; Dustmann and Soest 2001). The chap-
ter neglects the residence rule’s impact on labor market participation and individual
behavior such as job search, however, which may nonetheless exist. These impacts are
important to consider, on the one hand, because refugees may choose to take up em-
ployment rather than participating in an integration course. Second, being in “gainful
employment” bypasses the restrictions of the residence rule. Further analysis of these
issues requires more detailed information on the employment history of refugees in
Germany. Linking the Survey of Refugees with administrative data from the Federal
Employment Agency offers a promising avenue for future research.
The chapter’s contribution to the literature is threefold. First, to the best of my
knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the effect between residence restrictions
and refugees’ language development. This is surprising, given the strong link between
immigrants’ language skills and prospective labor market outcomes. Second, the paper
shows a causal effect based on the exogenous stipulation of refugees’ initial place of
residence based on the Königsstein Key. Third, the focus is on a recent cohort of
refugees who have arrived in Germany since 2013 and who differ substantially from
previous migrant and refugee groups. Against this backdrop, the chapter sheds light
on early integration outcomes in a very recent context.
Chapter 2: Local conditions and multi-dimensional integration of refugees
Refugees are a particularly vulnerable group in the labor market. For at least a
decade after their arrival, refugees’ employment rates and wages remain below those
of other immigrants (Brell et al. 2020). To better understand the drivers of refugee
integration, Chapter 2 investigates the effect of initial local conditions on refugees’
multi-dimensional integration outcomes based on data from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP
Survey of Refugees and the European Social Survey. In addition to several measures
of refugees’ labor market integration (such as participation in local labor markets
and monthly net wages), we use the framework outlined in Harder et al. (2018) to
build a Multi-dimensional Integration Index that identifies six crucial dimensions of
3
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integration. Similar to Chapter 1, Chapter 2 relies on the exogenous placement of
refugees into states and counties and the fact that refugees are not permitted to move
freely from one state or county to another within Germany.
The results highlight the important role of the initial conditions upon arrival
in refugees’ subsequent integration: High local unemployment rates and negative
attitudes towards migrants negatively affect the economic and social dimensions of
refugees’ integration. It is noteworthy that attitudes towards immigrants are as impor-
tant as local unemployment rates in shaping refugees’ integration outcomes. The gen-
eralized random forest methodology illustrates substantial treatment heterogeneities,
which emphasize that our results are driven by older people and those with secondary
or tertiary education. Furthermore, our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
reallocating refugees to counties with more favorable conditions would have significant
fiscal policy implications. For instance, a small scale reallocation of 10,000 randomly
selected working-age refugees to a county with a one standard deviation lower unem-
ployment rate would generate annual savings of more than e 2 million.
This chapter offers insights into how attitudes towards immigrants at the local level
affect refugees’ multi-dimensional integration outcomes. This is an aspect that has not
been the focus of investigation in the previous literature. To measure attitudes at the
local level, we draw on data from the ad-hoc migration module of the European Social
Survey in 2014 and use a principle component analysis to build the Migrant Acceptance
Index. While the Migrant Acceptance Index allows us to capture several dimensions
of attitudes (including economic, cultural, and social dimensions), we cannot provide
this information at the county-level. This is a drawback of the analysis, because there
may also be regional variation at the county level that we cannot exploit. We are,
however, confident that the Migrant Acceptance Index is a valid measure of attitudes
towards immigrants, and we show that our results are robust to alternative county-level
measures, for instance, the percentage of the votes for the right-wing populist party
“Alternative für Deutschland” in the federal elections in Germany in 2013. What is
more, because the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provides information on refugees’
first and current place of residency within Germany only, the analysis is limited by the
fact that we do not observe refugees’ entire moving history in the data.
In this chapter, we make several key contributions to the literature. Building
on several previous studies that have investigated the effects of initial local economic
conditions on refugee integration (Fasani et al. 2020a; Godøy 2017; Marbach et al. 2018;
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Martén et al. 2019; Åslund and Rooth 2007), we consider attitudes towards migrants
as an important factor affecting refugees’ integration. We expand previous research on
the importance of initial conditions by using an identification strategy that allows for
causal interpretation. Finally, we focus on multi-dimensional integration rather than
solely on economic integration as far less attention has been devoted to non-economic
outcomes.
The results from Chapters 1 and 2 call into question the principle of residence
restrictions for refugees in the first years after their arrival, such as those currently
in place in Germany, but also in Denmark and the Netherlands (Renner 2018). The
results also have implications for the design of refugee allocation policies. Although
there are strong political arguments for distributing refugees nationwide, the results
suggest that too small a supply of integration and language courses and unfavorable
local conditions come at a significant cost to subsequent integration outcomes. This
may impair refugee integration in the long-run and therefore have negative welfare
effects. One possibility to address these concerns while maintaining the principle of
allocating refugees nationwide would be to alter the underlying allocation mechanism
so that it incorporates unfilled job vacancies and the availability of integration courses.
The findings also have implications for the refugee policies at European level. The
Dublin Regulation stipulates that an application for asylum must be processed by
the first Dublin country the asylum seeker enters. With the majority of refugees
entering Europe by way of the Mediterranean routes (Aksoy and Poutvaara 2019), this
places a substantially higher burden on countries such as Italy and Greece, which are
traditionally characterized by high (youth) unemployment rates. Our findings suggest
that this regulation may result in worse integration outcomes across the European
Union, as refugees placed in regions with high unemployment and negative attitudes
towards immigrants face a risk of worse subsequent economic and social integration.
Chapter 3: Hate crimes and the mental health of refugees
The sudden inflow of refugees into Europe is associated with a shift in attitudes
towards immigrants and refugees and, in turn, increasing violence against immigrants
(The Council of Europe 2016). Hate crimes may be particularly detrimental to refugees
in that they may also affect their long-term integration, given that refugees tend to
be “permanent immigrants” whose lifetime utility is based on their initial integration
success. Against the backdrop of increasing violence against immigrants and refugees,
5
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Chapter 3 investigates the effect of hate crimes on refugees’ mental health in Germany.
For this purpose, we combine two innovative datasets: administrative data on attacks
against refugee shelters from the Federal Criminal Office (Bundeskriminalamt (BKA))
and data from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany. In line with
previous arguments, if refugees choose their place of residence based on regional char-
acteristics, which may jointly determine refugees’ mental health and the occurrence of
hate crime, estimated effects will be inconsistent. To circumvent this limitation, we
rely on the exogenous timing of hate crimes and the fact that refugees in the SOEP
have no influence on the timing of their interview. Using counties with at least one
hate crime against a refugee shelter, we compare mental health outcomes for refugees
who were interviewed immediately before and immediately after an attack occurred
in their county of residence. Formally, we employ a regression-discontinuity-in-time
design.
The results demonstrate that hate crime has a strong and negative effect on
refugees’ mental health, measured by the Mental Component Summary Score (MCS)
and the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-4). In contrast, we do not find an effect
on refugees’ life satisfaction or on their intention to stay in Germany. While the effects
of hate crimes are only transitory, we argue that negative mental health shocks during
the critical period after arrival have important long-term consequences. Furthermore,
we show that the level of exposure to hate crime matters: Refugees living at closer ge-
ographic proximity to a focal hate crime experience stronger adverse effects on mental
health than refugees living further away. This suggests that it is the direct exposure
to such crimes that drives the results. Finally, our findings suggest that refugees with
higher levels of country-specific human capital (e.g., higher German proficiency levels
or more frequent contact with German natives) are less severely affected.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold: First, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to analyze the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health. This is
surprising, given the stark increase in forced migration, which is expected to increase
further given the economic and environmental changes worldwide (UNHCR 2019),
and the fact that mental illnesses has the highest prevalence of all non-communicable
diseases (Bloom et al. 2011). Our results further suggest the importance of mental
health for (labor market) integration and the subsequent long-term consequences for
refugees in Germany. Second, we show that human capital has the potential to protect
refugees against negative external shocks, a mechanisms that has not been shown in
6
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previous empirical studies before. Refugee migration is increasing across Europe and
we contribute by providing a new mechanism that explains heterogeneities in refugee
integration outcomes.
The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 3 concentrates on the direct effects
of hate crime on refugees’ mental health indicators. Yet in addition to this first-order
effect, there may also be second-order effects: for instance, refugees with impaired
mental health may also suffer from poor structural integration outcomes, such as lower
rates of labor market participation. To gain additional insights into these effects, future
research could exploit the panel dimension of the SOEP data. Furthermore, the paper
remains silent on the external fiscal effects of xenophobic violence on host societies.
In light of the fact that the direct and indirect costs of mental health conditions were
estimated at 2.5 trillion US dollars worldwide in 2010 (Bloom et al. 2011), taking fiscal
effects of hate crime into consideration may serve as an interesting extension of this
chapter.
The empirical results from Chapter 3 show that hate crime has substantial negative
effects on refugees and host societies. As a consequence, our results point to the need
for increased protection of refugee shelters as well as further attention to the mental
health needs of refugees. The results are in line with our findings from Chapter 2, which
emphasize the negative effects of negative attitudes towards immigrants on refugees’
subsequent integration in Germany.
Chapter 4: Migrants’ Missing Votes
The fourth chapter shifts the focus away from refugee immigration to look at the
political effects of emigration. Emigrants are a selective group of citizens, in terms of
age and education, but also with respect to their political preferences (Berlinschi and
Harutyunyan 2019). They are also less likely to participate in elections in their home
country. High emigration rates may therefore have a systematic influence on election
results.
The goal of this chapter is to causally analyze the role of emigration on election
outcomes in Poland. The case of Poland is particularly interesting, as the country
experienced high emigration rates after joining the European Union and subsequently
introducing free labor mobility. We use detailed administrative emigration data and
merge it with official election results from all elections from 2004 and 2019 at the county
level. To account for endogeneity that may result, for example, from unobserved
7
Introduction
economic conditions, we instrument emigration with distance to the nearest “open”
border or international airport. The instrument is a strong predictor of emigration,
both when we measure distance in kilometers or duration in hours.
Our findings show that emigration has a positive effect on the share of votes for
right-wing parties, while decreasing the share of votes for left-wing parties. The results
are robust to alternative party classifications, alternative measures of distance, as well
as a static version of the instrument that allows us to analyze the effect of emigration
on electoral outcomes since 2001. We further find that emigration has a positive
effect on pro-European behavior in the country of origin. There are several potential
explanations for this surprising result, including migration intentions, reduced labor
market competition, and political remittances.
To understand whether emigration affects social norms and preferences in the
home country, we draw on additional data from the Life in Transition Survey. We pro-
vide suggestive evidence that trust in political authorities is lower in high-emigration
counties, a mechanism that helps to explain our estimation results.
One clear limitation of the paper is the lack of individual-level data on emigrants:
If we had observed data on migrants’ education level, family ties, or destinations, we
would have been able to disentangle underlying mechanisms, such as strategic voting,
monetary remittances, and return migration much more carefully. We therefore plan
to incorporate additional individual-level data from the Polish Labor Force Survey into
future research to investigate these issues.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we address the gap in research
on the political effects of emigration and we show that emigration has a strong and
positive effect on the share of votes for right-wing parties. As such, this paper offers a
new approach that helps to explain the rise of right-wing and populist parties across
Europe. Second, in contrast to previous literature, we focus on a developed and
democratic country. Third, we strengthen the causal interpretation of the effect based
on an established instrumental variable design (Dustmann et al. 2015) that has not
been used in this context previously.
As migration increases, so does the number of citizens who are voting from abroad.
Our results have important–albeit normative–policy implications that can lead to the
creation of fairer election systems. Migrants who face difficulties in casting a vote in
their home country and who are not yet eligible to vote in their current country of
residence are effectively disenfranchised. If governments made it easier for their citizens
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to vote from abroad, for instance, by allowing postal voting or increasing the number
of polling stations in emigrants’ destination countries, this would ensure that migrants
have equal access to the electoral process. The results further emphasize that more
flexible electoral processes, such as those for the European Parliament, which guarantee
citizens the right to cast a vote in their country of residence as well as in their country
of origin, are a step in the right direction to increase participation in the electoral
process and to foster the formation of political will.
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1 Must I stay or may I go? Initial residence
restrictions and refugees’ language
acquisition
I would like to thank Charlotte Bartels, Stefan Bauernschuster, Sebastian Braun, Tom-
maso Frattini, Yvonne Giesing, Magdalena Krieger, Guido Neidhöfer, Carsten Schröder
as well as seminar participants at the GC Summer Workshop, the BeNA Summer Work-
shop, the IZA Annual Migration Meeting, the IIPF, the VfS Annual Conference, the
SOEP User Conference, and the 5th Workshop on the Economics of Migration for
helpful suggestions and feedback.
1.1 Introduction
The destabilization of the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) has trig-
gered a sudden inflow of foreigners into Europe in recent years. Between 2015 and
2017, roughly 3.3 million asylum seekers entered Europe (Eurostat 2020). This influx
poses major challenges to national governments and raises the need for targeted policy
measures fostering integration into European societies. This is particularly relevant
considering that many refugees1 have been granted protection and will stay in their
host countries for an extended period of time, or even permanently.
Given that Germany experienced a particularly large inflow of refugees (Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017), see Figure 1.5), the federal
Government introduced several integration measures for beneficiaries of protection, in-
cluding the residence rule (“Wohnsitzauflage”). The residence rule severely restricts
refugees’ ability to choose their place of residence. It aims at avoiding the clustering of
refugees, thereby distributing financial burdens more evenly across counties and intend-
1In the public debate, the term refugee and migrant are often used interchangeably. Nevertheless,
it is essential to explicitly differentiate between them. A migrant describes an individual moving to
another country expecting to live there for a certain period of time. A refugee is someone who fears
“being persecuted for regions of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
unwilling to return to it” (United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees 1951).
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ing to facilitate the planning of integration activities and language courses (Sachver-
ständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration 2016). Considering
the strong link of language skills and immigrants’ subsequent labor market outcomes
established in the literature (Bleakley and Chin 2004; Chiswick 1991; Chiswick and
Miller 1995; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003; Dustmann and Soest 2001), completing an in-
tegration course may be considered a first essential step towards successful integration
in the host country. Consequently, this paper disentangles the effects of the residence
rule on participation in integration courses and refugees’ language development in
Germany.
From a theoretical perspective, the effect of residence restrictions on participa-
tion in integration courses and German language proficiency levels is ambiguous. If
refugees face lower information and search costs as a result of restricted mobility, by
this means increasing the take-up of respective integration measures, one would expect
a positive effect. On the other hand, the distribution of refugees across states (and
counties) in Germany is primarily based on population size and does not take the
presence of integration measures and labor market tightness into account. Misalloca-
tion of refugees may thus increase the search duration of a suitable integration course,
which may further impair refugees’ language proficiency levels. Finally, a third feature
affecting language proficiency levels are refugees’ (ethnic) networks (see e.g., Battisti
et al. (2016), Bertrand et al. (2000), Borjas (1998, 2000), Damm (2009), Edin et al.
(2003, 2004), and Lazear (1999)).
The empirical analysis relies on a quasi-experimental setting that exploits variation
in residence restrictions across German states after the reform has been introduced
in 2016. As a result of the residence rule, a group of refugees that was formerly
able to choose its place of residence freely, now faces severe and persistent residence
restrictions.2 Yet, there exists substantial variation in the implementation of the policy
across states. While refugees may move freely within some states, a couple of states
have decided to implement the residence rule more rigorously, such that refugees are
obliged to stay in a certain county. To identify a causal effect, this paper exploits both
temporal and spatial variation in a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation design.
Overall, I find that introducing the residence rule had no substantial impacts on
refugees’ participation in integration courses and their German language proficiency
2When the Integration Act was first introduced, the residence rule was established for a period of
three years. In 2019, the residence restrictions have been extended for an indefinite period of time.
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levels. Using the longitudinal design of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
which allows to investigate the development of refugees’ language proficiency in the
short-, medium-, and long-run, I find estimated effects to be bounded to a tight inter-
val around zero. There are some exceptions to the overall pattern of null results. First,
the probability to achieve intermediate language proficiency levels increases moder-
ately by 2.6 percentage points for refugees in treatment states after the residence rule
has been put in place. Yet, the effects diminish in the long-run and do not translate
into higher self-assessed German language skills. Second, when I stratify the sample
by refugees’ characteristics, I find small positive effects for refugees without children,
female refugees, and refugees with at least secondary education. Similar to preceding
findings, the effects are small and tend to fade out in the long-run. This paper also
provides suggestive evidence that the misallocation of refugees to counties with insuf-
ficient supply of integration courses in treatment states can at least partially explain
the results: I complement the analysis with administrative data from the Federal Of-
fice for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), which supplies yearly information on the
local supply of integration courses. The results from the survival analysis suggest that
while the number of integration courses in all states significantly increased over time,
treatment states fail to place refugees in counties with sufficient supply of integration
courses. Taken in their entirety, the findings provide little reason to interpret language
proficiency levels and integration course attainment arising due to causal effects of
residence restrictions.
This paper is connected to three branches of research. The first studies the effect of
initial residence restrictions on determinants of economic assimilation and immigrants’
labor market performance. In this context, it is essential to account for selective migra-
tion patterns. If immigrants choose their place of residence in the host country based
on factors such as expected labor market outcomes (Card 1990) or pre-existing ethnic
enclaves (Edin et al. 2003), estimates may be seriously biased. To tackle this potential
pitfall, Peri (2016) emphasizes the importance of exogenous variation in the empirical
analyses and suggests to use natural experiments. In the existing literature, a number
of studies have accounted for endogenous sorting of immigrants by studying reforms
that are very similar to the residence rule. These “settlement policies”, introduced in
Sweden and Denmark in the 1980s, determined immigrants’ place of residence without
considering their individual preferences and, as such, exogenously. Using the size of an
ethnic enclave in the year of assignment as an instrumental variable (IV), Edin et al.
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(2003) show that being placed in an ethnic enclave increases immigrants’ earnings sig-
nificantly, in particular for immigrants in the lower tail of the skill distribution. This
finding was confirmed by Damm (2009), who reports that this positive effect is pri-
marily driven by immigrant networks. Edin et al. (2004) use a difference-in-differences
design and show that policies that choose income support over reintegration measures
have detrimental effects on immigrants’ earnings. Additionally, Rosholm and Vejlin
(2010) report that lowering public income transfers have a positive effect on the prob-
ability to find employment in a competing risk framework. Finally, Åslund and Rooth
(2007) emphasize that local as well as national labor market conditions play a crucial
role in determining long-term integration outcomes.
This paper is furthermore related to several studies that examine the causal relation-
ship between intensified language training and refugees’ structural integration out-
comes. For instance, Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen (2016) show that tailored sequences
of active labor market programs (ALMP), so called “integration plans”, shifted refugees
attention from regular ALMP towards more language training, which in turn increased
refugee earnings by 47 percent. Likewise, Lochmann et al. (2019) evaluate the intro-
duction of a language training program in France, which assigns non-EU migrants to
language training if their score in an initial language test falls short a certain threshold.
Using this cut-off in a regression discontinuity design, the authors show that intensi-
fied language training increases labor force participation by 15 to 27 percentage points.
Finally, Arendt et al. (2020) use the launch of a Danish refugee integration program
in the 1990s involving and improving language learning provision with a regression
discontinuity design. In line with previous results, the authors find strong and positive
effects on refugees earnings and employment probability in the medium- and long-run.
Furthermore, with better language skills facilitating access to education, they show
that the program induced substantial form of skill upgrading.
Third, this paper relates to the research on the relationship between immigrants’
language skills as “an important form of human capital” (Chiswick and Miller 1995,
p.248) and their labor market performance. Chiswick (1991) showed the relevance
of self-reported language skills on immigrants’ earnings, and concludes that reading
fluency is more important than speaking fluency. Using data on Australia, the United
States (U.S.), Canada, and Israel, a subsequent study provides evidence that this effect
holds in an international context (Chiswick and Miller 1995). Dustmann and Soest
(2001) build on the aforementioned studies by accounting for measurement errors in self-
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reported language skills and unobservable variables, which are correlated with language
acquisition and respective outcome variables, such as ability: They demonstrate that
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are subject to substantial biases and find
that estimated effects on earnings are considerably larger once these factors are taken
into account. Combining both a matching and an IV estimator, Dustmann and Fabbri
(2003) find a positive effect of language skills on the probability to find employment in
the UK, while the effect on earnings is less precise. Finally, Bleakley and Chin (2004)
use a quasi-experimental approach and show that English language proficiency affects
the wages of adults, who arrived in the US as children. Furthermore, they show that
this effect is driven mainly by education.
I contribute to the literature in several ways: This paper is the first to study
the effect of initial residence restrictions on language acquisition of refugees. This is
surprising, given the strong link between immigrants’ language skills and prospective
labor market outcomes. I further show a causal effect based on an allocation scheme
which determines refugees’ initial place of residence exogenously. Second, I focus on a
recent cohort of refugees, who have arrived in Germany since 2013 and differ substan-
tially from other migrant and refugee groups who arrived before. As such, this paper
sheds light on early integration outcomes in a very recent context. Furthermore, in
contrast to previous analyses that identify refugees by country of origin3, the unique
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees provides precise information on the refugees’
types of residence permit. This is particularly important because the residence restric-
tions apply only to a subset of refugees with temporary or permanent residence permit,
so called “humanitarian migrants”.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
institutional background and illustrates the relevant policy reform. After a short de-
scription of the dataset, Section 1.3 provides descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 outlines
the empirical strategy. Section 1.5.1 reports the main results and Section 1.5.2 sheds
light on the underlying mechanism. Section 1.5.3 demonstrates the implemented ro-
bustness checks. Section 1.6 concludes.
3Notable exceptions in the recent literature include Bratsberg et al. (2017) and Schultz-Nielsen
(2017).
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1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 The stages of the German asylum procedure
While Germany has no distinct Immigration Act that explicitly rules immigration other
than asylum requests, the stages of the asylum procedure are governed by the German
Asylum Act. Individuals seeking for political asylum in Germany have to register at a
state authority upon arrival (BAMF 2016b). They will then be distributed to an ini-
tial reception center, and thereby to a particular state, based on the “Königstein Key”.
The Königsstein Key is a distribution mechanism that allocates refugees at state level
based on the state’s tax revenue and population size. Since this distribution mech-
anism strives to ensure a proportional distribution of refugees across states without
considering individuals’ preferences, initial placement of refugees into a specific state
is exogenous and as such immune to self-selection.4
After being assigned to an initial reception center, asylum seekers may formally
pose their asylum request. Until a final decision has been reached, refugees face severe
residence restrictions and must reside in the initially assigned state (“Residenzpflicht”).
Importantly, this residence restriction for asylum seekers has remained unaffected by
the residence rule. For clarification, Figure 1.6 illustrates the states of the German
asylum procedure schematically.
In total, there exist four different classes of protection once a decision on an asylum
claim has been reached (see Table 1.12). Following the OECD’s definition5, this paper
hereinafter refers to all refugees who have been granted a protection status of category
one to three as humanitarian migrants. Tolerated foreigners, who are legally required
to leave Germany eventually, are discarded from the analysis, because they have not
been affected by the residence rule.
4See Appendix 1.7.1 for a more detailed description of the Königsstein Key. Furthermore, Ap-
pendix 1.7.1 describes the redistribution of asylum seekers to counties within states, providing sugges-
tive evidence that, conditional on the population size of respective county, asylum seekers are indeed
randomly assigned to German counties.
5The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines people who
have successfully applied for asylum as have been granted some form of protection as humanitarian
migrants (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2016, p.7).
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1.2.2 The residence rule
While moving is severely restricted until a final decision on the asylum request has been
reached, humanitarian migrants could choose their place of residence freely within
Germany in the past. The new regime, in contrast, enforces severe restrictions on
humanitarian migrants’ initial place of residence if certain criteria apply. Those who
do not comply lose their social benefits.
There are only few exemptions from the residence rule, for example, if a humani-
tarian migrant or a close relative (such as a spouse, domestic partner, or child) attends
university or vocational training or has taken up employment with a certain number
of working hours.6 If none of the exemption criteria applies, humanitarian migrants
must stay in the state in which they formally applied for asylum, i.e., the state initially
determined by the Königsstein Key, for three years after the asylum decision. Hence,
the residence rule restricts mobility between states. Mobility within states, however,
is only affected if states enforce additional legislation. A residence restriction at state
level may be considered a marginal change only. Especially in economically less devel-
oped states, this restriction may nevertheless be effective for humanitarian migrants
targeted by the reform. Even though humanitarian migrants are free to leave the state
if they find employment or training conditions that satisfy the exemption rule, com-
peting with native workers is challenging. The residence rule may therefore severely
restrict freedom of movement for humanitarian migrants.
With the introduction of the Integration Act, states have further been given the
possibility to impose additional regulations at the state level (Federal Ministery of Jus-
tice and Costumer Protection (2016), §12a Art. 9 AufenthG). As of now, five states
have decided to apply the residence rule more rigorously, including Baden Wurttem-
berg, Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland, and Saxony Anhalt (Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development 2017, p.49f). These states mandate hu-
manitarian migrants to live in a specific district and are consequently defined as treat-
6For detailed information, please see Federal Ministery of Justice and Costumer Protection (2016),
§12a AufenthG, Art.1.
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ment states.7 In all other states (control group), humanitarian migrants remain free
to move within the assigned state.
1.2.3 Integration courses
With the vast majority of refugees lacking adequate command of the German language,
language training is generally mandatory for humanitarian migrants in Germany.8
90 precent of refugees in the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees report to have no
German knowledge before migration (Brücker et al. 2016). Their German proficiency
levels have greatly improved since their arrival, however, and 18 percent of refugees
with less than two years of residence in Germany assess their German proficiency level
as “good” or “very good”.
Attending an integration course is therefore considered mandatory for humanitar-
ian migrants in Germany.9 The integration course curriculum is split in two parts,
a general course on life in Germany (100 hours) and a language course (600 hours).
Upon completion of this mandatory schedule, participants take a final exam including
a language test and a quiz relating to the orientation course.
1.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis relies on the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees (the Survey
of Refugees), which is conducted as part of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP,
see Goebel et al. (2019)). This dataset provides information on refugees who have
arrived in Germany from 2013 and 2016, and has been collected on an annual basis
since 2016 (Brücker et al. 2016; DIW 2017). It collects comprehensive information on
7Please refer to Bayerische Staatsregierung (2016), Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westphalen (2016),
Ministerium für Inneres, Digitalisierung und Migration, Baden-Württemberg (2016), Ministerium für
Inneres und Sport, Sachsen-Anhalt (2017), and Staatskanzlei Saarland (2016), the respective regula-
tions are available in German only. Furthermore, Hessen an Saxony implemented additional regula-
tions in September 2017 and April 2018, respectively. This is not relevant for the underlying analyses,
because only few observations in the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Sample received their asylum decision in this
time period.
8Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und
der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz, §44 ZuWG & §44a ZuWG).
9Giesecke and Schuss (2019, p.6) highlight that “until today, a considerable share of immigrants
effectively does not participate in language training”, the reason for this is supply falling behind
demand in some regions creating substantial excess demand.
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individual refugees’ migration, education, and employment histories as well as detailed
information on their participation in language courses and overall living conditions
in Germany. To date, the Survey of Refugees is the only dataset that allows for
quantitative and empirical social research on refugees who were part of the most recent
arrival cohort in Europe.
Using this data source has several distinct advantages: First, the Survey of Refugees
maintains detailed information on residence status and the exact date of receiving a
residence permit.10 It is also possible to extract information on the current place of res-
idence at the county level. Consequently, I can identify treatment and control group in
the pre- and post-treatment period. Secondly, the Survey of Refugees surveys individ-
uals on a household level. Hence, it is possible to deduce information on respondent’s
family characteristics, such as children’s educational or vocational training status, and
to identify spouses living in the same household.
The first survey wave in 2016 (samples M3, M4), which covered approximately
4,500 adult refugees in Germany, has been augmented by roughly 3,000 observations
in 2017 (sample M5). The relevant samples feature an excellent overall response rate
(49 percent, Kroh et al. (2017, p.14)). For this paper’s empirical analysis, we pool
all SOEP refugee observations in 2016, 2017, and 2018 and use the respondent’s latest
valid interview information. Given that the residence rule applies to humanitarian
migrants, who are not exempt from the residence rule, this accumulates to a total of
3,795 observations.
I define a working sample that is subject to several restrictions (Table 1.1). Since
the reform is applicable to first-time asylum seekers only, I drop observations who
pose a repeated asylum request. I further drop observations who report missing in-
formation on the timing of the asylum decision. This reduces the sample size by
16 percent, whereby the majority of humanitarian migrants reports a missing value for
both the year and the month of asylum decision (72 percent). Furthermore, I restrict
the working sample to have non-missing values for all exploratory variables employed
10The exact wording and answer categories of the relevant survey questions are as follows. When
was the decision regarding your application for asylum made? [Year, Month, No details]. Which
residence title do you currently hold? If you are not sure which residence title you hold, please check
the Immigration Authority’s label in your passport. [Asylum seeker, Person entitled to asylum, Per-
son with refugee status, A settlement permit according to Section 26 sub-section 3 of the German
Residence Act, A temporary suspension of deportation according to section 60a of the German Resi-
dence Act, Admission on humanitarian grounds, Admission on other humanitarian grounds, Another
residence title, No details].
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Table 1.1: Definition of the working sample
Relevant sample of survey respondents: M3, M4, M5 3795
Missing: timing of decision -634
Repeated asylum request -33
Missing information on spouse -38
Missing values in explanatory variables -383
N 2707
Note: Table 1.1 illustrates the necessary sample restrictions resulting in the construction of the
working sample. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
in the difference-in-differences analysis. Finally, humanitarian migrants may be ex-
empt from the residence rule based on his or her spouse’s characteristics. Considering
that I cannot identify these cases of exemption for humanitarian migrants who are
married, but whose spouse is living in a different household in Germany, I drop these
observations from the working sample. Taking these considerations into account, the
defined working sample consists of 2,707 observations: 1,444 treated and 1,263 control
individuals.
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics. Column 1 provides information on the
full sample, columns 2 and 3 then add information on the treatment and control
group respectively. Differences between individuals in treatment and comparison states
are reported in column 4. The table indicates that treatment and control group are
very similar in socio-economic characteristics. Overall, I find very little differences
with respect to observable characteristics, such as gender, age, years of schooling, and
their family status. For instance, while 43.4 percent of observations are female in
the treatment group, the share of females equals 43.0 percent in the control group.
The table suggests only small differences in the presence of children and the share
of single individuals. What is more, descriptive statistics suggest that the overall
asylum procedure is similar in treatment and control states. For instance, there exist
no differences in the distribution of asylum classes or the number of months since the
asylum decision.
Finally, Table 1.2 underlines that there exists some variation with respect to the
country of origin.11 For example, while 59 percent of the treatment group stem from
11We explicitly differentiate between Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, which correspond to the main
countries of origin in Germany. All other origin countries are subsumed under the category “other
origin”.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics




mean/sd/b mean/sd/b mean/sd/b mean/sd/b
Female 0.432 0.434 0.430 0.004
(0.495) (0.496) (0.495)
Age in years 34.929 34.679 35.148 -0.469
(10.835) (10.819) (10.848)
Single 0.251 0.267 0.238 0.029∗
(0.434) (0.442) (0.426)
Divorced 0.034 0.037 0.030 0.007
(0.180) (0.189) (0.172)
Widowed 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.001
(0.162) (0.164) (0.160)
Children 0.647 0.625 0.666 -0.042∗∗
(0.478) (0.484) (0.472)
Years of schooling 8.349 8.374 8.328 0.046
(4.430) (4.502) (4.368)
Some German before emigration 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.002
(0.134) (0.137) (0.131)
Want to stay in Germany 0.950 0.952 0.948 0.004
(0.218) (0.214) (0.222)
Entitled to asylum 0.070 0.074 0.066 0.009
(0.255) (0.263) (0.248)
Refugee status 0.881 0.873 0.889 -0.015
(0.323) (0.333) (0.315)
Admission on
humanitarian grounds 0.049 0.052 0.046 0.007
(0.215) (0.223) (0.209)
Months since arrival 31.381 31.653 31.144 0.509
(11.437) (11.516) (11.366)
Months since asylum decision 21.565 21.457 21.660 -0.203
(11.875) (11.966) (11.797)
Syrian origin 0.644 0.589 0.691 -0.102∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.492) (0.462)
Afghan origin 0.099 0.139 0.063 0.076∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.346) (0.243)
Iraqi origin 0.141 0.133 0.148 -0.015
(0.348) (0.340) (0.355)
Other origin 0.117 0.139 0.098 0.041∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.346) (0.297)
N 2707 1263 1444 2707
Note: Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample (column 1), and disaggregated
by treatment status (columns 2 and 3, respectively). Means (standard deviation). Treated states
include Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, North Rhein-Westphalia, Saarland, and Saxony. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Syria, 69 percent in the control group report Syria as their country of origin. Similar
patterns arise for Afghanistan and Iraq as well as for other countries of origin. One
reason for this disparity is that in order to reduce processing times, some regional
offices of the BAMF have specialized on particular countries of origin. While this may
indeed cause clustering of nationalities to a certain extent, none of the countries of
origin are processed in treatment or control states exclusively. Consider, nevertheless,
that refugees have no say in where to be placed during their asylum procedure, but are
assigned to a particular state based on the Königgstein Key (Section 1.7.1). What is
more, the difference-in-differences estimator may explicitly control for these differences
as long as they remain constant over time.
Table 1.3 provides descriptive statistics on participation and average duration time
of integration courses in Germany based on the Survey of Refugees. To be precise, Ta-
ble 1.3 differentiates between the full sample (column 1) as well as individuals who
live in states with stricter and less strict residence restrictions (columns 2 and 3 re-
spectively). Column 4 illustrates the difference between respective characteristics in
treatment and comparison states. 52 percent of humanitarian migrants in the Survey of
Refugees do either still participate or have participated in an integration course, while
36 percent have completed the course in the past. On average, humanitarian migrants
take eight months to complete an integration course with a standard deviation of five
months. The large standard deviation implies that course participation and completion
is heterogeneous and subject to individual constraints. A comparison of individuals
living in stricter versus less strict states suggests that humanitarian migrants subject
to the residence rule complete an integration course slightly faster than humanitarian
migrants in less restrictive states (8.1 versus 8.4 months). It has to be emphasized
though that none of the differences is statistically significant at conventional levels.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics on integration courses and German proficiency levels




mean/sd/b mean/sd/b mean/sd/b mean/sd/b
Participates in an integration course 0.518 0.510 0.527 0.017
(0.500) (0.500) (0.499)
Completed an integration course 0.362 0.357 0.367 0.011
(0.481) (0.479) (0.482)
Duration of integration course 8.268 8.124 8.428 0.304
(4.982) (4.724) (5.258)
Duration between decision and take-up 9.880 9.911 9.847 -0.064
(11.398) (11.215) (11.601)
Average German language proficiency levels 2.902 2.919 2.883 -0.036
(0.940) (0.950) (0.929)
Speaking German language proficiency levels 2.877 2.895 2.855 -0.040
(0.925) (0.936) (0.911)
Reading German language proficiency levels 2.962 2.976 2.945 -0.031
(1.053) (1.046) (1.061)
Writing German language proficiency levels 2.869 2.886 2.849 -0.036
(0.992) (1.007) (0.974)
N 2707 1444 1263 2707
Note: Table 1.3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample (column 1), and disaggregated
by treatment status (column 2 and 3, respectively). Means (standard deviation). Outcome “Par-
ticipates in an integration course” equals one if 1) a refugee completed an integration course in
the past or 2) a refugee is still enrolled in an integration course at the timing of the interview,
zero else. Outcome “Completed an integration course” equals one for refugees, who completed an
integration course already, zero else. Duration of integration course measures the duration of an
integration course from start to end, in months. Duration between decision and take-up measures
the duration between asylum decision and take-up of an integration course in months. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Difference-in-differences estimation
To estimate the effect of strict statutory requirements regarding place of residence
on language outcomes of humanitarian migrants, I employ a difference-in-differences
design, taking advantage of legal variation across states as well as the fact that human-
itarian migrants may not influence their place of initial residence. Considering that
this estimate compares the changes in the outcome variables of treated and control
units over time (“double differences”, Lechner (2011, p.168)), this quasi-experimental
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method controls for existing time trends as well as for differences between treatment
and control group that exist permanently (cf. Bertrand et al. (2004), Abadie (2005)
or Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)).
The residence rule was introduced as part of the Integration Act in July 2016. On
this basis, the pre-treatment period consists of all survey respondents who received
a positive asylum decisions until this legally defined cut-off date. Observations with
a positive decision thereafter are considered to be post-treatment observations (see
Figure 1.7).
To define treatment and comparison group, I exploit regional variation in residence
restrictions across states. Based on §12a of the Integration Act, states may impose
further requirements on humanitarian migrants’ initial placement. In this case, human-
itarian migrants will face residence restrictions within states, in addition to being un-
able to move between states. Baden Wurttemberg, Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia,
Saarland, and Saxony Anhalt have passed additional decrees which provide severe
limitations on residence decisions of humanitarian migrants. Consequently, I consider
observational units in more restrictive states to be treated and others to be comparison
units.
Figure 1.8 illustrates which states impose stricter statutory regulations on initial
place of residence as well as the launch of the residence rule in each state. I use these
sources of exogenous variation to estimate a difference-in-differences model12 that can
be defined as in the following equation:
Yit = α0 +α1T reati +α2P ostt +α3T reati ∗ P ostt +Xitγ + εit (1.1)
where Yit is the outcome of interest measured for individual i in survey year t. I
use several measures for refugees’ language acquisition: (i) the probability to begin
an integration course; (ii) the probability to complete an integration course; (iii) the
probability to achieve intermediate German proficiency levels; and (iv) refugees’ self-
assessed German language skills. I provide two alternative estimation specifications:
while the first specification abstains from including control variables, the second specifi-
cation includes a rich set of individual and region specific covariates, including country
of origin, year of arrival, and state fixed effects (see Table 1.14). The dummy vari-
able T reati ∈ (0,1) is equal to one if an individual lives in a treated state, zero else.
12The respective estimations are based on an ordinary least square (OLS) estimation.
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(b) Complete an integration course
Note: Panel a (b) in Figure 1.1 displays the share of humanitarian migrants beginning (completing)
an integration course each year disaggregated by treatment status. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP
Survey of Refugees, v35.
P ostt ∈ (0,1) equals one if the respondent’s asylum decision has been made in the
post-treatment period, zero else. εit is a mean zero term. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level to allow for serial auto-correlation within federal states. Since the
small number of clusters (G=16), may bias standard errors down, I also review the
results using wild cluster bootstrap t-procedures (Cameron et al. (2008), see Section
1.5.3). In this setting, α3 captures the causal effect of interest. Since the regression
model provides reduced form estimates of stricter requirements on all humanitarian
migrants who reside in the treatment area, one may interpret α3 as intention-to-treat
effect (ITT).
To investigate the common trend assumption, Figure 1.1 compares the share of
humanitarian migrants participating in an integration course in treatment and com-
parison states disaggregated at the yearly level.13 The figure illustrates that both
graphs develop similarly prior to the reform suggesting that individuals in treatment
and comparison states are indeed equally likely to begin or complete an integration
course before the residence rule was introduced. Consequently, this provides graphi-
cal evidence that the common trend assumption is met. What is more, Figure 1.11
illustrates that the average number of integration courses in treatment versus control
states begun and completed behave very similarly between 2013 to 2018.
13With the residence rule being introduced in August 2016, I further split the sample in 2016.
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To examine the treatment effect over time, I furthermore include both time leads
and lags. This modified specification of Equation 1.1 incorporates treatment indicators
for individuals receiving their asylum decision in 2013, 2014, 2015, and up to July 2016
(pre-treatment period), and from August 2016 to 2017 for individuals who received a
decision on their asylum claim in the post-treatment period. The revised estimation
equation is defined as follows:
Yit = β0 + ζi + ηt +
2017∑
j=2013
βjT reatiP ostj +Xitγ + εit, (1.2)
where ζi represents the individual treatment status, ηt represents year of asylum
decision fixed effects, and the interaction term
∑2017
j=2013βjT reatiP ostj provides an es-
timate for each year of asylum decision in the Survey of Refugees specifically. The
rationale behind this is two-fold: First, treatment leads simulate a pseudo treatment
before the residence rule was introduced and, therefore, provide further evidence that
the common trend assumption is met (Autor 2003). Figure 1.9 consistently reports
zero-effects in the period absent of treatment (until July 2016). Second, treatment lags
demonstrates changes in treatment effects over time. For instance, treatment states
may take some time to introduce integration courses in relevant counties, which could
result in a delayed treatment effect.
1.4.2 Potential threats to identification
Besides introducing the residence rule, policy makers also suspended the so-called
“priority review” in summer 2016. The priority review is a check mechanism by the
Federal Employment Agency that states that an asylum seeker in Germany can take
up employment only if there was no German or EU citizen who would be available for
a specific job. One might therefore worry about confounding the estimated effects with
other reforms or changes taking place at the same time. Yet, since the two reforms
target different groups of refugees (asylum seekers vs humanitarian migrants), it is
unlikely that the overlap in time will bias estimation results. I have not found any
other significant reforms or policy changes that could be of concern for the results.
Due to the controversial discussion about immigration in Germany at the time of
the policy change, a second source of bias could arise if individuals have anticipated
the reform. Even if this was the case, asylum seekers generally have no possibility
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to influence the timing of their asylum decision. What is more, due to the sudden
influx of refugees into Germany in 2015 and 2016, many asylum seekers had to wait
for a prolonged period of time until they received a final decision.14 Ergo, anticipation
effects are largely negligible.
Similarly, a potential threat to our identification could be manipulation across the
cutoff: if decision makers strategically move the decision on asylum based on expected
gains to take place before (or after) the residence rule has been installed, our estimate
may be inconsistent. I use information on the date of the asylum decision to compute
the distance to the introduction of the residence rule in months and compare the
density of asylum decisions around the cutoff (McCrary 2008). Figure 1.10 illustrates
that there is no discontinuity, suggesting that institutional decision makers did not
engage in manipulations of asylum dates.15
Finally, one might be concerned about selection into treatment. If treatment and
control states exhibit different geographic, economic or political patterns, such differ-
ences may have led treatment states to impose additional regulations at the state level.
Qualitative investigations show that treatment states justify additional legislation at
the state level based on §12a Art. 9 AufenthG: residence restrictions at the county level
may help humanitarian migrants to acquire suitable accommodations, to gain sufficient
command of spoken German language proficiency, and to enter paid employment.16
Table 1.13 provides additional and quantitative evidence that treatment and con-
trol states share similar political and labor market characteristics in 2013.17 The table
contrasts county level information on several regional level characteristics (disaggre-
gating between counties in treated and control states), including, for instance, the
average population size, the average age of the population, and regional unemploy-
ment rates. On average, there exist only marginal differences in treatment and control
14Due to the massive inflow of foreigners in Germany, waiting times on asylum decision (measured
in months from arriving in Germany) have increased steadily from 2015 to 2018. While asylum seekers
in the working sample had to wait on average 5.6 months (SD=5.6) in 2015, this increased to 9.3
months (SD=5.8) in 2016, 16.6 months (SD=7.1) in 2017, and 22.5 months (SD=14.1) in 2018.
15Figure 1.10 shows the results for the full sample. The results hold, however, if I differentiate
between asylum decisions in treatment and control states.
16See, for instance, Minister of the Interior in Baden Wurttemberg Thomas Strobel’s
interview: https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/service/presse/pressemitteilung/pid/
wohnsitzauflage-wird-konsequent-umgesetzt-1/, last accessed 03.12.2020.
17To avoid potential biases, I use information as of 2013 to compare regional characterize at the
county level, which corresponds to a period before the refugee inflow. This year also coincides with
a parliamentary elections, which allows to compare the political dimension as well.
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states. While treatment states tend to be slightly more economically successful, these
differences are rarely statistical significant. Using electoral data from the parliamen-
tary elections in 2013 reinforces this impression: For example, while turnout amounts
to 71.1 percent in treatment states, control states feature an average voter turnout
of 71.4 percent. What is more, the choice to apply additional legislation at the state
level did not depend on the political party in office. Table 1.13 hence suggests that
treatment and control states share similar political and labor market characteristics
rebutting the assumption of selection into treatment.
1.5 Results and sensitivity analyses
1.5.1 Main results
The Integration Act aims at improving access to integration measures and language
courses in particular. Hence, this paper investigates if strict residence restrictions have
an effect on the probability to begin an integration course, the probability to complete
an integration course, and certified language levels.18 Since an integration course aims
to supply refugees with intermediate German language proficiency levels (Level B1), I
redefine this variable to take a value of one if the respective level has been achieved
in the final exam, zero else. Furthermore, I explicitly differentiate between integration
outcomes in the short-, medium-, and long-run. Short-run outcomes correspond to
integration outcomes in the year of the asylum decision, medium-term outcomes eval-
uate integration outcomes 12 months after the decision on the asylum claim has been
reached, and long-run integration outcomes correspond to integration outcomes at the
time of the latest survey interview.19 Finally, I also consider humanitarian migrants’
self-assessed German language proficiency levels at the time of the latest survey inter-
view, which are reported on a 5-point likert scale from 1 “not at all” to 5 “very good”.
While this allows for a differentiated view on refugees’ abilities to read, speak, and
write the German language, self-assessed language proficiency may be prone to mea-
surement error (Dustmann and Soest 2001). Similarly to the variable “Intermediate
German proficiency levels”, I build an indicator variable which takes a value of one
18Language proficiency levels are measured on a scale from 0 to 3 (0 “No certified level”, 1 “Level
A1”, 2 “Level A2”, 3 “Level B1”).
19On average, humanitarian migrants in the sample have reached a decision on their asylum claim
some two years ago (mean 22 months, SD 12 months).
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for humanitarian migrants who report at least “good” current German language skills,
zero else.
The average number of integration courses in treatment and control states over
the period from 2013 to 2018 is shown in Figure 1.11: Panel a displays the average
number of integration courses begun each year and Panel b displays the average number
of integration courses completed. Three points are noteworthy. First, there is no
difference between treatment and control states before the introduction of the residence
rule in 2016. Second, the large number of foreigners entering Germany in 2015 induced
a sharp increase in the average number of integration curses per state. Third, while
the graph suggests treatment states performed slightly better than control states in
2017, these differences have diminished in 2018 already.
Figure 1.2 reports estimation results based on Equation 1.1 for the outcome vari-
ables in the short-, medium-, and long-run. Tables 1.15 to 1.18 report the main esti-
mation results in detail. Somewhat surprisingly, I find that the residence rule has had
no impact on the the probability to begin or complete an integration course (Panel a
and b in Figure 1.2). For instance, effects on the probability to complete an integra-
tion course range between 0.010 percentage points in the short and 0.008 percentage
points in the long-run. These zero effects are precisely estimated with small standard
errors such as 0.015 and 0.041 respectively. The results consequently suggest that
the residence rule has failed in increasing refugees’ attendance in integration measures
including integration courses.
A closer look at humanitarian migrants’ language skills indicates that humanitar-
ian migrants in treatment states are somewhat more likely to complete intermediate
German language proficiency levels in the medium-run (12 months after their asylum
decision). To be precise, the residence rule increased the probability to achieve inter-
mediate German proficiency levels by 2.6 percentage points for humanitarian migrants
in treatment states, relative to a mean of 8 percent (Column 2 in Table 1.17). This
translates into an increase of 32.5 percent. Yet, the effect seems to fade out over time
and does not translate into higher self-assessed German proficiency levels, including hu-
manitarian migrants’ ability to read, write, and speak German in the long-run (Figure
1.3d).
To conclude, stricter residence restrictions as a result of the so-called residence
rule have consistently small, and non-significant effects on humanitarian migrants’
attendance in integration courses and their German language proficiency levels. While
28
Initial residence restrictions and refugees’ language acquisition





































Read German Speak German Write German
(d) Self-assessed German proficiency levels
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.2 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands of
the difference-in-differences estimator, which represents the effect of strict residence restrictions on
humanitarian migrants’ participation in integration courses and their German proficiency levels.
Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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small positive effects exist in the medium-run, the effects are not prevailing over a
longer period, and do not translate in higher self-assessed German language proficiency
levels. It thus seems that strict placement policies failed in reaching their goal to
improve access to integration measures and courses.
1.5.2 Misallocation of humanitarian migrants as potential
mechanism
While the effect of strict residence restrictions on humanitarian migrants is a priori
ambiguous (cf. Section 1.1), with most policy interventions there is no reason that
the expected input would be zero. This section provides suggestive evidence that the
misallocation of refugees to counties with insufficient supply of integration courses (and
other integration measures) provides an underlying mechanism driving the regression
results.
Section 1.5.1 shows that the introduction of strict residence restrictions as a result
of the residence rule has only limited impact on humanitarian migrants’ participation
in integration and their German language proficiency levels. This finding holds if I
investigate participation in any language course (see Section 1.5.3). While the aver-
age number of integration courses per state develops similarly over time (see Figure
1.11), this states little on the local accessibility of German language courses and other
integration measures. If counties in treatment states fail to offer a sufficient number
of integration courses, this may play a crucial role in explaining our results (“spatial
mismatch”, see Kain (1968)).
To test this hypothesis, I draw on administrative data from the BAMF, which
provides yearly information on the supply of integration courses at county level (“Inte-
grationskursgeschäftsstatistik”). To be precise, the dataset lists the number of courses
begun and completed per county in a given year. Thus, this external data base pro-
vides exact information on the local access to integration courses. I use information
on humanitarian migrants’ county of residence and their year of asylum decision, to
merge this information to the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees. Table 1.4 then
compares the local supply of integration courses per county in treatment and control
states.
A comparison of the local supply of integration courses in treatment and con-
trol states shows that control states offer a significantly higher amount of integration
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Table 1.4: Local supply of integration courses in treatment and control states
Mean(Treated) Mean(Control) Diff. Std. Error Obs.
# begun 83.2 211.6 128.4∗∗∗ 11.408 2616
# completed 54.3 118.7 64.4∗∗∗ 6.481 2616
Mean(Treated) Mean(Control) Diff. Std. Error Obs.
# begun, per 1000 foreigners 2.0 2.6 0.6∗∗∗ 0.077 2613
# completed, per 1000 foreigners 1.3 1.4 0.1∗∗ 0.052 2613
Note: Table 1.4 compares the local supply of integration courses in treatment and control states
using a t-test. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5; *** significant at 1%. Source: IAB-
BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35, BAMF Integrationskursgeschäftsstatistik (2013-2018), and
Regionaldatenbank Destatis.
courses per district. This holds for the number of courses begun and the number of
courses completed. Germany has 16 federal states in total, including three so called
city states (Bremen, Berlin, and Hamburg), which encompass the city and its sur-
rounding areas. All city states have decided to forgo stricter residence restrictions,
and are therefore considered part of the control group. Likewise, city states experience
higher numbers of immigration. A simple control of the number of integration courses
is therefore insufficient. Consequently, I compare the number of integration courses
per 1,000 foreigners in a second step.20 As such, I can relate the number of integra-
tion courses to the size of the relevant population in each county. The second Panel
of Table 1.4 illustrates that the adjusted number of integration courses is still higher
in control than in treatment states. For example, the number of integration courses
begun per 1,000 foreigners equals 2.0 per county in treatment states and 2.6 in control
states. This difference is statistically significant at the one percent level. The mean
comparison therefore suggests that misallocation of humanitarian migrants plays an
important role in explaining the results.
Since the Survey of Refugees provides precise information on the date of asylum
decision and the start date of the integration course, I may investigate the underlying
mechanism even further. The Kaplan-Meier estimator in Figure 1.3 illustrates the
probability to begin an integration course after the asylum decision has been reached,
20The number of foreigners by county and year is provided by the German Federal Statistical Office
(Regionaldatenbank Destatis). The variable is defined as the number of integration courses begun or
completed divided by the number of foreigners in thousands.
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i.e., the duration between asylum decision and the take-up of an integration course
for humanitarian migrants in months. To be precise, Panel a in Figure 1.3 shows the
overall pattern and Panel b in Figure 1.3 disagreggates the duration by treatment
status. In line with previous arguments, I find that it takes humanitarian migrants
equally long to begin an integration course in treatment and control states.
Table 1.5 presents the effect of receiving the asylum decision in the post-treatment
period, the effect of living in a treatment state, and the respective interaction term
on the time to an integration course after the asylum decision. The latter can be
interpreted as the treatment effect for those humanitarian migrants, who received their
asylum decision in a treatment state after the residence rule was put in place.21 The
coefficients are displayed as hazard ratios. Table 1.5 illustrates that the duration to
take-up has substantially decreased over time. The hazard ratio for the coefficient Post
is 2.1, i.e., humanitarian migrants in the post-treatment period have twice the chance of
taking-up an integration course at a particular time than humanitarian migrants in the
pre-treatment period. This corresponds to an extended offer of integration courses over
time (Figure 1.11). The results suggest, however, no statistically significant between
humanitarian migrants in treatment and control states or a significant interaction
effect. Overall, the results indicate that treatment states failed to place humanitarian
migrants in counties with sufficient supply of integration courses, which translates in
zero effects after the residence rule was installed.
1.5.3 Heterogeneity analyses and robustness checks
Tables 1.15 to 1.19 suggest that some parameters have substantial influence on the
participation in integration courses and German language proficiency levels, includ-
ing for example gender, the presence of children in the household, and humanitarian
migrants’ level of education. Following these main results, I do several heterogeneity
analyses to gain further insights. Female refugees are significantly less likely to par-
ticipate in integration courses in Germany. Figure 1.12 consequently investigates if
treatment effects differ by gender. In line with the main results, Panels a and b in
Figure 1.12 indicate that there are no gender differences in humanitarian migrants’
21The Cox regression model considers only observations with “positive” duration, i.e. observations
who started an integration course after receiving their asylum decision. This reduces the number of
observations by 10 percent. Furthermore, I loose observations who do not provide information on the
month in which they begin an integration course. The number of observations therefore drops to 971.
32
Initial residence restrictions and refugees’ language acquisition











0 12 24 36 48 60 72












0 12 24 36 48 60 72
Time to integration course in months
Control Treatment
(b) By treatment status
Note: Panels a and b in Figure 1.3 display the duration between asylum decision and the take-up of
an integration course in months for the full sample and disaggregated by treatment status. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Table 1.5: Cox regression model
(1) (2)
































Number of vacencies 1.000
0.000
Year of arrival FE No Yes
N 971 971
Note: Table 1.5 provides regression results from the survival analysis. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5; *** significant at 1%. Reference categories are as follows: male, primary education,
aged 18-24, Syrian refugee, married, and subsidiary protection. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey
of Refugees, v35.
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likelihood to begin or complete an integration course. Likewise, the figures show zero
effects. Panel c in Figure 1.12 illustrates that–in contrast to males–living in a state
that enforces the residence rule more strictly increases female humanitarian migrants’
probability to achieve intermediate German proficiency levels in the medium-run. The
effect is substantial in size and statistically significant: the probability increases by
6 percentage points, relative to a mean of 6 percent. In line with the main results,
however, I find no statistically significant differences between treatment and control
states in the long-run. Comparing households with and without children present, Fig-
ure 1.13 illustrates little differences with respect to the probability to complete an
integration course and humanitarian migrants’ ability to reach intermediate German
proficiency levels. In the long-run, I find a small effect for the probability to begin an
integration course. This may, in turn, translate into improved integration outcomes
in the future. Finally, education can be considered an essential asset in immigrants’
integration process (cf. Ichou (2014) and Spörlein and Kristen (2019a,b)). Figure 1.14
therefore investigates if estimation results differ between humanitarian migrants with
primary education (low education) and humanitarian migrants with secondary or ter-
tiary education (medium and high education). Panel b in Figure 1.14 illustrates that
while humanitarian migrants with medium and high education have a higher proba-
bility to attend integration courses, better educated humanitarian migrants who live
in a federal state that applies stricter residence rule are more likely to complete an
integration course and achieve higher German proficiency language levels. Yet, in the
long-run, none of these effects prevail.
There exists extensive literature on the importance of social networks. The effect
of existing ethnic enclaves is theoretically ambiguous though. For instance, while a
smaller network of compatriots in the location of residence may increase an immigrant’s
incentives to participate in a language course in order to learn the host country lan-
guage (Lazear 1999), immigrants may be less informed about potential course offerings
(Bertrand et al. 2000). Similar, yet opposing, arguments hold for a network of natives.
Hence, the effect of network size in humanitarian migrants’ language proficiency lev-
els are not clear a priori. Table 1.20 highlights the importance of both inter-ethnic
and intra-ethnic networks with respect to the probability to participate in integration
courses and German proficiency levels. For example, frequent contact with German
natives increases the probability to complete an integration course in the short-run
by 0.018 percentage points. The table further emphasizes that frequent contact with
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Germans is positively correlated with the probability to achieve intermediate German
proficiency levels and self-assessed German language skills. Interestingly, frequent con-
tact with compatriots is positively correlated with humanitarian migrants’ probability
to achieve intermediate German proficiency levels, too. In general, however, includ-
ing network variables does not significantly alter the main results. Furthermore, for
humanitarian migrants with frequent or irregular contact with German natives, I find
that the respective estimates consistently report null results, which leads me to the
conclusion that there is little difference across the two groups. Similar findings hold
for networks with humanitarian migrants. However, humanitarian migrants with ir-
regular contact with compatriots seem to be more successful in achieving intermediate
German proficiency levels in the medium-term and long-run.
Based on its historical background, Germany changed to a federal system after
the second world war, where individual states have great freedom in their legislative
and executive powers. Considering that city states much smaller than territorial states,
residence restrictions may be less severe. Consequently, Figure 1.17 displays estimation
results for a restricted sample without humanitarian migrants living in city states as an
additional robustness test. Throughout, the effects resemble the main specification in
Figure 1.2 to a great extent, which implies that differences between city and territorial
states do not drive estimation results.
Besides integration courses, there exist many other possibilities to participate in a
language course in Germany, for example so called ESF-BAMF courses, entry courses
for German language skills, and other language courses. While I find limited evidence
of stricter residence restrictions on participation in integration courses, humanitarian
migrants in treatment states may be more likely to select in other integration measures
and language courses. This is why, I further analyze the effect of stricter residence
restrictions on participation in any language course.22 The results are presented in
Figure 1.4. In line with the main results, I do not find an effect of strict residence
restrictions on the probability to begin (or complete) a language course in Germany
in the short-, medium-, and long-run. Thus, I conclude that treatment states did not
succeed in improving access to language courses after the residence rule was put in
place.
22Unfortunately, the SOEP changed its questionnaire content and does not provide certified lan-
guage levels for courses other than integration courses after 2016. Due to this limitation, it is impos-
sible to analyze German language proficiency levels for all language courses.
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(b) Complete a language course
Note: Panels a and b in Figure 1.4 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands
of the difference-in-differences estimator, which represents the treatment effect of strict residence
restrictions on humanitarian migrants’ participation in language courses. Source: IAB-BAMF-
SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
Cluster-robust inference is based on the assumption that the number of clusters
goes to infinity. Cameron et al. (2008, p.414, ed. notes) show that “[with] a small
number of clusters, the cluster-robust standard errors are downward biased.” To ac-
count for the limited number of clusters in the German context (G=16 states), I
follow the authors’ recommendation and apply wild cluster bootstrap as a robustness
check, which provides asymptotic refinement in a two-step procedure. First, I gener-
ate pseudo-samples of the original regression’s residuals using so called “Rademacher
weights”. Second, I reestimate the regression equation based on the generated pseudo-
samples, while keeping the vector of control variables constant. Results gained from
this estimation exercise confirm the findings provided in previous sections (Table 1.21).
In a setting of 999 replications, the wild-cluster bootstrap procedure usually returns
p-values that are slightly larger than the ones from original cluster-robust inference.
For instance, the wild-cluster bootstrap procedure returns a p-value of p = 0.72 for
the probability to complete an integration course in the medium-run (12 months after
asylum decision), compared to a p-value of p = 0.71 in the baseline estimates. Similar
findings hold for all relevant outcome variables.
Finally, to further validate the assumption that treatment and control units would
have followed similar paths in absence of the reform, I perform placebo test simulating
37
Initial residence restrictions and refugees’ language acquisition
that the reform took effect in August 2015, one year before the reform was actually
implemented. Figure 1.18 illustrates that - similar to the main results - this placebo test
yields insignificant estimates for all of the respective outcome variables. Throughout,
the coefficients are small and close to zero.
1.6 Conclusion
There is currently a controversial debate about how to integrate immigrants success-
fully into their host countries. This dispute, fueled by the increased inflow of refugees
into Europe in recent years, prompted several European countries to change their leg-
islation in order to enhance integration measures and allow for targeted integration of
immigrants into local labor markets. Similarly, Germany has introduced the so called
residence rule.
This paper uses the varying degree of the Act’s implementation across states to
analyze the causal effect of tight residence restrictions on humanitarian migrants’ lan-
guage acquisition and their participation in language courses. Despite the overall
number of integration courses increasing over time, for most outcomes, I report esti-
mates that are statistically indistinguishable from zero but are often precise enough
to bound the parameter estimated to a tight range around the point estimate. The
results are robust to several robustness checks and specifications. Thus, it appears
that the residence rule has been ineffective in reaching its goal to improve access to
integration courses and thereby improve humanitarian migrants’ language proficiency
levels and foster labor market integration. The results suggest that the misallocation
of humanitarian migrants to counties with insufficient offerings of integration courses
plays a crucial role in explaining our findings. The results are particularly important
considering that the residence rule, which has initially been introduced for a period of
three years in 2016, has recently been extended for an indefinite period of time.
Besides first-order effects on humanitarian migrants’ participation in language
courses and their language proficiency levels, the residence rule’s impact on labor
market participation and individual behavior such as job search is an important topic
for future research. Given that being employed is an important alternative to par-
ticipating in integration courses and the fact that gainful employment bypasses the
restrictions of the residence rule, there are likely to be large returns to future employ-
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ment on this topic. Respective analyses, however, require more detailed information
on the employment history of refugees in Germany. Linking the IAB-BAMF-SOEP
data with administrative data from the Federal Employment Agency offers a promising
avenue for future research.
The residence rule led to a trade-off between humanitarian migrants’ freedom of
movement and their future integration. The paper’s insights are directly relevant to
policy debates around the world. With migration increasing word wide, many coun-
tries experience similar immigration shocks and related challenges. One clear policy
implication is that the local accessibility of integration measures and language courses
should be explicitly considered in the distribution mechanisms of refugees across states
and counties. As immigrants’ language proficiency levels are inherently linked to their
prospective integration outcomes, they should have easy access to participate in lan-
guage courses directly after arrival. The results further suggest that tight (residence)
restrictions, which can also affect humanitarian migrants’ sense of well-being and, in
turn, future integration (e.g., Kao and Tienda (1995) and Leitner et al. (2019)), need
to be tailored to provide the best possible support for immigrants and refugees (World
Bank 2018) and facilitate prompt access to to employment (Edin et al. 2004; Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2018; Rosholm and Vejlin 2010).
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 The Königsstein Key and redistribution to German counties
The Königsstein Key is a distribution mechanism that allocates refugees at state level
based on the state’s tax revenue and population size to ensure a proportional dis-
tribution of refugees across German states. The respective formula incorporates tax
revenues by two thirds and population size by one third.23 In case there exist several
reception centers within the assigned state, the EASY quota system (“Erstverteilung
der Asylbegehrenden”, engl. Initial distribution of asylum seekers) chooses the recep-
tion center located nearest to the authority where the registration took place in order
to minimize commuting costs. In practice, there is only one exception: In compliance
with basic constitutional law (Art. 6 GG), state authorities intend to place parents and
minor children in the same state if family members arrive at different points of time.
Because family members generally apply for so called “family asylum”, this influences
less than 10 percent of the placement decisions.
Table 1.6 illustrates the exact allocation scheme from 2010 to 2018. Table 1.7
then compares a state’s received versus assigned percentage share of asylum seekers
(determined by the Königgstein Key) for German states from 2013 to 2018. The
table demonstrates that asylum seekers are indeed allocated to states according to the
Königsstein Key.
While the 16 German states individually determine the further distribution of asy-
lum seekers to a given county, most states use population size as the main distribution
criterion (Table 1.8). Few states decided to employ a quota, that incorporates other
measures, including for example unemployment rate or area in square meters.
One implication of the institutional setting is that, conditional on the population
size of the county, the number of asylum seekers should be orthogonal to observed and
unobserved county characteristics. While this is not directly testable, it is possible to
provide suggestive evidence on the respective hypothesis.
Table 1.9 illustrates the cross-sectional regression results using the number of asy-
lum seekers per county as the independent variable conditional on population size,
unemployment rate, the share of settlement areas, GDP per capita, and the popula-
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Table 1.6: Assigned percentage share of asylum seekers determined by the Königgstein
Key
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Baden Wurtemberg 12.8 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.0 12.9 13.0 13.0 13.0
Bavaria 15.1 15.2 15.2 15.3 15.3 15.5 15.5 15.6 15.6
Berlin 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1
Brandenburg 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
Bremen 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Hamburg 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6
Hessen 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
Lower Saxony 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.4
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
North Rhein-Westphalia 21.3 21.4 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.1 21.1 21.1
Rhineland Palatine 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
Saarland 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Saxony 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0
Saxony-Anhalt 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
Schleswig Holstein 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Thuringia 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Note: Table 1.6 lists the percentage share of refugees that is assigned to the German states
disaggregated by states and years for the period of 2010 to 2018. Figures in percent.
Source: https://www.gwk-bonn.de/themen/finanzierung-von-wissenschaft-und-forschung/
koenigsteiner-schluessel/, last downloaded on June 8, 2020.
tion’s average age. If the assumption of random assignment holds, we would expect
the coefficients on county characteristics other than population size to be statistically
insignificant from zero. The table shows that population size is a highly significant
predictor for the number of asylum seekers. The remaining variables, on the other
hand, have little predictive power and are statistically insignificant. This holds true
if we include state as well as state and year fixed effects in a longitudinal context
(Table 1.10 & Table 1.11). Hence, conditional on population size, asylum seekers are
randomly allocated across German counties.
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Table 1.9: Random assignment conditional on county population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Population size 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Unemployment
rate 11.335
∗ 12.385 12.024 20.490 69.035 51.835 27.506
(6.841) (9.005) (10.354) (18.153) (45.136) (35.736) (22.008)
Share of
settlement areas 277.719 208.298 115.237 -104.051 -428.590 -423.812 60.694
(168.553) (196.450) (226.502) (375.762) (979.726) (724.539) (438.338)
GDP per capita -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Average age 12.666 9.437 10.752 6.122 -89.096 -85.199 -18.479
(11.631) (14.811) (16.664) (28.734) (87.542) (52.098) (26.056)
r2 0.867 0.865 0.887 0.878 0.826 0.888 0.909
N 390 400 400 400 400 401 400
Note: Table 1.9 displays cross-sectional results for a test of random assignment conditional on the
county’s population size for the period 2011 - 2017. ∗p < 0.1,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Population
size corresponds to the total population in the respective county. The unemployment is the share
of all unemployment persons of the labor force. The share of settlement areas is calculated as the
are devoted to settlements and traffic over the total area of the county. The GDP per capita is total
county GDP, divided by the population of the respective county. The average age is calculated
based on the total population of the respective county. Robust standard errors clustered on the
state level are in parentheses. Source: Destatis.
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Table 1.10: Random assignment conditional on county population exploiting within
state variation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Population size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment
rate 8.033 13.127
∗ 12.737 13.627 -6.998 53.753 20.300
(6.389) (7.503) (8.492) (17.521) (59.884) (38.525) (18.190)
Share of
settlement areas 219.648
∗ 115.992 47.757 -136.384 62.762 -707.254 -50.916
(113.683) (129.748) (145.672) (296.477) (1145.283) (654.160) (348.268)
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Average age 9.402 -0.291 2.610 -9.135 -92.631 -33.896 -11.905
(7.198) (9.124) (10.014) (22.572) (95.482) (48.726) (27.088)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.955 0.955 0.960 0.937 0.853 0.917 0.929
N 390 400 400 400 400 401 400
Note: Table 1.10 displays cross-sectional results for a test of random assignment conditional on the
county’s population size for the period 2011 - 2017. Each regression includes a full set of state
indicators. ∗p < 0.1,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Population size corresponds to the total population
in the respective county. The unemployment is the share of all unemployment persons of the
labor force. The share of settlement areas is calculated as the are devoted to settlements and
traffic over the total area of the county. The GDP per capita is total county GDP, divided by the
population of the respective county. The average age is calculated based on the total population
of the respective county. Robust standard errors clustered on the state level are in parentheses.
Source: Destatis.
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Table 1.11: Random assignment conditional on county population exploiting within








Share of settlement areas -141.061
(309.559)








Note: Table 1.11 displays cross-sectional results for a test of random assignment conditional on the
county’s population size for the period 2011 - 2017. The regression includes a full set of state
and year indicators.∗p < 0.1,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Population size corresponds to the total
population in the respective county. The unemployment is the share of all unemployment persons
of the labor force. The share of settlement areas is calculated as the are devoted to settlements and
traffic over the total area of the county. The GDP per capita is total county GDP, divided by the
population of the respective county. The average age is calculated based on the total population
of the respective county. Robust standard errors clustered on the state level are in parentheses.
Source: Destatis.
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1.7.2 Tables
Table 1.12: Categories of Protection in Germany
Category Rate of Pro-
tection in %




1 Political asylum 0.70 Grundgesetz
Art. 16a
3 years Reexamination of protec-
tion grounds after 3 years;
permanent residence permit
after 5 years (Niederlas-
sungserlaubnis).
2 Geneva Refugee Convention (GFK) 20.50 GFK 1951,
§ 3 AsylG
3 years Reexamination of protec-
tion grounds after 3 years;
permanent residence permit
after 5 years (Niederlas-
sungserlaubnis).
3 Subsidiary protection status 16.30 §4 AsylG 1 year Protection status can be ex-
tended several times.
4 Foreigners with tolerated status 6.60 §60 AufenthG 1 year Deportation restriction can
be renewed several times;
still, foreigners with toler-
ated status have to leave
Germany eventually.
Rejections 55.90 If the asylum claim has been
ultimately rejected, the in-
dividual is obliged to leave
Germany.
Note: Table 1.12 describes the four different classes of protection that may be granted to a refugee in
Germany, once a decision on an asylum claim has been reached. The table also provides evidence on
the underlying legal basis, duration of residence permit, as well as some details on further procedure.
Source: Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (2017b, p.4) and
BAMF (2018, p.10).
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Table 1.13: Descriptive statistics in treated and comparison states, as of 2013
(1) (2)




Share asylum seekers 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
Average age 44.092 45.259
(1.555) (1.921)




Unemployment rate 6.151 8.370
(3.202) (2.985)
Voter turnout 71.062 71.444
(2.927) (2.462)
Share votes: CDU/CSU 0.453 0.401
(0.042) (0.029)
Share votes: SPD 0.233 0.264
(0.053) (0.065)
Share votes: Green party 0.085 0.075
(0.017) (0.021)
Share votes: FDP 0.051 0.042
(0.008) (0.013)
Share votes: Die Linke 0.061 0.110
(0.049) (0.079)
Share votes: AFD 0.044 0.051
(0.005) (0.010)
Share votes: Other parties 0.073 0.057
(0.018) (0.014)
N 213 189
Note: Table 1.13 compares descriptive statistics at county level for treatment and comparison
states. Means (standard deviations). Population size corresponds to the total population in the
respective county. Share asylum corresponds to the number of asylum seekers receiving asylum
seeker benefits devided by the county’s respective population. The unemployment rate is the
share of all unemployment persons of the labor force. The share of settlement areas is calculated
as the are devoted to settlements and traffic over the total area of the county. The GDP per
capita is total county GDP, divided by the population of the respective county. The average age
is calculated based on the total population of the respective county. Source: Destatis.
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Table 1.14: List of control variables
Variable name Description
female Female gender
children Having children in the household
edu2 Secondary education, reference category: primary education
edu3 Tertiary education, reference category: primary education
dummy_age2 Aged 25-34, reference category: aged 18-24
dummy_age3 Aged 35-44, reference category: aged 18-24
dummy_age4 Aged 45-54, reference category: aged 18-24
dummy_age5 Aged 55+, reference category: aged 18-24
family_dummy1 Single, reference category: married
family_dummy2 Divorced, reference category: married
family_dummy3 Widowed, reference category: married
stat2 Entitled to asylum, reference category: refugee status
stat6 Admission on humanitarian grounds, reference category: refugee
status
alq_year Unemployment rate at county level in given survey year
pop_year Population size at county level in given survey year
vac_year Number of vacancies at county level in given survey year
year_arr_* Year of arrival fixed effects, reference category: 2013
countrydummy* Country of origin fixed effects, reference category: Syria
dummy_bula* State fixed effects, reference category: North Rhine-Westphalia
Note: Table 1.14 provides an overview of individual and regional level covariates of humanitarian
migrants from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, which have been used throughout the
empirical analyses.
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DiD 0.040 -0.029 0.022
(0.040) (0.048) (0.037)
Post 0.079∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.020) (0.029) (0.030)
Treated -0.135∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(0.028) (0.038) (0.029)
Female -0.065∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Children -0.087∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
Secondary education 0.053∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.018) (0.019)
Tertiary education 0.089∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
Single 0.055∗∗ 0.025 -0.004
(0.025) (0.031) (0.029)
Divorced 0.042 0.025 0.041
(0.058) (0.039) (0.035)
Widowed -0.034∗ 0.007 -0.009
(0.017) (0.035) (0.043)
Afghan origin -0.008 -0.024 0.066∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.028)
Iraqi origin -0.015 -0.011 -0.005
(0.017) (0.020) (0.023)
Other origin 0.010 -0.005 0.018
(0.045) (0.056) (0.039)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.007∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Population size -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of vacencies 0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year of arrival FE Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.088 0.104 0.069
N 2707 2508 2707
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are given in parentheses. * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the probability to begin
an integration course. Reference categories are as follows: male, primary education, year of
arrival = 2013, Syrian refugee, and North-Rhine Westphalia. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey
of Refugees, v35.
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DiD 0.010 0.009 0.008
(0.015) (0.024) (0.041)
Post 0.030∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.012) (0.018) (0.023)
Treated -0.049∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.026)
Female 0.001 -0.020 -0.107∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Children -0.029∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.023)
Secondary education 0.034∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.023)
Tertiary education 0.045∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.018) (0.028)
Single 0.023 0.024 0.053∗∗
(0.017) (0.029) (0.023)
Divorced 0.017 0.042 0.066
(0.020) (0.047) (0.042)
Widowed -0.024∗ 0.026 -0.035
(0.012) (0.025) (0.039)
Afghan origin 0.006 -0.015 -0.010
(0.018) (0.025) (0.031)
Iraqi origin -0.010 -0.005 -0.015
(0.016) (0.025) (0.023)
Other origin -0.034∗ -0.039 -0.054
(0.017) (0.029) (0.034)
Unemployment rate -0.000 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Population size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of vacencies 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year of arrival FE Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.045 0.079 0.079
N 2707 2391 2707
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are given in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the probability to complete
an integration course. Reference categories are as follows: male, primary education, year of
arrival = 2013, Syrian refugee, and North-Rhine Westphalia. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey
of Refugees, v35.
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Table 1.17: Effect of strict placement restrictions on the probability to achieve inter-




DiD 0.006 0.026∗∗ -0.010
(0.013) (0.010) (0.015)
Post 0.016∗ 0.009 -0.014
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
Treated -0.051∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Female 0.005 -0.008 -0.023
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Children -0.009∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗
(0.004) (0.015) (0.019)
Secondary education 0.022∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Tertiary education 0.045∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.020) (0.025)
Single 0.033∗∗ 0.044 0.066∗∗
(0.013) (0.026) (0.030)
Divorced 0.009 0.014 0.002
(0.016) (0.020) (0.029)
Widowed -0.006 -0.004 -0.008
(0.008) (0.019) (0.022)
Afghan origin -0.013 -0.010 -0.027
(0.012) (0.022) (0.022)
Iraqi origin -0.016∗ -0.014 -0.024
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
Other origin -0.030∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.016) (0.015)
Unemployment rate -0.003∗∗ -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Population size -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of vacencies 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year of arrival FE Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.048 0.084 0.097
N 2707 2707 2707
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are given in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the probability to achieve
intermediate German language proficiency (Level B1). Reference categories are as follows: male,
primary education, year of arrival = 2013, Syrian refugee, and North-Rhine Westphalia. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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DiD -0.002 0.023 0.020
(0.031) (0.037) (0.040)
Post -0.018 -0.016 -0.026
(0.024) (0.026) (0.031)
Treated -0.226∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Female -0.044∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.021)
Children -0.030 -0.026 -0.026
(0.026) (0.016) (0.016)
Secondary education 0.213∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
Tertiary education 0.399∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.036) (0.021)
Single 0.138∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.040) (0.037)
Divorced 0.024 0.011 0.027
(0.045) (0.036) (0.036)
Widowed 0.006 0.044 0.040
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
Afghan origin -0.011 0.013 0.009
(0.044) (0.032) (0.034)
Iraqi origin -0.008 -0.028∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.017)
Other origin -0.026 -0.068∗∗ -0.072∗∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.029)
Unemployment rate -0.003 -0.005 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population size -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of vacencies 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year of arrival FE Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.210 0.205 0.224
N 2706 2706 2706
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are given in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Language proficiency levels (speaking, writing,
reading) are measured on a scale from 1 “not at all” to 5 “very well”. Outcome variable is the
probability to read (speak, write) German at least well. Reference categories are as follows: male,
primary education, year of arrival = 2013, Syrian refugee, and North-Rhine Westphalia. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Panel A - Begin an integration course
DiD 0.062 0.010 0.045
(0.042) (0.046) (0.032)
Post 0.081∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.017) (0.026) (0.022)
Treated -0.016 -0.002 -0.035
(0.024) (0.028) (0.027)
R-Squared 0.021 0.028 0.002
N 2707 2508 2707
Panel B - Complete an integration course
DiD 0.020 0.037 0.061
(0.013) (0.023) (0.045)
Post 0.015∗ 0.030∗∗ -0.013
(0.008) (0.013) (0.028)
Treated -0.018 -0.024 -0.038
(0.011) (0.017) (0.035)
R-Squared 0.004 0.007 0.002
N 2707 2391 2707
Panel C - Intermediate German proficiency levels
DiD 0.014 0.031∗ 0.011
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Post 0.006 -0.007 -0.045∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.014)
Treated -0.006 -0.021 -0.002
(0.006) (0.014) (0.022)
R-Squared 0.002 0.001 0.004
N 2707 2707 2707
(1) (2) (3)
Read Speak Write
Panel D - Self-assessed German proficiency levels
DiD 0.039 0.054 0.049
(0.024) (0.034) (0.038)
Post -0.093∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.024) (0.028)
Treated -0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.037) (0.033) (0.032)
R-Squared 0.007 0.006 0.008
N 2706 2706 2706
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are given in parentheses. * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reference categories are as follows: male,
primary education, year of arrival = 2013, Syrian refugee, and North-Rhine Westphalia. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Panel A - Begin an integration course
DiD 0.041 -0.028 0.020
(0.040) (0.048) (0.035)
Post 0.079∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.021) (0.029) (0.029)
Treated -0.134∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗
(0.029) (0.039) (0.029)
Frequent contact with Germans 0.019 -0.001 0.003
(0.015) (0.021) (0.019)
Frequent contact with compatriots 0.001 0.007 0.036∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
R-Squared 0.089 0.104 0.070
N 2699 2501 2699
Panel B - Complete an integration course
DiD 0.010 0.009 0.008
(0.015) (0.024) (0.040)
Post 0.030∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.011) (0.019) (0.022)
Treated -0.048∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.026)
Frequent contact with Germans 0.018∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.014
(0.007) (0.012) (0.016)
Frequent contact with compatriots 0.002 -0.014 0.025
(0.007) (0.013) (0.016)
R-Squared 0.046 0.080 0.080
N 2699 2384 2699
Panel C - Intermediate German proficiency levels
DiD 0.006 0.024∗ -0.012
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
Post 0.016∗ 0.009 -0.014
(0.009) (0.013) (0.017)
Treated -0.050∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Frequent contact with Germans 0.016∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
Frequent contact with compatriots 0.014∗∗∗ 0.004 0.018∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.010)
R-Squared 0.052 0.087 0.100
N 2699 2699 2699
(1) (2) (3)
Read Speak Write
Panel D - Self-assessed German proficiency levels
DiD -0.000 0.025 0.022
(0.032) (0.038) (0.041)
Post -0.018 -0.016 -0.025
(0.025) (0.027) (0.032)
Treated -0.220∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Frequent contact with Germans 0.104∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.012)
Frequent contact with compatriots -0.012 -0.011 -0.024
(0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
R-Squared 0.220 0.222 0.237
N 2699 2699 2699
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are given in parenthesis. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 1.20 includes the full set of covariates as
described in Table 1.14. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference
categories are as follows: male, primary education, year of arrival = 2013, Syrian refugee, and
North-Rhine Westphalia. Survey respondents indicate the frequency of contact with German
natives and compatriots on a scale from 1 “never” to 6 “very day”. Frequent contact is defined as
indicating a value above 3 “every week”. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Table 1.21: Inference from wild-cluster bootstrap procedure
Clustered s.e. Wild cluster bootstrap
Begin an integration course Short-run 0.33 0.54
Medium-run 0.56 0.58
Long-run 0.55 0.62
End an integration course Short-run 0.51 0.53
Medium-run 0.71 0.72
Long-run 0.85 0.86
Intermediate German proficiency levels Short-run 0.66 0.71
Medium-run 0.02 0.04
Long-run 0.49 0.51
Self-assessed German proficiency levels Read German 0.94 0.90
Speak German 0.54 0.59
Write German 0.63 0.67
Note: Table 1.21 compares p-values from cluster-robust inference with p-values from wild cluster
bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al. (2008)). Outcome variable begin an integration course describes
the probability to take-up in an integration course in the short-, medium-, and long-run. Outcome
variable complete an integration course captures the probability to end an integration course in the
short-, medium-, and long-run. Certified language proficiency levels are measured on a four point
likert scale from 0 “No certified level”, 1 “Level A1”, 2 “Level A2”, to 3 “Level B1”. Outcome variable is
the probability to achieve intermediate German language proficiency (Level B1). Language proficiency
levels (reading, writing, speaking) are measured on a five point likert scale from 1 “not very well” to 5
“very well”. Outcome variable is the probability to read (speak, write) German at least well. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
1.7.3 Figures
56
Initial residence restrictions and refugees’ language acquisition






1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Year of Application
First-Time Applications Repeated Applications
Total Applications
Note: Figure 1.5 provides the number of asylum applications in Germany from 1995 to 2018.
Source: BAMF (2019a). Own calculations.
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Note: Figure 1.6 describes the stages of the German asylum procedure schematically. Source: BAMF
2016b.
Figure 1.7: Timeline of the residence rule
12.15 01.16 02.16 07.16 08.16 09.16
post-treatment period
Note: Figure 1.7 illustrates the timing of the residence rule.
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Figure 1.8: Treatment intensity across states
















































































































Note: Figure 1.8 demonstrates which states impose stricter statutory regulations on initial place
of residence as well as the exact launch of the residence rule. Source: Bayerische Staatsregierung
(2016), Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westphalen (2016), Ministerium für Inneres, Digitalisierung und
Migration, Baden-Württemberg (2016), Ministerium für Inneres und Sport, Sachsen-Anhalt (2017),
and Staatskanzlei Saarland (2016), own illustration.
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Figure 1.9: Visualization of the results with leads and lags
Treatment effect 2015
Treatment effect 2016 pre
Treatment effect 2016 post
Treatment effect 2017
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Short-run Medium-run Long-run
(a) Begin an integration course
Treatment effect 2015
Treatment effect 2016 pre
Treatment effect 2016 post
Treatment effect 2017
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Short-run Medium-run Long-run
(b) Complete an integration course
Treatment effect 2015
Treatment effect 2016 pre
Treatment effect 2016 post
Treatment effect 2017
-.2 -.1 0 .1
Short-run Medium-run Long-run
(c) Intermediate German proficiency levels
Treatment effect 2015
Treatment effect 2016 pre
Treatment effect 2016 post
Treatment effect 2017
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Read German Speak German Write German
(d) Self-assessed German proficiency levels
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.9 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands of
the difference-in-differences estimator, which represent the effect of strict placement restrictions on
refugees’ participation in integration courses and their language proficiency levels for specification
1.2 including leads and lags. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Note: Figure 1.10 displays the empirical pdf around the introduction of the residence rule. Each bin
corresponds to one month. Each bar corresponds to the density of asylum decisions each month. The
vertical line indicates the introduction of the residence rule. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of
Refugees, v35.
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(b) Average number of integration courses completed
Note: Panels a and b in Figure 1.11 displays the average number of integration courses begun
(completed) in treatment and comparison states from 2013 to 2018. Source: Integrationskurs-
geschäftsstatistik.
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Figure 1.12: Effect of placement restrictions on participation in integration courses and
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(d) Self-assessed German proficiency levels
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.12 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands of
the difference-in-differences estimator, which represents the effect of strict placement restrictions
on refugees’ participation in integration courses and their German proficiency levels, disaggregated
by gender. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Figure 1.13: Effect of placement restrictions on participation in integration courses and
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(d) Self-assessed German proficiency levels
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.13 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands
of the difference-in-differences estimator, which represent the effect of strict placement restrictions
on refugees’ participation in integration courses and their German proficiency levels, disaggregated
by the presence of children in the household. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Figure 1.14: Effect of placement restrictions on participation in integration courses and
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(d) Self-assessed German proficiency levels
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.14 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands of
the difference-in-differences estimator, which represent the effect of strict placement restrictions on
refugees’ participation in integration courses and their German proficiency levels, disaggregated
by gender. Low education corresponds to refugees with primary education. Medium and high
education corresponds to refugees with at least secondary education. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP
Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Figure 1.15: Effect of placement restrictions on participation in integration courses and
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(d) Self-assessed German proficiency levels
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.15 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands
of the difference-in-differences estimator, which represent the effect of strict placement restrictions
on refugees’ participation in integration courses and their German proficiency levels, disaggregated
by frequency of contact to German natives. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Figure 1.16: Effect of placement restrictions on participation in integration courses and
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Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.16 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands
of the difference-in-differences estimator, which represent the effect of strict placement restrictions
on refugees’ participation in integration courses and their German proficiency levels, disaggregated
by frequency of contact with compatriots. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
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Figure 1.17: Effect of placement restrictions on participation in integration courses and
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(d) Self-assessed German proficiency levels
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.17 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands
of the difference-in-differences estimator, which represent the effect of strict placement restrictions
on refugees’ participation in integration courses and their German proficiency levels for a sample
without city states. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35.
68
Initial residence restrictions and refugees’ language acquisition
Figure 1.18: Effect of placement restrictions on participation in integration courses and
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(d) Self-assessed German proficiency levels
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 1.18 displays the interaction effects and 95 percent confidence bands
of the difference-in-differences estimator, which represent the effect of strict placement restrictions
on refugees’ participation in integration courses and their German proficiency levels for a placebo
reform simulating the reform took place om August 2015. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of
Refugees, v35.
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2 First time around: Local Conditions and
Multi-dimensional Integration of Refugees
We thank Patrick Burauel, Ralph De Haas, Katia Gallegos, Yvonne Giesing, Martin
Lange, Nadzeya Laurentsyeva, Karen Macours, Seyhun Orcan Sakalli, Katrin Sommer-
feld, and participants at the Jahrestagung Verein für Socialpolitik, the CEMIR Junior
Economist Workshop on Migration Research, and ZEW Research Seminar for their
valuable feedback.
2.1 Introduction
Refugees typically arrive in a host country with worse language skills and less locally
applicable human capital than economic migrants, and consequently are likely to start
at significantly lower levels of wages and employability (Brell et al. 2020). Therefore,
refugees are often among the most vulnerable immigrant groups, facing the steepest
barriers to economic and social integration (Martén et al. 2019). At the same time,
initial conditions at the time of arrival matter for successful integration and have been
shown to have long-lasting effects for refugees and economic migrants (Chiswick and
Miller (1999), Åslund and Rooth (2007), Barsbai et al. (2019)).
In this paper, we provide the first systematic evidence on how initial local unem-
ployment shapes the multi-dimensional integration of refugees in the context of the
European refugee crisis. We focus on refugees who arrived in Germany between 2013
and 2016 and have been subsequently interviewed in the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of
Refugees, the largest representative survey of refugees in Europe. Refugees are eligible
to enter the German labor market three months after submitting their asylum request.1
Our identification relies on the exogenous placement of refugees upon arrival across
counties and the fact that they cannot freely choose their place of residence for a pe-
riod of at least three years. This settlement policy provides an almost ideal exogenous
1See Section 2 for detailed information about the institutional setting and refugees’ access to
education and labor market.
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variation to study the causal effect of initial local conditions on refugees’ integration,
and is one of the factors that differentiates our work from previous studies.2
A further distinguishing feature of our work is the fact that we consider attitudes
towards immigrants3, which have not previously received much attention in the liter-
ature, as an important factor in shaping refugees’ integration.4 This lack of focus is
surprising since attitudes towards immigrants are being recognized as an important
driver of public policy (Facchini and Mayda 1999; Matakos et al. 2020) and recent
literature shows that immigration also increases anti-migrant sentiment and support
for far-right parties (see, for example, Otto and Steinhardt (2014), Edo et al. (2019),
Hangartner et al. (2019), and Ajzenman et al. (2020)). Moreover, we focus on multi-
dimensional (economic, linguistic, navigational, political, psychological, and social)
integration of refugees as opposed to simply economic integration. This is important
as far less attention has been devoted to non-economic outcomes, despite the fact that
they are crucial for encouraging a sense of belonging in the host country. We fill these
gaps in our paper.
Our main findings are twofold. First, we find that refugees assigned to counties
with high unemployment rates are less likely to be in employment or education and less
likely to be in full- or part-time employment. Furthermore, poor initial labor market
conditions have a strong negative impact on refugees’ net monthly earnings and the
Multi-dimensional Integration Index. Second, we find that favorable attitudes towards
immigrants positively affect refugees’ labor market outcomes and their economic and
social integration. Together, these findings help us to understand how conditions at
the time of arrival affect refugees’ integration. They also have implications for the
design of refugee allocation policies, as gains made in the first few years have long-
2An important exception is Martén et al. (2019).
3It is important to emphasize early on that local attitudes towards immigrants do not co-move
with unemployment: the correlation between the Migrant Acceptance Index and unemployment rate
is very weak (-0.19). See Section 4 for more details on the identification strategy.
4There are two related experimental studies. Bansak et al. (2016) conducted a conjoint experiment
in which voters in 15 European countries were asked to evaluate hypothetical asylum seekers that
randomly varied on nine attributes. They found that applications by asylum seekers who have better
employment potential and more credible claim for asylum are more likely to be supported, while
applications by Muslims receive lower support, ceteris paribus. In a related study, Getmansky et al.
(2020) field a conjoint survey experiment in Turkey to examine whether Turkish citizens reduce anti-
refugee attitudes if they know that Syrian refugees have made proactive effort to integrate by forging
social ties with the locals and learning the local language. They find a significant bias against Arabs
and Kurds compared to Turkomans, and against former pro-regime fighters.
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lasting effects. In terms of fiscal cost, our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest
that allocating 10,000 randomly selected working-age refugees to a county with a one
standard deviation lower unemployment rate would generate an annual saving of more
than e 2 million.
To look beyond average effects, we use a machine learning classifier algorithm (in
this case, causal forest) and investigate treatment heterogeneity. We find that our
results are driven by older people and those with secondary or tertiary education. We
also conduct several additional robustness checks and address potential concerns about
omitted variable bias (following Oster (2019)) as well as multiple hypothesis testing
(following Young (2019)).
Our paper is closely related to a handful of studies that have examined the effect of
initial conditions on refugees’ integration outcomes. Among those, two recent studies
focused on the impact of employment bans that prevent asylum seekers from entering
the local labor market upon arrival. Fasani et al. (2020a) show that exposure to a
ban at arrival reduces refugee employment probability in subsequent years by about
15 percent, an impact driven primarily by lower labor market participation. Marbach
et al. (2018) leverage a natural experiment in Germany, where a court ruling prompted
a reduction in the length of the employment ban. They find that longer employment
bans considerably slowed down the economic integration of refugees. To the best of
our knowledge, only three papers have explored the effect of local initial conditions, all
of which focused only on refugees’ economic integration. Martén et al. (2019) study
the role of ethnic networks on refugee integration by leveraging the allocation policy in
Switzerland, where some refugees are assigned to live in a specific location upon arrival
and are not permitted to relocate during the first five years. They find that refugees
assigned to locations with many co-nationals are more likely to enter the labor market.
Åslund and Rooth (2007) examine the long-term effects of labor market conditions
encountered upon arrival in Sweden on immigrant earnings and employment. They
find that early earnings assimilation depends crucially on a favorable national labor
market. Exposure to high local unemployment rates also affects individuals for a
decade. Godøy (2017) studies a subset of refugees in Norway, who are subject to a
quasi-experimental settlement policy. She finds that assigning refugees to regions with
good non-OECD immigrant labor markets increases their later labor market earnings.
We complement these studies by providing new evidence on the short-term integration
outcomes for refugees using a representative sample from Germany.
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We also contribute to the growing literature on the social integration of refugees.
Ager and Strang (2008) develop a conceptual framework that specifies ten core factors
(ranging from housing, education, and health to social connection in the community)
that affect refugee integration. Harder et al. (2018) also propose a survey-based mea-
sure that identifies six dimensions (psychological, economic, political, social, linguistic,
and navigational) of immigrant integration. In this paper, we use the definitions pro-
vided by Harder et al. (2018) and formally test how initial local conditions shape the
various integration dimensions.5
Our paper is related to the literature on the factors that affect refugees’ labor
market integration.6 Several studies (see, for example, Edin et al. (2003), Damm
(2009), and Beaman (2012)) have found that living in regions with high concentra-
tions of co-ethnic individuals can improve refugees’ labor market outcomes. Arendt
et al. (2020) analyze the impact of an expansion of language training for refugees in
Denmark. They show that, after eighteen years refugees who received more and bet-
ter language training were more likely to be in employment and had higher earnings.
Furthermore, children of refugees who received enhanced language classes were more
likely to complete lower secondary school and less likely to commit crime. Battisti et al.
(2019) conduct a field experiment to evaluate the impact of job search assistance on
the employment of recently arrived refugees in Germany. They find that personalized
job search assistance can improve labor market integration of refugees.
Finally, there is a growing body of work on how refugees’ labor market outcomes
compare to those of other migrant groups and natives in high-income host countries.
Brell et al. (2020) provide a comprehensive review of refugees’ economic integration in
several OECD countries and find that refugees have substantially lower employment
rates than other immigrants, for at least the first decade after arrival. Those refugees
who do find work also receive much lower wages than other immigrants.7 Similarly,
5Braun and Dwenger (2020) show that settlement location strongly affected the economic and
social integration of millions of Germans who were expelled from Eastern Europe into West Germany
after the Second World War, with integration proceeding worse in agrarian regions and in regions
with high inflows of migrants. Bauer et al. (2013) show that in 1971, expellees still fared worse
economically than other Germans.
6For more comprehensive review of this literature, see Strang and Ager (2010) and Becker and
Ferrara (2019).
7Bratsberg et al. (2017), Sarvimäki (2017), Schultz-Nielsen (2017), and Joyce (2019) find that per-
sistent employment gaps between refugees and economic migrants or natives remain in Scandinavian
countries. In the UK, employment and work hour gaps between asylum seekers and other migrants
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using data from 19 European countries, Fasani et al. (2020b) document that labor
market outcomes for refugees are consistently worse than those for other comparable
migrants. Using data from Germany, Brücker et al. (2020) show that 50 percent of the
refugees have a job after five years. Although the labor market integration of refugees
is making slower progress than that of economic migrants in Germany, refugees who
have arrived since 2013 fare better than previous refugee cohorts. We find that among
refugees aged 18 to 49, 54 percent of men and 17 percent of women who have been
in Germany five years are in employment or education. Refugees’ low labor force
participation constitutes a major loss both to refugees themselves and to the receiving
country. What makes it even more striking is that refugees who arrived in Germany
are positively self-selected with respect to human capital (Aksoy and Poutvaara 2019).
It is also important to highlight that we analyze the integration process of refugees
at an early stage. About 85 percent of refugees in our study have been in Germany for
three years or less at the time of the interview, with some 15 percent having stayed four
or five years. This means that current employment rates are lower than those expected
in a few years’ time. Yet, having information on the short-term integration outcomes
provides important insights on how well or poorly the integration process is progressing.
From the policy perspective, obtaining such early insights is more valuable than waiting
until the integration process has run its course in order to help the large number of
refugees who have arrived in Germany in the meantime. Furthermore, comparing early
outcomes for men and women, for refugees from various origin countries, and refugees
with differing levels of education provides valuable insights on which groups face the
most severe challenges. Finally, our results can be informative for designing integration
policies for other refugee-hosting countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides information
on institutional background and exogenous placement of refugees. Section 3 provides
details on the data sources and descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the empirical
strategy. Section 5 presents the results, after which Section 6 concludes.
take more than 25 years of residence in the country to close, but earnings and salary gaps persist
(Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2018).
74
Local conditions and multi-dimensional integration of refugees
2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Refugee settlement policy and exogenous placement
The distribution of refugees across Germany follows an established process including
a pre-defined allocation scheme, the Königstein Key. Each refugee is registered upon
arrival and subsequently assigned to an initial reception center in one of Germany’s
16 federal states, where the refugee may formally apply for political asylum.8
The Königstein Key determines what share of asylum seekers is received by each
state based on the states’ tax revenues (accounting for 2/3 of the quota) and population
sizes (accounting for 1/3 of the quota), which are calculated on an annual basis.9
This mechanism ensures a proportional distribution of asylum seekers across states.
Appendix Table 2.9 illustrates the states’ received versus assigned share of asylum
seekers based on the Königstein Key between 2013 and 2018. The reported shares
suggest that the distribution of asylum seekers has been mostly in line with the quotas
(i.e., Königstein Key). Small deviations from the quota can be explained by the fact
that the distribution of applicants takes into account additional criteria (such as health-
care related reasons and family reunification).
Since many refugees are likely to stay in Germany for a long time, the federal gov-
ernment passed the Integration Act in July 2016. This law severely restricts refugees’
ability to choose their place of residence. Unless legal exemption criteria apply, refugees
with a temporary or permanent residence permit are obliged to stay in their initial
county of residence for at least three years.10 Therefore, mobility across counties
8Asylum seekers can be accommodated in reception facilities for up to six months, or until their
application is decided on. They can, however, also be allocated to another facility during this period
under certain circumstances, for instance for family reunification.
9In case there are several reception centers within the assigned state, the EASY (Initial Distribu-
tion of Asylum Seekers) quota system chooses the reception center located nearest to the authority
where the registration took place in order to minimize commuting costs. Within each state, asylum
seekers are allocated to a particular municipality, usually the place of the initial reception center
at first and possibly another municipality when the obligation to live in the initial reception center
ends. For further information, please see https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/
germany/overview-legal-framework, last accessed on November 24, 2020.
10Exemptions apply, for instance, if the refugee or a close relative (spouse, domestic partner, or
child) attends university/vocational training or has taken up employment with a certain number of
working hours. For further information, see the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection,
2016, Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) Section 12a, Art. 1. Considering that the vast majority of
refugees are still not in employment or education (Table 2.2), residence restrictions are still widely
common for refugees in Germany.
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is severely restricted for the vast majority of refugees in Germany. This minimizes
concerns related to the endogenous residential sorting of refugees when analyzing the
effects of initial local conditions. The settlement policy also addresses two important
potential sources of bias: (i) it is mandatory for states and counties to participate
in the allocation program; (ii) it is also mandatory for refugees to participate in the
allocation program.
All three features (exogenous allocation, mobility restriction, and mandatory par-
ticipation) of the settlement policy are crucial for our identification strategy as they
generate a random allocation of refugees to counties. In other words, we rely on a
quasi-natural experiment of exogenous allocation of refugees to identify the causal
effect of initial local conditions on their multi-dimensional integration outcomes.
2.2.2 Access to Education and the Labor Market
Schooling is compulsory for all children in Germany and children’s right to education
is protected by the United Nations (Massumi et al. 2015). This implies that children
who have arrived in Germany as asylum seekers have to attend school after three
to six months, irrespective of their type of residence permit. Adult refugees’ right to
education, on the other hand, is expressed in the Geneva Refugee Convention, whereby
refugees should be treated as favorably as possible, and in any event, not less favorably
than foreigners in the same circumstances.11
Refugees’ access to the German labor market has been greatly facilitated in recent
years (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration 2017a).
In 2014, the employment ban for asylum seekers was reduced from nine to three months,
so that asylum seekers are generally eligible to enter the German labor market three
months after submitting their asylum request.12 This excludes asylum seekers from
Germany’s list of “safe countries” (that is, all EU member states, Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Ghana, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Senegal, and Serbia),
who are very unlikely to be granted a permanent residence permit. The “priority
11See UNHCR, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, Article 22 (1951)
(available online).
12The period is extended to six months for asylum seekers with minor children and nine
months for asylum seekers who are required to live in an initial reception center (https:
//www.bmas.de/DE/Themen/Arbeitsmarkt/Infos-fuer-Asylsuchende/arbeitsmarktzugang-
asylbewerber-geduldete.html), last accessed 09.09.2020.
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check” also has been abolished. With the “priority check” in place, asylum seekers in
Germany could take up employment only if the Federal Employment Agency concluded
that there was no German or EU citizen who would be available for that specific job.
Refugees with a permanent residence permit have unrestricted access to the German
labor market.
2.2.3 Cross-state Variation in Germany
Germany adopted a federal system after the Second World War and individual states
have legislative and executive powers in many important policy areas, including ed-
ucation. This causes large variations in policies across German states. Furthermore,
states differ in their demographic and industrial structure and in their income levels.
The differences are especially pronounced between eastern and western German states,
still reflecting differences from before the German reunification in 1989. On average,
eastern German states are less densely populated, their populations tend to be older,
and they have lower per capita income.
These structural differences may go together with variations in preferences and
values. To compare differences in attitudes and values across German states, we rely
on information from the European Social Survey (ESS), a cross-sectional, nationally
representative attitudinal survey.
Table 2.1 provides descriptive evidence on preferences and values for Germany as
a whole (column 1), western German states (column 2), and eastern German states
(column 3). The table illustrates the large cross-state variation in attitudes towards
migrants, trust, and various satisfaction measures: people in western German states are
more likely to be in favor of immigration, more likely to trust people and institutions,
and more likely to be satisfied with life. Overall, we make sure that our empirical
strategy accounts for systemic differences across states.
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Table 2.1: Attitudinal differences across Germany
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample West Germany East Germany
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Allow immigration from ethnic majority 0.285 0.385 0.096
(0.887) (0.812) (0.986)
Allow immigration from ethnic minority 0.271 0.397 0.033
(0.942) (0.888) (0.994)
Allow immigration from poorer countries 0.143 0.265 -0.089
(0.992) (0.953) (1.022)
Immigrants put more in than they take out 0.246 0.352 0.042
(0.966) (0.894) (1.063)
Immigrants do not worsen crime problems 0.163 0.233 0.028
(0.977) (0.915) (1.073)
Immigration good for cultural life 0.094 0.176 -0.062
(0.982) (0.929) (1.060)
Immigrants make Germany a better place to live 0.143 0.241 -0.043
(1.013) (0.940) (1.116)
Immigration good for economy 0.179 0.269 0.008
(0.966) (0.919) (1.029)
Trust in people 0.081 0.153 -0.056
(0.949) (0.912) (1.002)
Trust in legal system 0.016 0.142 -0.223
(1.007) (0.955) (1.059)
Trust in politicians 0.122 0.213 -0.051
(1.003) (0.966) (1.049)
Trust in parties 0.132 0.222 -0.039
(1.000) (0.972) (1.029)
Trust in European Parliament -0.097 -0.017 -0.251
(1.029) (1.009) (1.050)
Satisfaction with life 0.133 0.237 -0.065
(0.929) (0.873) (0.998)
Satisfaction with economy 0.474 0.563 0.305
(0.840) (0.802) (0.884)
Satisfaction with government 0.384 0.496 0.171
(0.954) (0.899) (1.017)
Satisfaction with democracy 0.150 0.324 -0.182
(0.978) (0.915) (1.006)
N 3045 1993 1052
Note: Means (standard deviations). Berlin is assigned to Eastern Germany. Questions in favor of
immigration (the first three questions in the table above) are measured on a 4-point likert scale
from 1 “Allow many” to 4 “Allow few”. Preferences on immigration are measured on an 11-point
likert scale from 0 “bad” to 10 “good”. Questions on trust are measured on an 11-point likert scale
from 0 “you can’t be to careful” to 10 “most people can be trusted”. Questions on satisfaction are
measured on an 11-point likert scale from 0 “extremely dissatisfied” to 10 “extremely satisfied”. For
consistency reasons, the scale is reversed in “allow immigration” questions, so that higher values
indicate more favorable attitudes towards immigrants. All variables are standardized with mean
zero and standard deviation one. Source: European Social Survey (2014).
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees
We obtain information on refugees’ demographic characteristics and labor market out-
comes in Germany from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees (the Survey), an
annual survey focusing on migrants who are seeking protection from political persecu-
tion, war, and conflicts (Brücker et al. (2016) and DIW (2017)). The Survey is collected
as part of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, see Goebel et al. (2019)) and has
been carried out on an annual basis since 2016. It is representative of the nationali-
ties and demographic characteristics of refugees who arrived in Germany from 2013 to
2016. The surveys are conducted in different languages and gather information from
refugees aged 18 and older.
The Survey provides information on refugees’ location of residence histories, socio-
demographic characteristics and integration outcomes in Germany. The first wave,
conducted in 2016, covers 4,465 adult refugees in Germany. The add-on samples added
2,965 observations in the subsequent survey years. The total sample covers 7,430 adult
refugees, who have been part of the Survey at least once. We use the latest survey
wave available (that is, v35, 2018) and pool information on all three waves.13
The Survey is well-suited for our identification strategy as it provides information
on refugees’ residency at the time of interview and their initial place of residence.14
This information allows us to exploit the exogenous assignment of refugees across
German counties. In particular, we define our estimation sample as follows: (i) we
drop respondents who do not provide information on their county of first residence;
(ii) we then further limit the sample to refugees whose initial interview was during
their first two years of residence in Germany. By doing so, we ensure that our sample
only includes refugees who are exogenously allocated to counties and have not sorted
themselves into another county for socio-economic reasons (see Section 2.2.1); (iii) we
13Two thirds of the sample were interviewed in 2018 (62 percent). 22 percent of the refugees were
last interviewed in 2017 and the remainder of refugees provided information only in the first survey
wave in 2016.
14In their first SOEP interview, refugees are asked: “Now, please think of the accommodation
in which you were housed the longest in Germany before your current accommodation. Where was
this accommodation?” While information on the longest place of residence in the first interview
should coincide with refugees’ first place of residence in most cases, measurement error increases with
numbers of years in Germany. To circumvent this limitation, we limit the sample to refugees who
gave their first SOEP interview in the first two years of residence in Germany.
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focus on young adults aged 18 to 49 (making up 91 percent of the refugee population)
since this age group is much more likely be active in terms of participation in the
workforce or being in education. In our final sample, we study about 3,000 refugees
aged 18 to 49 who have spent at least two years in Germany.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the distribution of refugees across the 401 German coun-
ties, for all refugees and refugees from main source countries, based on the Survey
and administrative data from Destatis, respectively. As the number of refugees per
state increases with tax revenues and population size, it is not surprising that western
German states receive, on average, higher shares of refugees (Figure 2.3). A compari-
son with Figure 2.4 shows that these are the states with lower levels of unemployment.
Yet, the figures emphasize that all German states have received refugees from the main
source countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Furthermore, these figures illustrate
that the SOEP successfully sampled refugees throughout Germany and that refugees’
allocation resembles administrative numbers to a great extent. There are 38 NUTS-2
sub-regions and 401 counties (also known as districts) in Germany. Our representative
sample consists of refugees from 259 German counties (about two-thirds of German
counties). On average, we observe 60 refugees per county and the median equals 40
refugees.
2.3.2 Multi-dimensional Integration Index
We broadly follow the framework outlined in Harder et al. (2018) to build a Multi-
dimensional Integration Index. In particular, Harder et al. (2018) identify six crucial
dimensions of integration: psychological, economic, political, social, linguistic, and
navigational. The index aims to measure the degree to which immigrants have the
knowledge and capacity to build a successful life in the host society and has two main
components: (i) knowledge, which includes factors such as proficiency in the host
country’s language and ability to navigate the host country’s labor market, political
system, and social institutions; and (ii) capacity, which refers to the mental, social,
and economic resources immigrants have to invest in their futures.15
Based on the questions and definitions proposed in Harder et al. (2018), we con-
struct a Multi-dimensional Integration Index, which consists of 12 survey questions
scaled from 1 to 5. The final index scores are calculated at the individual record level
15See Harder et al. (2018) for a greater detail of the methodology.
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by taking the sum of responses and diving it by 12. We then rescale it to range from
0 to 1, with higher values indicating better integration.
In addition, we calculate six sub-indices for each dimension of integration. The
respective dimensions are constructed using the following survey items:
1. Psychological integration (aims to capture respondents’ feeling of connection with
the host country): do you feel welcome in Germany? (1 not at all, 5 totally);
how often do you feel like an outsider? (1 very often, 5 never);
2. Economic dimension (aims to capture respondents’ economic activity in the host
country): what were your gross net earnings last month? (1 lowest quintile, 5
highest quintile); information on work status (1 unemployed, 3 in education or
training, 5 in paid work);
3. Political integration (aims to capture understanding of the political issues in the
host country): do you think the following things should happen in a democracy
or not? The people choose their government in free elections (1 should defi-
nitely not happen, 5 should definitely happen); civil rights protect the people
from government oppression (1 should definitely not happen, 5 should definitely
happen);
4. Social integration (aims to capture social ties and interactions with natives and
non-natives in the host country): how often do you spend time with German
people (1 never, 5 every day); how often do you spend time with people from
other countries (1 never, 5 every day);
5. Linguistic integration (aims to capture respondents’ assessment of their ability
to read and speak the language of their host country): how well can you speak
German (1 not at all, 5 very well); how well can you read German (1 not at all,
5 very well);
6. Navigational integration (aims to capture respondents’ ability to manage basic
needs in the host country): have you received help to look for employment (1 no,
5 yes); did you receive help to look for health care (1 no, 5 yes);
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2.3.3 County level variables
Administrative data on additional county-level characteristics come from the German
Federal Statistical Office (Destatis). We use the share of foreigners of Syrian origin,
Afghan origin, and Iraqi origin in refugees’ county of residence (as a proxy for pre-
existing migrant networks) at the county level from 2014–before refugees started arriv-
ing in large numbers in Germany. We use two-year lagged county-level unemployment
rate as a proxy for local economic conditions.
Figure 2.4 illustrates unemployment patterns among counties. A couple of patterns
emerge: (i) unemployment rate varies substantially across counties; (ii) unemployment
rates tend to be higher in eastern Germany, and generally lower in Baden-Wurttemberg
and Bavaria.
2.3.4 Migrant Acceptance Index from European Social Survey
We use European Social Surveys (ESS) conducted in Germany in 2014 to construct our
Migrant Acceptance Index (MAI). The ESS sample includes roughly 3,000 respondents
aged 18 and older from all 16 states.
The index variables we use come from questions asked to all ESS respondents in
an ad-hoc migration module: (i) to what extent do you think Germany should allow
people of the same race or ethnic group as most German people to come and live
here?; (ii) how about people of a different race or ethnic group from most German
people?; (iii) how about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?; (iv) would
you say that Germany’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people
coming to live here from other countries?; (v) is Germany made a worse or a better
place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?; (vi) would you say
it is generally bad or good for Germany’s economy that people come to live here from
other countries?; (vii) are Germany’s crime problems made worse or better by people
coming to live here from other countries?; (viii) do you think people who come here
take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out? For questions (i),
(ii) and (iii), responses were coded on a 4-point scale, ranging from “allow many to
come and live here” to “allow none”. For questions (iv) to (viii), responses were coded
on a 11-point scale, ranging from 0 “negative attitudes towards immigrants” to 10
“positive attitudes towards immigrants”. Using principle component analysis (PCA),
we construct the MAI, in which the higher index score reflects more favorable attitudes
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toward immigration. The MAI is standardized (with mean zero and standard deviation
one) and ranges from -1 to 1. Higher values indicate more positive attitudes toward
migrants. Figure 2.5 plots the eigenvalues of principal components used in the PCA.
Figure 2.1 provides a visual summary of the index at the state level. Attitudes
towards migrants are most favorable (that is, the MAI is highest), in the three city
states (Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg) and in the northernmost state Schleswig Hol-
stein, followed by other western German states. The index has lowest values in the
former East Germany, outside of Berlin. The Migrant Acceptance Index is therefore
in line with recent media coverage, which suggests that attitudes towards immigrants
are less favorable in eastern Germany.16 Furthermore, several studies have shown that
migrants and refugees are more likely to experience xenophobic violence in eastern
German states (Entorf and Lange 2019; Falk et al. 2011; Graeber and Schikora 2020;
Krueger and Pischke 1997). Throughout the analysis, we include the MAI as one of
our main variables of interest as attitudes towards refugees in their initial place of
residence are likely to affect their integration outcomes.
Evidence that the Migrant Acceptance Index conveys meaningful information
An issue that is key to the interpretation is whether our Migrant Acceptance
Index conveys meaningful information. To provide evidence on this, we check the
correlation between the MAI and four alternative measures: (i) the Gallup Diversity
Index (see Section 2.3.5); (ii) the share of respondents who reported some worries
about immigration in 2014;17 (iii) the share of respondents who reported big worries
about immigration in 2014; and (iv) the vote share of the right-wing populist party
“Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)” in the federal elections in 2013.
We present this evidence in Figure 2.6, which confirms that the alternative mea-
sures we identify are strongly associated with the MAI and with the expected pairwise
comparisons. For example, we find that the correlation between our MAI and Gallup
16For instance, see https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-east-west-germany-refugees-
20180917-story.html or https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/xenophobia-in-
eastern-germany-a-legacy-from-the-past-a-1115163.html, last downloaded on 16.09.2020.
17Information on worries about immigration come from the SOEP, where respondents are asked
on worries about immigration each year. The question states “How is it with the following topic–
immigration to Germany–do you have worries about that?” [1 “Big worries”, 2 “Some worries”, 3 “No
worries”]. Following Poutvaara and Steinhardt (2018), we restrict the sample to German natives aged
18-64. We define an indicator “big worries” equals 1 if respondents state to have big worries, zero
otherwise. The indicator “some worries” takes a value of 1 if respondents state to have at least some
worries about immigration, zero otherwise.
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Note: Figure 2.1 plots the Migrant Acceptance Index at state level. Source: European Social Survey
(2014). Abbreviations are as follows: SH – Schleswig Holstein; HH – Hamburg; NS - Lower Saxony;
HB – Bremen; NW – North Rhine-Westphalia; HE – Hessen; RP – Rhineland Palatine ; BW –
Baden Wurttemberg; BY – Bavaria; SL – Saarland; BE – Berlin; BB – Brandenburg; MV –
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania; SN – Saxony; SA – Saxony Anhalt; TH – Thuringia.
Diversity Index (some worries about immigration) is 0.79 (0.78). The raw correlation
between MAI and AfD vote is 0.53. Overall, these patterns suggest that the Migrant
Acceptance Index is strongly associated with other measures and the index is very
likely to capture the meaningful differences in migrant attitudes.
2.3.5 Diversity Index from Gallup World Polls
We also use readily available “Diversity Index” from Gallup World Polls to check the
robustness of our Migrant Acceptance Index. The Diversity Index measures a commu-
nity’s acceptance of people from different racial, ethnic, or cultural groups. We again
use data from 2014 at the state level.
The index is constructed using the following questions: (i) is the city or area where
you live a good place or not a good place to live for racial and ethnic minorities?; (ii)
is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place to live for gay or
lesbian people?; (iii) is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place
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to live for immigrants from other countries?; (iv) is the city or area where you live a
good place or not a good place to live for people with intellectual disabilities?
Index scores are calculated at the individual record level. For each individual
record the following procedure applies: The four items are recoded so that positive
answers are scored as a “1” and all other answers (including don’t know and refused)
are assigned a score of “0”. If a record has no answer for an item then that item is not
eligible for inclusion in the calculations. An individual record has an index calculated
if it has valid scores for at least three items. A record’s final index score is the mean
of valid items multiplied by 100. To ensure comparability, we again standardize the
index (with mean zero and standard deviation one) and it ranges from -1 to 1. Higher
values indicate more positive attitudes. Similar to the Migrant Acceptance Index,
Figure 2.7 indicates that the Diversity Index is more favorable in western Germany
and Germany’s city states.
2.3.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for our working sample from the IAB-BAMF-
SOEP Survey of Refugees. For the full sample, we find that a majority of survey
respondents are male (about 60 percent). On average, they have been in Germany
for about 2.7 years. In terms of human capital, nearly 12 (48) percent of refugees
have tertiary (secondary) education as their highest level of education. When it comes
to language skills, respondents are asked to assess their German proficiency (reading,
writing, and speaking) on a 5-point likert scale from 1 “not at all” to 5 “very good”. We
find that refugees’ average language skill score is about 3. As expected, Syrians (about
50 percent), Afghanis (about 13 percent), and Iraqis (about 14 percent) are the most
common nationalities we have in our sample. This is also in line with a recent report
from the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF 2017b), which reports these
to be the main origin countries in 2016, and, hence, suggests good representativeness
of our sample in terms of nationalities.18
Table 2.10 presents refugees’ main activities separately for both genders, and for
men and women separately by the number of years since arrival. Similar to Brücker
et al. (2020) and Brell et al. (2020), we find that the percentage of refugees not being
18For 2016, the BAMF reports Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq to be the main origin countries with
37, 17, and 13 percent respectively.
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in employment or training decreases with years of residence in Germany and that after
three years of residence in Germany roughly 30 percent of refugees are employed.19
There are also major gender differences: less than 7 percent of women are employed
full- or part-time, while 28 percent of men are. While men and women are about equally
likely to go to school or university, the share of women taking part in vocational training
or apprenticeship is much lower than among men. Irrespective of the duration of stay
in Germany, the share of women who are employed or in education or training is
considerably lower than among men. While the share of those employed and the share
of those studying or participating in vocational training increase over time, a majority
of female refugees remains unemployed even after five years in Germany. Part of this
gender gap is related to the presence of children: 72 of female refugees report to have
a minor child in the household, in contrast to 43 percent of male refugees. However,
Table 2.11 shows that major gender differences remain even if attention is restricted
to singles without children.
Analyzing the main activities for different age groups demonstrates that a consid-
erable number of respondents in their early adulthood are studying (about 13 percent
attend school, university or vocational training–see Appendix Table 2.12). For refugees
younger than 50, the probability of not being in employment or education decreases
with residence duration in Germany. Refugees aged 25-49 are most likely to be em-
ployed full- or part-time. Older refugees struggle to participate in local labor markets:
73 percent of refugees aged 50+ are not in employment or education and even after
4 years of residence in Germany their labor market participation remains low. Only
about 20 percent are employed full- or part-time.
19These numbers further correspond to administrative records from August 2018, which show that
three years after the refugee influx into Germany 28 percent of people from countries at war (including
Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria) are employed.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Males Females
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Female gender 0.387 0.000 1.000
(0.487) (0.000) (0.000)
Age in years 32.163 31.879 32.614
(8.269) (8.371) (8.087)
Married 0.638 0.562 0.758
(0.481) (0.496) (0.428)
Children in household 0.541 0.429 0.719
(0.498) (0.495) (0.450)
Years of schooling 8.497 8.750 8.096
(4.387) (4.228) (4.601)
Secondary education 0.477 0.494 0.450
(0.500) (0.500) (0.498)
Tertiary education 0.121 0.120 0.122
(0.326) (0.325) (0.328)
Worked in home country 0.656 0.838 0.368
(0.475) (0.369) (0.483)
Average language skills 3.105 3.268 2.848
(0.965) (0.926) (0.970)
Years since arrival 2.681 2.730 2.604
(0.719) (0.718) (0.713)
In education or employment 0.277 0.380 0.114
(0.448) (0.485) (0.318)
Syrian 0.525 0.519 0.535
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499)
Afghan 0.130 0.128 0.133
(0.336) (0.334) (0.339)
Iraqi 0.136 0.138 0.134
(0.343) (0.345) (0.341)
N 3524 2159 1365
Note: Means (standard deviations). Secondary education refers to 9 to 15 years of education
and tertiary education refers to completed four years of education beyond “secondary education”.
Average German language proficiency levels (speaking, writing, reading) are measured on a scale
from 1 “not at all” to 5 “very good”. Years since arrival is defined as the difference between
year of the interview and year of arrival. Being in employment or education is equal to one for
IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey respondents in employment or education. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP
Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018).
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
We estimate linear probability models for the dichotomous outcomes for ease of inter-
pretation, though logistic regression models returned similar patterns. For continuous
outcomes, we rely on ordinary least squared estimations (OLS). Our models take the
form:
Yict = β1UEc,t−2 + β2MAIs0,2014 +γXit + δXct + ηt + ζnuts2 + εict, (2.1)
where Yict is the integration outcome of refugee i in county c and interview year t.
We use several measures for refugees’ social and economic integration in Germany: (i)
being in employment or education; (ii) being in full- or part-time employment; (iii) the
net monthly wages; and (iv) the Multi-dimensional Integration Index. Since the wage
variable has a few outliers and substantial number of zeros, the natural logarithm is
an unsuitable transformation. We, therefore, follow common practice and apply the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (see, Bellemare and Wichman (2020) and Aksoy
et al. (2020)).
Following Åslund and Rooth (2007), the variable UEc,t−2 measures the county-
level unemployment rate in year t-2 (t being the year of the interview) in the initial
county of residence to address endogeneity of unemployment in response to mass mi-
gration. MAIs0,2014 is the Migrant Acceptance Index in the refugee’s initial state of
residence, measured in 2014.20 To be able to compare the point estimates, we report
the standardized coefficients throughout the paper. Importantly, raw correlation be-
tween initial unemployment rate and the Migrant Acceptance Index is very low (-0.19),
suggesting that attitudes do not co-move with unemployment. This enables us to es-
timate the impact of local unemployment on refugee integration, holding attitudes
constant and vice versa.
In all models, we include year of interview dummies (to capture the impact of
county-level shocks that affect all counties simultaneously) and NUTS-2 sub-region
dummies (to control for time-invariant variation in the outcome variables caused by
20Due to data limitations we can only construct the Migrant Acceptance Index at the state level
instead of county-level. While there may be some within-state variation in attitudes towards migrants,
it is worth noting that cross-state differences in attitudes are much larger in the context of Germany.
In robustness section, we also use alternative measures (that is, the AfD vote share in 2013 and
the share of respondents who reported some or big worries about immigration in 2014) to capture
attitudes towards migrants at the county level and find qualitatively similar results.
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factors that vary across sub-regions).21 In the robustness section, we also show that our
results do not change qualitatively when we include NUTS-2*year fixed effects, which
control for all potentially omitted variables that can vary across NUTS-2 regions and
years.
Xit is a vector of demographic variables that includes: a dummy variable for female
gender; a dummy variable for the presence of children in the household (any child aged
15 or below); a dummy for the German language skills before migration;22 a dummy
variable for having received help in finding employment; a dummy variable for having
received support from family or friends before migration; age group dummies (25-29, 30-
34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49); education dummies (secondary education, tertiary education);
country of origin dummies (Afghan origin, Iraqi origin, other origin); dummy variables
for years of residence in Germany (three years of residence, four years of residence); a
dummy variable indicating residence in western Germany. Xct is a vector of county-
level control variables that includes: the share of Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis in the
county of residence in 2014–these covariates control for the existing migrant networks.
We cluster robust standard errors, εict, at the level of county to account for the
potential correlation existing in the errors within the same county. Our results remain
virtually the same, when standard errors are calculated using corrections for spatial
correlation (Conley 1999)23 and clustered at the state level.24
Identification assumption
Our identification strategy exploits the German refugee settlement policy as a
quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal effect of local conditions (in terms of
economic conditions and attitudes towards immigrants) on refugees’ socio-economic
integration. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the exogenous allocation of refugees across
counties addresses the bias from endogenous sorting due to growing demand for labor
21We cannot include county-fixed effects since county-level unemployment rates are strongly corre-
lated over time and migration across counties is restricted. Regressions with county-level unemploy-
ment rates thereby underestimate the effect of initial unemployment. Instead, we include NUTS-2
sub-region fixed effects throughout.
22The respective survey question asks: How well could you speak German before you moved to
Germany? [Not at all; Poorly; Fairly; Good; Very good]. The dummy variable takes a value of one
for refugees with at least “good” German skills and zero otherwise.
23In particular, we use statistical package, acreg, provided by Colella et al. (2019). The cut-off
window we use is 100 km, but the results are virtually unchanged for 75 km, 125 km, and 150 km–the
results with alternative distance cut-offs are not reported here but available upon request.
24These results are reported in Appendix.
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(Card 1990) or pre-existing ethnic enclaves (Edin et al. 2003). Our key identifying
assumption is that the allocation of refugees is independent of county-level unemploy-
ment rates and state-level migrant attitudes in Germany in the year of arrival.
To further validate this argument, we provide an indirect test following Barsbai
et al. (2019). If the distribution of refugees is indeed exogenous to local conditions, un-
employment rates and state-level attitudes towards migrants should be uncorrelated
with refugees’ individual-level characteristics. Table 2.3 shows the results, whereby
column (1) and (2) restrict the sample to refugees who were interviewed in the first
two years after arrival and column (3) and (4) use the full sample. In line with our
identification assumption, for the sample of recent arrivals, none of the estimates is
statistically significant. For the full sample, we find a small positive correlation of
female gender with the Migrant Acceptance Index, but the effect is far from being eco-
nomically significant. Overall, the results presented in Table 2.3 support our argument
that the allocation of refugees is an exogenous process.
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Table 2.3: Evidence on the validity of identification assumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First two years First two years Full sample Full sample
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Panel A - State-level Unemployment rate
Age at migration 0.008 0.000 0.009∗∗ 0.000
(0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Female -0.054 -0.002 0.039 0.003
(0.082) (0.006) (0.072) (0.004)
Secondary education -0.037 0.001 0.054 0.004
(0.079) (0.005) (0.081) (0.004)
Tertiary education 0.017 0.007 0.227∗∗ 0.009
(0.161) (0.012) (0.105) (0.006)
State FE No Yes No Yes
Year of arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.020 0.995 0.016 0.995
N 2963 2963 6859 6859
Panel B - County-level Unemployment rate
Age at migration 0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.002
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Female -0.070 0.001 -0.006 -0.032
(0.113) (0.070) (0.095) (0.064)
Secondary education -0.008 0.029 0.144 0.073
(0.089) (0.072) (0.107) (0.072)
Tertiary education 0.062 0.072 0.188 -0.006
(0.190) (0.121) (0.154) (0.113)
State FE No Yes No Yes
Year of arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.014 0.505 0.012 0.480
N 2641 2641 6182 6182
Panel C - Migrant Acceptance Index
Age at migration 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Female 0.006 0.006 0.023∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004)
Secondary education 0.029 -0.004 0.035∗∗ -0.007
(0.022) (0.009) (0.014) (0.005)
Tertiary education -0.005 -0.010 0.007 -0.017
(0.028) (0.009) (0.021) (0.012)
State FE No Yes No Yes
Year of arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.023 0.847 0.017 0.799
N 2963 2963 6859 6859
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors
are clustered on the state and year of arrival level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool
observations from survey years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information.
Reference category is primary education. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35
(2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).91
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2.5 Results
In this section, we start by analyzing how local labor market conditions and attitudes
towards immigrants at the time of arrival affect refugees’ multi-dimensional integration
outcomes. We then investigate the heterogeneity using causal forest methodology and
present robustness checks.
2.5.1 Multi-dimensional Integration Outcomes
We first examine the effects of local conditions at the time of arrival (that is, un-
employment rate and attitudes towards immigrants) on the probability of being in
employment or education (Column 1 of Table 2.4); being in full- or part-time em-
ployment (Column 2 of Table 2.4); net monthly wages (Column 3 of Table 2.4); and
Multi-dimensional Integration Index (Column 4 of Table 2.4). We present results for
refugees aged 18 to 49 in the year of the interview and, as noted above, the sample is
restricted to those with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany.
Table 2.4 shows that both the county-level unemployment rate in year t-2 (t being
the year of the interview) and MAI play a major role: one standard deviation (0.98)
increase in county-level unemployment rate leads to a -4.3 (-4.2) percentage points
change in the likelihood of being in employment or education (full- or part-time em-
ployment). The point estimates on MAI (that is, more favorable attitudes towards
migrants) suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the Migrant Acceptance
Index leads to a 5.0 (4.7) percentage points increase in the likelihood of being in
employment or education (full- or part-time employment).
We also find that both unemployment rate and MAI have statistically significant
effects on net monthly wages–with effects going in opposite directions (as expected)
and the effect of unemployment being about twice as large as the effect of the MAI.
In Column 4, we find that more favorable attitudes towards migrants positively affect
their multi-dimensional integration, while unemployment has the opposite effect. The
magnitude of the standardized coefficients suggests that attitudes towards migrants
are as important as the local unemployment rate when it comes to multi-dimensional
integration of refugees.25
25Since help finding a job is part of the navigational index, hence, part of the Multi-dimensional
Integration Index, we don’t control for it in Column 4.
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Looking at other covariates, we find that those who received help to find a job,
those with tertiary education and those with satisfactory health status consistently
exhibit better integration outcomes.
2.5.2 Fiscal Implications of our Results
Refugees with a valid residence status who are not in employment or education are
entitled to the same social benefits as natives in Germany.26 Since few refugees have
been employed for a period of 12 months, this means that refugees who are unem-
ployed receive on average e 400 of monthly unemployment benefits II (“Hartz IV”),
corresponding to e 4800 per year. This is an underestimate of the actual cost to the
state of refugees’ unemployment, as it excludes government spending on housing and
health care, social benefits, as well as lost tax revenues.
Our estimations suggest that placing a working-age refugee aged 25 to 49 in a
county with a one standard deviation lower county-level unemployment rate increases
the probability of them being in full- or part-time employment after two years by
4.2 percentage points. Clearly, it would not be possible to place all refugees in more de-
sirable locations without general equilibrium effects through higher labor supply which
would negate part of the gains. Still, already a smaller-scale relocation of, say, 10,000
randomly selected working-age refugees to a county with a one standard deviation
lower unemployment rate would generate an annual saving of more than e 2 million
(0.042*10,000*4800=2,016,000). Increasing the scope of reallocation would mean that
part of the savings would be lost due to general equilibrium effects, but as we also
exclude public finance benefits from taxes and social insurance contributions that em-
ployed refugees pay, overall public finance benefits could be higher even once general
equilibrium effects were accounted for. Furthermore, it is important to note that this
calculation takes into account the effect after only two to four years in Germany. To
the extent that earlier integration into the labor market would also boost subsequent
employment outcomes, dynamic gains over refugees’ remaining working life in Ger-
many could be substantial. Reallocation to states with one standard deviation higher
Migrant Acceptance Index would generate public finance benefits of the same order of
magnitude.
26See https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/content-
international-protection/social-welfare (last downloaded 02.11.2020).
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Table 2.4: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.084) (0.007)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.011∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.092) (0.006)
Female -0.196∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -1.286∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.093) (0.005)
Secondary education 0.039∗∗ 0.021 0.114 0.040∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.107) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.061∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.152) (0.010)
Participated in integration course 0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.041∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.112) (0.006)
German skills before emigration 0.051 -0.009 0.200 0.072∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.041) (0.370) (0.017)
Help finding a job 0.179∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.180)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.028 -0.018 -0.271
∗∗ 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.127) (0.007)
Children in household -0.074∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.138) (0.009)
Married/ In partnership -0.044∗∗ 0.017 0.051 -0.024∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.151) (0.008)
Satisfactory health status 0.061∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.129) (0.010)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.229 0.205 0.228 0.253
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted
to individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In
employment or education” takes a value of one for refugees who report being in employment or
education. Outcome variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in
full- or part-time employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation. Table 2.4 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section
2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. For the full set of variables,
please check Table 2.13. Reference categories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24 (aged
25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin.
Information on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values
on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in
Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social
Survey (2014).
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2.5.3 Unbundling the Multi-dimensional Integration Index
This section explores how unemployment rate and the MAI affect the components of
Multi-dimensional Integration Index.
In Table 2.5, we consider six sub-indices of the Multi-dimensional Integration In-
dex. The outcomes across the columns are as follows: Psychological Integration in
Column 1; Linguistic Integration in Column 2; Economic Integration in Column 3;
Political Integration in Column 4; Social Integration in Column 5; and Navigational
Integration in Column 6.
The results suggest that both the unemployment rate and the MAI are relevant in
explaining social and economic components of the index with similar point estimates.
Yet we find no evidence that the unemployment rate or the MAI affects psychological,
linguistic, political, or navigational integration outcomes.
Although we view this as an exploratory exercise rather than a testing of a specific
hypothesis, our results suggest that attitudes towards migrants not only do matter
for refugees’ economic integration but also affect their social integration into the host
country. This finding is important as previous literature has not paid much attention
to the role of attitudes towards immigrants in refugees’ integration.
2.5.4 Gender Differences
As shown already in Table 2.2, there is a major gender difference in refugees’ integration
outcomes, with 38 percent of men, but only 11 percent of women, being in education
or employment. Therefore, we next analyze the effects of initial conditions on refugees’
labor market and social outcomes separately by gender.
Table 2.6 shows the effects of initial unemployment and the Migrant Acceptance
Index in Panel A for males and in Panel B for females. The effects are considerably
stronger for males. Higher initial local unemployment reduces males’ chances of being
in employment or education, the effect being almost identical when analyzing full- or
part-time employment, and also depresses net monthly wages and values of the Multi-
dimensional Integration Index. For females, only the effect on net monthly wages is
statistically significant. The Migrant Acceptance Index, in turn, predicts a higher
probability of males being in employment or education and being in full or part-time
employment. For females, the Migrant Acceptance Index has a somewhat smaller effect
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Table 2.5: Effect of unemployment and attitudes towards immigrants on the dimen-
sions of the Multi-dimensional Integration Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Psychological Linguistic Economic Political Social Navigational
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.001 -0.002 -0.036∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.025∗ -0.010
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.016 -0.005 0.033∗∗ -0.013 0.027∗∗ -0.003
(0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
Female 0.006 -0.071∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
Secondary education -0.010 0.122∗∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.006 0.059∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013)
Tertiary education -0.032∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.011 0.042∗∗ 0.026
(0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.008) (0.018) (0.023)
Participated in integration course 0.038∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ -0.001 0.013 -0.018
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
German skills before emigration -0.007 0.109∗∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.016 0.111∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.024) (0.025) (0.042) (0.010) (0.030) (0.042)
Support from family & friends
before emigration 0.024
∗∗ -0.012 -0.011 0.004 -0.011 0.020
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.005) (0.016) (0.014)
Children in household 0.053∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.071∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.023
(0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017)
Married/ In partnership -0.003 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.012 0.005 -0.046∗∗ -0.020
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.008) (0.018) (0.016)
Satisfactory health status 0.059∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.020 0.062∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.020) (0.018)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.078 0.356 0.266 0.056 0.157 0.065
N 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Dimensions are set similar
to Harder et al. (2018). Table 2.5 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section
2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as
follows: primary education, aged 18-24, two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin.
Information on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values
on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in
Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social
Survey (2014).
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than on males on the probability of being in employment or education, but no effect
on full- or part-time employment.
Higher education is associated with better multi-dimensional integration outcomes
for both males and females, and those with secondary education are more likely to be
in employment or education. Tertiary education increases the likelihood of being in
employment or education, as well as likelihood of being employed and net monthly
wages for males, but has no statistically significant effect on employment outcomes for
females. Both males and females with children in household are less likely to be in
employment or education, and earn less.
In Table 2.14, we analyze the effects of initial unemployment and the Migrant
Acceptance Index on different dimensions of the Multi-dimensional Integration Index.
Initial unemployment strongly reduces males’ economic integration, and is also associ-
ated with worse navigational outcomes, although the effect is weaker. For females, the
only effect is a counter-intuitive marginally statistically significant positive effect on
navigational outcomes. The Migrant Acceptance Index is related to better economic
integration for both genders, but the effect is statistically significant only for females.
Its other effects are statistically insignificant.
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Table 2.6: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes, by gender









Panel A - Males
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.057∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.121) (0.008)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.051∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.176 0.009
(0.022) (0.020) (0.130) (0.007)
Secondary education 0.043∗ 0.027 0.150 0.040∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.172) (0.009)
Tertiary education 0.068∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.619∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.253) (0.013)
Help finding a job 0.186∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.217)
Children in household -0.064∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.646∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.031) (0.031) (0.235) (0.013)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.199 0.183 0.214 0.193
N 1947 1454 1808 1527
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B - Females
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.012 -0.015 -0.200∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.014) (0.012) (0.076) (0.009)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.034∗∗ 0.008 0.119 0.010
(0.014) (0.010) (0.077) (0.010)
Secondary education 0.035∗ 0.007 0.091 0.034∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.015) (0.107) (0.009)
Tertiary education 0.045 0.005 0.099 0.061∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.018) (0.157) (0.015)
Help finding a job 0.119∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.030) (0.279)
Children in household -0.080∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.025) (0.020) (0.149) (0.012)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.143 0.100 0.119 0.245
N 1223 980 1205 950
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employ-
ment or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome
variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time
employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. Table 2.6 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For
illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows:
primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of resi-
dence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social
Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year
of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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2.5.5 Heterogeneity Analysis using Causal Forest
We also look beyond the average effects to understand how the causal effects vary with
observable characteristics. Unlike previous literature, we don’t rely on the estimation
of models by subgroups or the interaction effects as both approaches suffer from the
selective choice of covariates and a lack of statistical power when a high number of
parameters is included in linear regression models. Instead, to identify heterogeneous
treatment effects (that is, variation in the direction and magnitude of treatment effects
for individuals within a population), we use Causal Forests methodology, which pro-
vides a data-driven, less selective framework for heterogeneous treatment estimation
(Athey and Imbens 2016; Athey et al. 2019).
This alternative statistical framework is based on a regression tree that system-
atically splits the control variable space into increasingly smaller subsets. Regression
trees aim to predict an outcome variable building on the mean outcome of observations
with similar characteristics. A parameter that penalizes high-dimensionality reduces
model complexity. The causal forest estimation combines a magnitude of regression
trees to identify treatment effects, whereby each tree is defined by different orders and
subsets of covariates. Similar to bootstrapping processes, variance is based on the
diversity of regression trees.
Since we have two treatment variables, namely the unemployment rate and the
Migrant Acceptance Index, we feed the causal forest algorithm the full set of control
variables defined in Section 2.4 and one of the treatment variables at a time (while
controlling for the other) to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. For instance,







where Ỹict is the one of the four respective integration outcomes of refugee i in
county c and interview year t, and X
′
it is the full set of covariates and the Migrant
Acceptance Index in the first state of residence.
We first present conditional treatment effects based on 20,000 regression trees in
Figure 2.8 where each regression tree draws a random sample of the working sample and
estimates the treatment effect. We only present the results for the outcome variable
being in “employment or education” for illustrative purposes but find similar patterns
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for the other outcome variables.27 In the absence of treatment heterogeneity, we
would expect treatment effect to be clustered around the mean. However, we find the
opposite, suggesting that there is considerable treatment heterogeneity. Encouragingly,
the arithmetic mean is very close to the treatment effect we identified in the main
analysis.
Figure 2.9 presents the result for the variable importance, where we set our thresh-
old as 0.05 and above. In both panels, we find that age, country of origin, education
and the number of years since arrival are the important factors for treatment hetero-
geneity. Therefore, we only focus on these dimensions in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. The
results broadly suggest that the effects of unemployment and attitudes towards immi-
grants are stronger for older people (that is, age 40 and above) and those with higher
levels of education. The effects of the Migrant Acceptance Index are most pronounced
for those with tertiary education. With respect to initial unemployment, the effects
are of similar magnitude for those with secondary and tertiary education, but close to
zero for refugees with primary education.
2.5.6 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we provide additional checks that underline the robustness of the
main results.
Robustness to omitted variables bias
Although we exploit the exogenous variation generated by centralized refugee al-
location policy and control for various observable characteristics and fixed effects, one
still might be concerned whether our results are driven by omitted unobservable fac-
tors (such as political influence in refugees’ allocation across counties). To investigate
this concern formally, we perform a rigorous robustness check following the method
proposed by Oster (2019).
In both panels of Appendix Table 2.15, we first reprint the baseline estimates for
our main outcomes in the top rows for comparison purposes. The second rows present
the estimation bounds where we define Rmax upper bound as 1.3 times the R-squared in
specifications that control for observables following Oster (2019).28 The bottom row
27The figures for the other outcome variables are available upon request.
28Estimation bounds on the treatment effect range between the coefficient from the main spec-
ification and the coefficient estimated under the assumption that observables are as important as
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employment Net monthly wages
Multi-dimensional
Integration Index
TE s.e. TE s.e. TE s.e. TE s.e.
Aged 25-29 0.024 0.033 0.013 0.030 0.384 0.276 0.018 0.012
Aged 30-34 -0.018 0.035 -0.036 0.034 -0.292 0.240 -0.020 0.013
Aged 35-39 0.008 0.045 -0.012 0.029 0.068 0.320 -0.016 0.012
Aged 40-44 -0.110 0.033 -0.081 0.028 -0.686 0.222 -0.014 0.012
Aged 45-49 -0.067 0.038 -0.034 0.033 -0.410 0.258 -0.023 0.014
Primary education -0.010 0.023 0.001 0.021 -0.280 0.146 0.001 0.009
Secondary education -0.041 0.024 -0.048 0.024 -0.270 0.190 -0.018 0.007
Tertiary education -0.050 0.043 -0.031 0.036 -0.294 0.286 -0.017 0.013
Syria -0.013 0.024 -0.012 0.023 -0.151 0.185 -0.017 0.007
Afghanistan -0.012 0.036 -0.015 0.035 -0.356 0.231 -0.012 0.013
Iraq 0.001 0.035 -0.012 0.032 0.052 0.239 0.007 0.013
Rest of World -0.087 0.033 -0.066 0.029 -0.549 0.223 -0.014 0.011
2 years since arrival 0.001 0.018 0.003 0.014 -0.153 0.114 -0.003 0.007
3 years since arrival -0.059 0.033 -0.047 0.028 -0.392 0.253 -0.018 0.010
4 years since arrival -0.049 0.045 -0.050 0.048 -0.373 0.334 -0.019 0.017
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table provides informa-
tion on treatment effects (TE) and standard errors (s.e.). Outcome variable “In employment or
education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome variable
“Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time employment.
Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey
(2014).
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employment Net monthly wages
Multi-dimensional
Integration Index
TE s.e. TE s.e. TE s.e. TE s.e.
Aged 25-29 0.021 0.042 0.026 0.033 0.243 0.235 0.008 0.018
Aged 30-34 -0.007 0.039 -0.035 0.037 -0.291 0.258 -0.012 0.023
Aged 35-39 0.055 0.045 0.021 0.032 0.264 0.353 0.021 0.011
Aged 40-44 0.057 0.056 0.027 0.047 0.307 0.329 0.015 0.016
Aged 45-49 0.120 0.065 0.091 0.051 0.502 0.452 0.007 0.024
Primary education 0.055 0.031 0.002 0.025 0.194 0.201 0.001 0.019
Secondary education 0.063 0.037 0.020 0.028 0.312 0.258 0.004 0.010
Tertiary education 0.124 0.043 0.087 0.051 0.392 0.323 0.030 0.013
Syria 0.072 0.030 0.018 0.025 0.334 0.212 0.016 0.007
Afghanistan -0.102 0.092 -0.069 0.082 -0.381 0.465 0.046 0.019
Iraq 0.148 0.083 0.129 0.084 1.015 0.708 0.054 0.032
Rest of World 0.042 0.052 0.035 0.032 0.222 0.318 -0.038 0.027
2 years since arrival -0.019 0.054 0.016 0.025 0.319 0.215 0.025 0.014
3 years since arrival 0.049 0.038 -0.016 0.033 0.123 0.250 0.006 0.010
4 years since arrival 0.084 0.043 0.061 0.034 0.388 0.306 -0.004 0.012
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table provides informa-
tion on treatment effects (TE) and standard errors (s.e.). Outcome variable “In employment or
education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome variable
“Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time employment.
Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey
(2014).
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presents the Oster’s delta, which indicates the degree of selection on unobservables
relative to observables that would be needed to fully explain our results by omitted
variable bias. The results presented point to a very limited movement in coefficients.
High delta values also indicate that the unobservables have less effect on our coefficient
of interest than the observables. Given the exogenous variation generated by the policy
and wide-range of controls we include in our models, it is extremely unlikely that
there are unobserved factors that are 8 to 124 times as important as all observables.
Therefore, the estimates suggest that our results are unlikely to be driven by omitted-
variable bias.
Robustness to NUTS-2*year fixed effects
We also saturate our main specification with NUTS-2*year fixed-effects, which
helps us to control for all potential omitted variables (such as within-state policy
change on the length of the employment ban) that can vary across NUTS-2 regions
and years. The results presented in Appendix Tables 2.16 and 2.17 show that our
results remain robust.
Multiple hypothesis testing
To rule out any problem related to the simultaneous inference of multiple hy-
potheses, we re-estimate our main results using the randomization inference technique
suggested by Young (2019). This method helps us to establish the robustness of our
results both for individual treatment coefficients in separate estimations and also for
the null hypothesis that all treatment effects reported together are zero. The results
presented in Appendix Table 2.18 show that our findings remain robust both for the
individual coefficients and the joint tests of treatment significance.
Robustness to using alternative measures of unemployment rate at the county level
To capture the initial local economic conditions, we use county-level unemployment
rate in year t-2 in our main analysis. In Appendix Figure 2.10, we show that our
results are robust to using alternative measures of unemployment rate: one or three
years before the year of interview, or one, two, or three years before the year of arrival.
unobservables for the level of Rmax. Rmax specifies the maximum R-squared that can be achieved if
all unobservables were included in the regression. Oster (2019) uses a sample of 65 RCT papers to
estimate an upper bound of the R-squared such that 90 percent of the results would be robust to
omitted variables bias. This estimation strategy yields an upper bound for the R-squared, Rmax,
that is 1.3 times the R-squared in specifications that control for observables.
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Robustness to using alternative measures of attitudes towards immigrants at the
county level
As explained before, due to the lack of data availability we can only measure
attitudes towards migrants at the state level.
To further validate the robustness of our results, we use alternative county-level
measures: the AfD vote share in 2013 and the share of respondents who reported some
or big worries about immigration in 2014. Although these measures only partially
capture attitudes towards migrants, the results presented in Appendix Figure 2.11
show that our findings remain robust.
Robustness to using alternative measure of attitudes towards immigrants at the state
level
Our main specification uses information on attitudes towards immigrants at state
level based on the European Social Survey data. To check if our results are sensitive
to how we define the Migrant Acceptance Index, we use the readily available Diversity
Index from the Gallup World Polls as an alternative measure. Similar to our main
results, Appendix Table 2.19 suggests that both higher unemployment rate and neg-
ative attitudes towards immigrants (as measured in Gallup’s Diversity Index) in the
initial state of residence have a negative effect on refugees’ labor market and social
integration. While the estimates for the effect of county-level unemployment rate are
quantitatively similar, point estimates for the effect of the Diversity Index are larger.
Overall, we find robust evidence that attitudes towards immigrants–irrespective of
how we measure them–matter for refugees’ social and economic integration.
Robustness to logit models
In Section 2.5.1, we estimate linear probability models for the dichotomous out-
come variables for ease of interpretation. Appendix Table 2.20, which reports odd
ratios, illustrates that our results are qualitatively similar when we use logistic regres-
sion models.
Robustness to alternative age band, 18-64
Table 2.12 underlines that refugees aged 50+ have substantially lower labor market
participation rates. In our main analyses, we therefore restrict the working sample to
refugees aged 18 to 49 years old in order to capture refugees most likely to be active
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in the labor market.29 The results presented in Appendix Table 2.21 show that our
results remain robust when we include all adults aged 18 to 64.
Robustness to excluding counties with very few refugees
While the representative sampling design of the SOEP maps the distribution of
refugees across Germany very closely (see Section 2.3.1), the number of observations
per county is small for some counties. As a robustness check, we calculate the number
of refugees per county and exclude the least populated counties from the estimation
(lowest decile; N < 15). Appendix Table 2.22 shows that our results are robust to
excluding counties with small number of observations.
Robustness to alternative levels of clustering and correcting for spatial correlation
In our main specification, we cluster the standard errors at the county level. We
establish robustness of our results using alternative assumptions about the variance-
covariance matrix: the results are robust to clustering at gender-education-state level
(assuming that residuals co-move within these units) (see Appendix Tables 2.23 and
2.24), clustering standard errors at the state level–due to small number of clusters
(that is, 16 states) we also bootstrap strap standard errors–(see Appendix Tables 2.25
and 2.26) as well as correcting for spatial correlation following Conley (1999) (see
Appendix Tables 2.27 and 2.28).
Robustness to excluding potentially “bad controls”
We also checked for “bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). One might worry
that some of the individual characteristics (such as participation in an integration
course) are themselves affected by initial local conditions. However, as shown in Ap-
pendix Table 2.29, excluding them completely does not substantively change the point
estimates for our variables of interest. We keep these controls in our baseline specifi-
cation to avoid omitted variable bias.
Robustness to controlling for residence status
Table 2.30 adds a control for residence status, using those with positive asylum
decision as baseline category. We find that controlling for residence status does not
affect our main results.
29We restrict the sample to refugees aged 25 to 49 when we consider being “in full- or part-time
employment”.
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Robustness to not controlling for NUTS-2 fixed effects
Table 2.31 shows that our main results are robust to not controlling for NUTS-
2 fixed effects (only exception is that Migrant Acceptance Index has no impact on
multi-dimensional integration of refugees).
Robustness to analyzing only states with strictest restrictions on residency
Table 2.32 shows that our results remain robust if we restrict our sample to
refugees living in states where residency requirement applies at the county-level, un-
less a refugee finds employment. This strict residency requirement applies in Bavaria,
Baden-Wurttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony Anhalt and Saarland. The re-
sults provide additional evidence that initial conditions shape refugees’ integration
outcomes.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed how local conditions at the time of refugees’ arrival af-
fect their short-term integration outcomes. Leveraging the variation generated by the
centralized allocation policy used in Germany, we found that both high local unem-
ployment and negative attitudes towards migrants negatively affect refugees’ economic
and social integration. A one standard deviation increase in county-level unemploy-
ment rate leads to a decrease of 4.3 percentage points in refugees’ likelihood of being
in employment or education, and a one standard deviation increase in the Migrant
Acceptance Index leads to a 5.0 (4.7) percentage points increase in refugees’ likelihood
of being in employment or education (full- or part-time employment). Initial local un-
employment has a negative, and favorable attitudes towards migrants has a positive,
impact on the multi-dimensional integration of refugees. These effects are particularly
driven by economic and social components, with effects of psychological, linguistic,
political, and navigational components being statistically insignificant. In all cases,
the results are stronger for male refugees.
Our results highlight the importance of initial conditions for facilitating refugee
integration. They also have implications for the design of refugee allocation policies.
Although there is a strong political argument in favor of allocating refugees across the
whole country, our results suggest that these policies come at a significant cost for
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subsequent integration outcomes for those refugees placed in worse performing and
less welcoming regions. One possible way to address these concerns, while maintaining
the principle of allocating refugees across the country, would be to change the weight-
ing scheme to highlight even more the integration capacity of different states. One
possibility for Germany would be to replace the component that is related to state
population with a component related to unfilled job vacancies.
Our findings have also implications on refugee policy at the European level. Many
EU member states, notably Germany, have called for a system in which asylum seekers
would be reallocated across EU member states. Our findings suggest that, in addition
to political difficulties (inflaming tensions between EU member states and potentially
resulting in a populist backlash in those countries that are unwilling to host a larger
number of asylum seekers), such a quota system could result in worse integration
outcomes across the EU, as refugees placed in regions with high unemployment and
negative attitudes towards immigrants would face a risk of worse subsequent economic
and social integration.
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Local conditions and multi-dimensional integration of refugees
Table 2.10: Main activities by year since arrival in Germany, adults aged 18-49
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total 1 year ago 2 years ago 3 years ago 4 years ago 5 years ago
Panel A - Full sample
School or
university 0.023 0.011 0.023 0.028 0.024 0.021
(0.151) (0.105) (0.150) (0.166) (0.152) (0.145)
Vocational training 0.028 0.004 0.015 0.032 0.061 0.073
(0.164) (0.063) (0.122) (0.175) (0.240) (0.260)
Employed full-time 0.101 0.015 0.051 0.136 0.195 0.141
(0.301) (0.122) (0.220) (0.343) (0.396) (0.349)
Employed part-time 0.096 0.038 0.076 0.109 0.156 0.141
(0.294) (0.192) (0.266) (0.312) (0.363) (0.349)
Not in employment
or training 0.606 0.732 0.640 0.569 0.498 0.560
(0.489) (0.443) (0.480) (0.495) (0.500) (0.497)
Unemployed &
integration course 0.147 0.200 0.195 0.125 0.067 0.064
(0.354) (0.400) (0.396) (0.331) (0.250) (0.245)
N 6188 996 1652 2587 719 234
Panel B - Males
School or
university 0.024 0.012 0.023 0.028 0.023 0.031
(0.152) (0.110) (0.149) (0.164) (0.149) (0.173)
Vocational training 0.040 0.005 0.024 0.043 0.086 0.100
(0.195) (0.073) (0.152) (0.203) (0.281) (0.301)
Employed full-time 0.162 0.026 0.085 0.210 0.302 0.238
(0.369) (0.160) (0.279) (0.407) (0.459) (0.428)
Employed part-time 0.122 0.053 0.101 0.139 0.177 0.169
(0.327) (0.224) (0.302) (0.346) (0.382) (0.376)
Not in employment
or training 0.504 0.674 0.557 0.462 0.356 0.423
(0.500) (0.469) (0.497) (0.499) (0.479) (0.496)
Unemployed &
integration course 0.148 0.229 0.210 0.119 0.057 0.038
(0.356) (0.420) (0.408) (0.324) (0.232) (0.193)
N 3692 568 928 1625 441 130
Panel C - Females
School or
university 0.023 0.009 0.023 0.029 0.025 0.010
(0.149) (0.096) (0.152) (0.168) (0.157) (0.098)
Vocational training 0.010 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.022 0.038
(0.102) (0.048) (0.064) (0.111) (0.146) (0.193)
Employed full-time 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.025 0.019
(0.102) (0.000) (0.083) (0.111) (0.157) (0.138)
Employed part-time 0.056 0.019 0.044 0.058 0.122 0.106
(0.231) (0.136) (0.206) (0.234) (0.328) (0.309)
Not in employment
or training 0.756 0.808 0.746 0.752 0.723 0.731
(0.430) (0.394) (0.436) (0.432) (0.448) (0.446)
Unemployed &
integration course 0.144 0.161 0.175 0.136 0.083 0.096
(0.351) (0.368) (0.381) (0.343) (0.276) (0.296)
N 2496 428 724 962 278 104
Note: Means (standard deviations). Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-
2018).
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Table 2.11: Main activities by year since arrival in Germany, single refugees without
children aged 18-49
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total 1 year ago 2 years ago 3 years ago 4 years ago 5 years ago
Panel A - Males
School or
university 0.048 0.023 0.048 0.057 0.051 0.077
(0.215) (0.149) (0.213) (0.232) (0.220) (0.269)
Vocational training 0.068 0.010 0.041 0.077 0.169 0.154
(0.251) (0.098) (0.198) (0.267) (0.376) (0.364)
Employed full-time 0.164 0.016 0.084 0.235 0.311 0.231
(0.370) (0.127) (0.277) (0.424) (0.464) (0.425)
Employed part-time 0.124 0.055 0.117 0.156 0.136 0.135
(0.330) (0.229) (0.322) (0.363) (0.343) (0.345)
Not in employment
or training 0.491 0.672 0.575 0.415 0.299 0.404
(0.500) (0.470) (0.495) (0.493) (0.459) (0.495)
Unemployed &
integration course 0.105 0.224 0.136 0.060 0.034 0.000
(0.307) (0.418) (0.343) (0.238) (0.181) (0.000)
N 1655 308 419 699 177 52
Panel B - Females
School or
university 0.097 0.038 0.105 0.141 0.057 0.000
(0.296) (0.192) (0.307) (0.349) (0.233) (0.000)
Vocational training 0.033 0.013 0.007 0.031 0.075 0.267
(0.179) (0.113) (0.084) (0.173) (0.267) (0.458)
Employed full-time 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.057 0.067
(0.161) (0.000) (0.000) (0.217) (0.233) (0.258)
Employed part-time 0.099 0.051 0.063 0.110 0.226 0.133
(0.299) (0.221) (0.244) (0.314) (0.423) (0.352)
Not in employment
or training 0.618 0.633 0.671 0.595 0.547 0.533
(0.486) (0.485) (0.471) (0.492) (0.503) (0.516)
Unemployed &
integration course 0.126 0.266 0.154 0.074 0.038 0.000
(0.332) (0.445) (0.362) (0.262) (0.192) (0.000)
N 453 79 143 163 53 15
Note: Means (standard deviations). Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-
2018).
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Table 2.12: Main activities by year since arrival in Germany for different age groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total 1 year ago 2 years ago 3 years ago 4 years ago 5 years ago
Panel A - Aged 18-24
School or
university 0.070 0.028 0.070 0.091 0.070 0.100
(0.255) (0.164) (0.256) (0.288) (0.256) (0.304)
Vocational training 0.059 0.009 0.031 0.071 0.154 0.275
(0.235) (0.096) (0.173) (0.257) (0.362) (0.452)
Employed full-time 0.085 0.015 0.041 0.137 0.168 0.075
(0.278) (0.123) (0.199) (0.345) (0.375) (0.267)
Employed part-time 0.099 0.034 0.085 0.134 0.140 0.125
(0.299) (0.181) (0.279) (0.341) (0.348) (0.335)
Not in employment
or training 0.576 0.715 0.626 0.508 0.420 0.425
(0.494) (0.452) (0.484) (0.500) (0.495) (0.501)
Unemployed &
integration course 0.111 0.199 0.147 0.058 0.049 0.000
(0.315) (0.400) (0.354) (0.234) (0.217) (0.000)
N 1597 326 484 604 143 40
Panel B - Aged 25-49
School or
university 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.012 0.005
(0.083) (0.055) (0.058) (0.095) (0.110) (0.072)
Vocational training 0.017 0.001 0.009 0.020 0.038 0.031
(0.129) (0.039) (0.092) (0.139) (0.192) (0.174)
Employed full-time 0.107 0.015 0.055 0.136 0.201 0.155
(0.309) (0.121) (0.228) (0.343) (0.401) (0.362)
Employed part-time 0.094 0.040 0.073 0.101 0.160 0.144
(0.292) (0.197) (0.260) (0.302) (0.367) (0.352)
Not in employment
or training 0.616 0.740 0.646 0.588 0.517 0.588
(0.486) (0.439) (0.479) (0.492) (0.500) (0.494)
Unemployed &
integration course 0.159 0.200 0.215 0.146 0.071 0.077
(0.366) (0.400) (0.411) (0.353) (0.257) (0.268)
N 4591 670 1168 1983 576 194
Panel C - Aged 50+
School or
university 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000)
Vocational training 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employed full-time 0.022 0.011 0.007 0.016 0.071 0.038
(0.145) (0.104) (0.082) (0.125) (0.259) (0.196)
Employed part-time 0.065 0.011 0.027 0.063 0.119 0.308
(0.246) (0.104) (0.163) (0.243) (0.326) (0.471)
Not in employment
or training 0.733 0.761 0.755 0.740 0.690 0.577
(0.443) (0.429) (0.431) (0.439) (0.465) (0.504)
Unemployed &
integration course 0.179 0.217 0.211 0.177 0.119 0.077
(0.384) (0.415) (0.409) (0.383) (0.326) (0.272)
N 603 92 147 254 84 26
Note: Means (standard deviations). Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-
2018).
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Table 2.13: Determinants of refugees’ labor market outcomes, including the full set of
covariates









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.084) (0.007)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.011∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.092) (0.006)
Female -0.196∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -1.286∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.093) (0.005)
Secondary education 0.039∗∗ 0.021 0.114 0.040∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.107) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.061∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.152) (0.010)
Participated in integration course 0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.041∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.112) (0.006)
German skills before emigration 0.051 -0.009 0.200 0.072∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.041) (0.370) (0.017)
Help finding a job 0.179∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.180)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.028 -0.018 -0.271
∗∗ 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.127) (0.007)
Children in household -0.074∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.138) (0.009)
Afghan origin -0.015 -0.014 -0.256 -0.008
(0.023) (0.024) (0.157) (0.009)
Iraqi origin -0.107∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.145) (0.010)
Other origin -0.006 -0.009 0.101 -0.018∗
(0.024) (0.021) (0.172) (0.010)
3 years of residence in Germany 0.121∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.130) (0.008)
4 years of residence in Germany 0.227∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 1.495∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.202) (0.011)
Living in West Germany -0.085∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.890∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.044) (0.003)
Married/ In partnership -0.044∗∗ 0.017 0.051 -0.024∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.151) (0.008)
Satisfactory health status 0.061∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.129) (0.010)
Share of Syrians at county level in 2014 4.744 5.462 46.154 -4.692
(11.972) (11.157) (82.288) (6.463)
Share of Afghans at county level in 2014 5.952 40.448∗∗ 313.214∗∗ 27.655∗∗
(20.956) (19.295) (132.821) (11.155)
Share of Iraqis at county level in 2014 10.621 8.326 21.187 -0.477
(7.793) (7.254) (51.307) (4.680)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.229 0.205 0.228 0.253
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employ-
ment or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome
variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time
employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. Reference categories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29
for full- or part-time employment), two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin. In-
formation on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values
on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in
Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social
Survey (2014).
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Table 2.14: Effect of unemployment and attitudes towards immigrants on the dimen-
sions of the Multi-dimensional Integration Index, by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Psychological Linguistic Economic Political Social Navigational
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Panel A - Male
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.005 0.000 -0.052∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.023 -0.032∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.017)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.017 -0.008 0.028 -0.005 0.020 -0.009
(0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) (0.017) (0.015)
Secondary education -0.013 0.126∗∗∗ 0.034 0.003 0.048∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.013) (0.011) (0.021) (0.007) (0.016) (0.018)
Tertiary education -0.043∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.002 0.039∗ 0.025
(0.020) (0.016) (0.030) (0.011) (0.022) (0.031)
Participated in integration course 0.028∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.006 0.004 -0.025
(0.012) (0.010) (0.020) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
German skills before emigration 0.002 0.116∗∗∗ 0.090 0.030∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.031) (0.029) (0.055) (0.007) (0.039) (0.050)
Support from family & friends
before emigration 0.023
∗ -0.005 -0.030 0.000 0.013 0.023
(0.014) (0.011) (0.026) (0.007) (0.019) (0.021)
Children in household 0.077∗∗∗ 0.027∗ -0.072∗∗ 0.004 -0.017 0.049∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.029) (0.010) (0.026) (0.020)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.090 0.375 0.203 0.070 0.138 0.082
N 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527
Panel B - Females
Unemployment rate t-2 std. 0.004 -0.013 -0.011 0.005 -0.039 0.029∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.024) (0.016)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.014 -0.012 0.028∗∗ -0.027 0.033 0.013
(0.020) (0.017) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Secondary education -0.013 0.111∗∗∗ 0.004 0.011 0.072∗∗∗ -0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.017)
Tertiary education -0.027 0.206∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.022 0.044 0.024
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.014) (0.029) (0.029)
Participated in integration course 0.059∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ -0.010 0.040∗ -0.002
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.011) (0.024) (0.019)
German skills before emigration -0.050 0.078 0.004 -0.029 0.109∗ 0.132∗
(0.035) (0.048) (0.055) (0.032) (0.056) (0.069)
Support from family & friends
before emigration 0.024 -0.023 0.021 0.011 -0.040
∗ 0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.021) (0.020)
Children in household 0.020 -0.017 -0.040∗ -0.002 0.032 -0.004
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.024) (0.027)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.111 0.335 0.271 0.099 0.169 0.090
N 950 950 950 950 950 950
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Dimensions are set similar
to Harder et al. (2018). Table 2.14 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section
2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as
follows: primary education, aged 18-24, two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin.
Information on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values
on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in
Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social
Survey (2014).
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Table 2.15: Robustness to omitted variable bias, Oster test









Unemployment rate -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.084) (0.007)
Bounds on the treatment effect (-0.033, -0.043) (-0.033,-0.047) (-0.258,-0.341) (-0.009, -0.144)
Treatment excludes 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delta (Rmax = 1.3*R) 8.015 25.162 10.129 -17.435
Migrant Acceptance Index 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.011∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.092) (0.006)
Bounds on the treatment effect (0.049,0.050) (0.026,0.024) (0.187,0.178) (0.009,0.011)
Treatment excludes 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delta (Rmax = 1.3*R) -123.684 14.899 20.879 -12.107
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the state level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Reference categories are as follows:
primary education, aged 18-24, two years of residence in Germany, Syrian refugee. Information
on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes
towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.16: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes, including
NUTS-2*year fixed effects









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.048∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.085) (0.007)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.054∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.185∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.094) (0.006)
Female -0.198∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -1.292∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.095) (0.006)
Secondary education 0.039∗∗ 0.020 0.106 0.040∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.110) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.065∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.156) (0.010)
Participated in integration course -0.002 -0.009 -0.038 0.039∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.114) (0.006)
German skills before emigration 0.053 -0.011 0.139 0.071∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.042) (0.367) (0.017)
Help finding a job 0.182∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.181)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.029 -0.020 -0.288
∗∗ 0.000
(0.018) (0.018) (0.129) (0.007)
Children in household -0.069∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.020) (0.019) (0.140) (0.009)
Married/ In partnership -0.046∗∗ 0.017 0.030 -0.025∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.154) (0.008)
Satisfactory health status 0.062∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.134) (0.010)
Nuts-2 * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.248 0.226 0.246 0.274
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employ-
ment or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome
variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time
employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. Table 2.16 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For
illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows:
primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of resi-
dence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social
Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year
of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.17: Effect of unemployment and attitudes towards immigrants on the dimen-
sions of the Multi-dimensional Integration Index, including NUTS-2*year
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Psychological Linguistic Economic Political Social Navigational
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. 0.001 -0.005 -0.038∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.026∗ -0.009
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.018 -0.004 0.037∗∗∗ -0.013 0.029∗∗ 0.001
(0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
Female 0.005 -0.074∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
Secondary education -0.009 0.124∗∗∗ 0.022 0.007 0.057∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014)
Tertiary education -0.032∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.030
(0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.008) (0.019) (0.023)
Participated in integration course 0.037∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ -0.002 0.008 -0.016
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
German skills before emigration -0.007 0.104∗∗∗ 0.081∗ 0.015 0.108∗∗∗ 0.063
(0.025) (0.025) (0.043) (0.011) (0.031) (0.041)
Support from family & friends
before emigration 0.021
∗∗ -0.012 -0.012 0.002 -0.015 0.020
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014)
Children in household 0.053∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.066∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 0.027
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017)
Married/ In partnership -0.003 -0.044∗∗∗ -0.016 0.001 -0.045∗∗ -0.021
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017)
Satisfactory health status 0.057∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.015 0.060∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018)
Nuts-2 * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.106 0.375 0.282 0.095 0.196 0.100
N 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Dimensions are set similar
to Harder et al. (2018). Table 2.17 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section
2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as
follows: primary education, aged 18-24, two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin.
Information on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values
on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in
Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social
Survey (2014).
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Table 2.18: Multiple hypothesis testing - Main results









Unemployment rate -0.048∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.85) (0.007)
N 3,170 2,434 3,013 2,477





Migrant Acceptance Index 0.054∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.185∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.094) (0.006)
N 3,170 2,434 3,013 2,477





Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the county and year of interview level and are displayed in parenthesis. We pool ob-
servations from survey years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The
sample is restricted to individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Reference
categories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24, two years of residence in Germany, Syrian
refugee. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean
values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence
in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social
Survey (2014).
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Table 2.19: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.044∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.085) (0.007)
Diversity Index std. 0.213∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 1.021∗∗ 0.059∗
(0.072) (0.069) (0.498) (0.034)
Female -0.197∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -1.289∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.093) (0.005)
Secondary education 0.040∗∗∗ 0.021 0.118 0.040∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.107) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.060∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.390∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.152) (0.010)
Participated in integration course 0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.042∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.112) (0.006)
German skills before emigration 0.052 -0.008 0.209 0.072∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.041) (0.370) (0.017)
Help finding a job 0.178∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.180)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.027 -0.017 -0.266
∗∗ 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.127) (0.007)
Children in household -0.074∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.020) (0.019) (0.139) (0.009)
Married/ In partnership -0.043∗∗ 0.018 0.052 -0.024∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.151) (0.008)
Satisfactory health status 0.063∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.017) (0.128) (0.010)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.228 0.203 0.228 0.253
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employ-
ment or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome
variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time
employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. Table 2.19 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For
illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows:
primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of resi-
dence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on the diversity index stems from the Gallup
World Polls. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’
year of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of
Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and Gallup World Polls (2014).
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Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.292∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.115)




Secondary education 0.264∗∗∗ 0.185
(0.097) (0.139)
Tertiary education 0.389∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗
(0.130) (0.167)
Participated in integration course 0.072 0.086
(0.113) (0.146)
German skills before emigration 0.350 0.028
(0.253) (0.304)
Help finding a job 0.945∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.144)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.183 -0.121
(0.123) (0.184)
Children in household -0.477∗∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.159)
Married/ In partnership -0.217 0.204
(0.135) (0.211)
Satisfactory health status 0.664∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.290)
Interview year FE Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes
Pseudo R-Squared 0.218 0.255
N 3170 2434
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employ-
ment or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome
variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time
employment. Estimates are reported as odd ratios. Table 2.20 includes the full set of covariates,
as described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Ref-
erence categories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time
employment), two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes
stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards
immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.21: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes, adults aged
18-64









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.039∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.081) (0.006)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.041∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.160∗ 0.011∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.089) (0.006)
Female -0.182∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -1.196∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.084) (0.005)
Secondary education 0.040∗∗∗ 0.022 0.111 0.039∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.097) (0.006)
Tertiary education 0.060∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.130) (0.009)
Participated in integration course 0.000 -0.011 -0.048 0.040∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.104) (0.005)
German skills before emigration 0.014 -0.032 -0.011 0.068∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.036) (0.332) (0.015)
Help finding a job 0.176∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.175)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.028
∗ -0.021 -0.265∗∗ 0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.118) (0.006)
Children in household -0.073∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.574∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.018) (0.017) (0.124) (0.008)
Married/ In partnership -0.050∗∗ 0.003 -0.024 -0.025∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.136) (0.007)
Satisfactory health status 0.056∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.109) (0.008)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.230 0.199 0.227 0.261
N 3484 2748 3315 2727
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employ-
ment or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome
variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time
employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. Table 2.21 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For
illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows:
primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of resi-
dence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social
Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year
of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.22: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes, robustness to
excluding counties with very few refugees









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.046∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.096) (0.008)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.181∗ 0.009
(0.018) (0.015) (0.094) (0.007)
Female -0.197∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -1.261∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.097) (0.006)
Secondary education 0.032∗∗ 0.018 0.132 0.039∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.112) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.047∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.161) (0.011)
Participated in integration course -0.006 -0.011 -0.061 0.043∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.118) (0.006)
German skills before emigration 0.046 -0.015 0.108 0.062∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.043) (0.392) (0.017)
Help finding a job 0.187∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.192)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.027 -0.017 -0.270
∗∗ 0.004
(0.019) (0.019) (0.135) (0.007)
Children in household -0.073∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.020) (0.020) (0.144) (0.010)
Married/ In partnership -0.042∗ 0.015 0.040 -0.023∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.163) (0.009)
Satisfactory health status 0.050∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.180 0.039∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.133) (0.010)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.229 0.209 0.232 0.250
N 2808 2140 2670 2191
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employ-
ment or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome
variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time
employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. Table 2.22 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For
illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows:
primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of resi-
dence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social
Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year
of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.23: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes, clustering
standard errors on the gender, education, and state level









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.103) (0.006)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.011
(0.015) (0.012) (0.083) (0.007)
Female -0.196∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -1.286∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.118) (0.006)
Secondary education 0.039∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.114 0.040∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.073) (0.006)
Tertiary education 0.061∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.171) (0.013)
Participated in integration course 0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.041∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.139) (0.007)
German skills before emigration 0.051 -0.009 0.200 0.072∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.052) (0.440) (0.018)
Help finding a job 0.179∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.179)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.028
∗∗ -0.018 -0.271∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.014) (0.015) (0.100) (0.005)
Children in household -0.074∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.021) (0.018) (0.149) (0.009)
Married/ In partnership -0.044∗ 0.017 0.051 -0.024∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.159) (0.009)
Satisfactory health status 0.061∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.120) (0.009)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.229 0.205 0.228 0.253
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the gender, education, and state level (G=96 clusters) and are displayed in paren-
theses. We pool observations from survey years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey
information. The sample is restricted to individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in
Germany. Outcome variable “In employment or education” is one for refugees who report being in
employment or education. Outcome variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who
report being in full- or part-time employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly
wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Table 2.23 includes the full set of covariates, as
described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Refer-
ence categories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time
employment), two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes
stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards
immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.24: Effect of unemployment and attitudes towards immigrants on the dimen-
sions of the Multi-dimensional Integration Index, clustering standard errors
on the gender, education, and state level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Psychological Linguistic Economic Political Social Navigational
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.001 -0.002 -0.036∗∗ 0.001 -0.025∗ -0.010
(0.018) (0.005) (0.017) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.016 -0.005 0.033∗∗∗ -0.013 0.027∗ -0.003
(0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013)
Female 0.006 -0.071∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.020) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
Secondary education -0.010 0.122∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.006 0.059∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012)
Tertiary education -0.032∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.011 0.042∗∗ 0.026
(0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.007) (0.016) (0.021)
Participated in integration course 0.038∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ -0.001 0.013 -0.018
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
German skills before emigration -0.007 0.109∗∗∗ 0.077 0.016 0.111∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.027) (0.025) (0.049) (0.013) (0.032) (0.043)
Support from family & friends
before emigration 0.024
∗∗ -0.012 -0.011 0.004 -0.011 0.020
(0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.005) (0.012) (0.015)
Children in household 0.053∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.071∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.023
(0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017)
Married/ In partnership -0.003 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.012 0.005 -0.046∗∗ -0.020
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018)
Satisfactory health status 0.059∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.062∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.020) (0.018)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.078 0.356 0.266 0.056 0.157 0.065
N 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the gender, education, and state level (G=96 clusters) and are displayed in paren-
theses. We pool observations from survey years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey
information. The sample is restricted to individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in
Germany. Dimensions are set similar to Harder et al. (2018). Table 2.24 includes the full set of
covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not
shown. Reference categories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24, two years of residence
in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey.
We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of ar-
rival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35
(2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.25: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes, bootstrapped
standard errors at the state level









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.107) (0.006)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.097) (0.005)
Female -0.196∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -1.286∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.094) (0.006)
Secondary education 0.039∗∗ 0.021 0.114 0.040∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.115) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.061∗∗ 0.049∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.182) (0.009)
Participated in integration course 0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.041∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.096) (0.005)
German skills before emigration 0.051 -0.009 0.200 0.072∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.040) (0.384) (0.019)
Help finding a job 0.179∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.180)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.028 -0.018 -0.271
∗∗ 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.120) (0.007)
Children in household -0.074∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.021) (0.018) (0.146) (0.009)
Married/ In partnership -0.044∗∗ 0.017 0.051 -0.024∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.155) (0.009)
Satisfactory health status 0.061∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.136) (0.011)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.229 0.205 0.228 0.253
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
bootstrapped and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey years 2016 to
2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to individuals
with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employment or
education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome variable
“Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time employment.
Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Table 2.25 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes,
some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows: primary education,
aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of residence in Germany,
and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge
natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first
state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018)
and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.26: Effect of unemployment and attitudes towards immigrants on the dimen-
sions of the Multi-dimensional Integration Index, bootstrapped standard
errors at the state level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Psychological Linguistic Economic Political Social Navigational
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.001 -0.002 -0.036∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.025∗∗ -0.010
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.016 -0.005 0.033∗∗∗ -0.013∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Female 0.006 -0.071∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.011)
Secondary education -0.010 0.122∗∗∗ 0.024 0.006 0.059∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.005) (0.014) (0.012)
Tertiary education -0.032∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.011 0.042∗∗ 0.026
(0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.007) (0.017) (0.018)
Participated in integration course 0.038∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ -0.001 0.013 -0.018
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013)
German skills before emigration -0.007 0.109∗∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.016 0.111∗∗∗ 0.062∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.043) (0.011) (0.029) (0.037)
Support from family & friends
before emigration 0.024
∗∗ -0.012 -0.011 0.004 -0.011 0.020
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015)
Children in household 0.053∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.071∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.023
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.007) (0.018) (0.015)
Married/ In partnership -0.003 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.012 0.005 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.020
(0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016)
Satisfactory health status 0.059∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.062∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) (0.023) (0.021)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.078 0.356 0.266 0.056 0.157 0.065
N 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
bootstrapped and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey years 2016 to
2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to individuals
with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Dimensions are set similar to Harder et al.
(2018). Table 2.26 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For illustrative
purposes, some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows: primary
education, aged 18-24, two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on
attitudes stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes
towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in Germany.
Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey
(2014).
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Table 2.27: Determinants of refugees’ labor market and social outcomes, Conley stan-
dard errors









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.014∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.086) (0.008)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.069) (0.005)
Female -0.196∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -1.286∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.010) (0.099) (0.007)
Secondary education 0.039∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.114 0.040∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.121) (0.006)
Tertiary education 0.061∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.157) (0.012)
Participated in integration course 0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.041∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.108) (0.005)
German skills before emigration 0.051 -0.009 0.200 0.072∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.045) (0.514) (0.017)
Help finding a job 0.179∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.159)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.028
∗ -0.018 -0.271∗∗ 0.002
(0.016) (0.013) (0.117) (0.004)
Children in household -0.074∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.019) (0.015) (0.130) (0.008)
Married/ In partnership -0.044∗ 0.017 0.051 -0.024∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.126) (0.008)
Satisfactory health status 0.061∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.107) (0.011)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.229 0.205 0.228 0.253
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
corrected for arbitrary cluster correlation in spatial settings (acreg) and are displayed in paren-
theses. We pool observations from survey years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey
information. The sample is restricted to individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in
Germany. Outcome variable “In employment or education” is one for refugees who report being in
employment or education. Outcome variable “Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who
report being in full- or part-time employment. Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly
wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Table 2.27 includes the full set of covariates, as
described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not shown. Refer-
ence categories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time
employment), two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes
stems from the European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards
immigrants based on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source:
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.28: Effect of unemployment and attitudes towards immigrants on the dimen-
sions of the Multi-dimensional Integration Index, Conley standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Psychological Linguistic Economic Political Social Navigational
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.001 -0.002 -0.036∗∗ 0.001 -0.025 -0.010
(0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.013)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.016 -0.005 0.033∗∗∗ -0.013 0.027∗∗ -0.003
(0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
Female 0.006 -0.071∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
Secondary education -0.010 0.122∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.006 0.059∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017)
Tertiary education -0.032∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.026
(0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.005) (0.017) (0.020)
Participated in integration course 0.038∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ -0.001 0.013 -0.018
(0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
German skills before emigration -0.007 0.109∗∗∗ 0.077 0.016 0.111∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.028) (0.020) (0.052) (0.010) (0.028) (0.045)
Support from family & friends
before emigration 0.024
∗∗ -0.012 -0.011 0.004 -0.011 0.020
(0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014)
Children in household 0.053∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.071∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.023
(0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.008) (0.020) (0.019)
Married/ In partnership -0.003 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.012 0.005 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.020
(0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018)
Satisfactory health status 0.059∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.015) (0.012) (0.018) (0.008) (0.023) (0.023)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.078 0.356 0.266 0.056 0.157 0.065
N 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
corrected for arbitrary cluster correlation in spatial settings (acreg) and are displayed in paren-
theses. We pool observations from survey years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey
information. The sample is restricted to individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in
Germany. Dimensions are set similar to Harder et al. (2018). Table 2.28 includes the full set of
covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes, some control variables are not
shown. Reference categories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24, two years of residence
in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social Survey.
We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year of ar-
rival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35
(2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.29: Determinants of refugees’ labor market outcomes, dropping potentially
“bad controls”









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.047∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.090) (0.007)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.188∗ 0.011∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.097) (0.006)
Female -0.234∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -1.562∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.095) (0.005)
Secondary education 0.046∗∗∗ 0.025 0.166 0.047∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.105) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.086∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.163) (0.010)
Married/ In partnership -0.095∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.350∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.135) (0.008)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.201 0.177 0.192 0.223
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are
clustered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey
years 2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to
individuals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Table 2.29 includes a minimum
of control variables, including information on gender, education, country of origin, age, years of
residence in Germany, and family status. Outcome variable “In employment or education” is one
for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome variable “Full- or part-time
employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time employment. Outcome “Net
monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Reference cate-
gories are as follows: primary education, aged 18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment),
two years of residence in Germany, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the
European Social Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based
on refugees’ year of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP
Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.30: Determinants of refugees’ labor market outcomes, including control vari-
ables for type of residence status









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.048∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.086) (0.007)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.051∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.094) (0.006)
Female -0.200∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -1.299∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.094) (0.005)
Secondary education 0.039∗∗ 0.020 0.114 0.040∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.107) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.058∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.365∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.156) (0.010)
Participated in integration course 0.003 -0.007 -0.003 0.039∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.111) (0.006)
German skills before emigration 0.056 -0.004 0.224 0.073∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.042) (0.371) (0.017)
Help finding a job 0.176∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.181)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.022 -0.015 -0.242
∗ 0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.127) (0.007)
Children in household -0.076∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.619∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.139) (0.009)
Married/ In partnership -0.037∗ 0.020 0.084 -0.025∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.153) (0.008)
Satisfactory health status 0.057∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.248∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.016) (0.128) (0.009)
Asylum seeker -0.028 -0.036∗ -0.170 -0.013
(0.021) (0.021) (0.152) (0.009)
Tolerated foreigner -0.006 -0.037∗ -0.195 -0.016∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.131) (0.009)
Other residence status -0.014 -0.021 -0.105 -0.019∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.170) (0.010)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.232 0.207 0.231 0.256
N 3121 2398 2966 2445
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are clus-
tered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey years
2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to indi-
viduals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employment
or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome variable
“Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time employment.
Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Table 2.30 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes,
some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows: primary education, aged
18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of residence in Germany, positive
asylum decision, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social
Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year
of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.31: Determinants of refugees’ labor market outcomes, without regional fixed
effects









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.033∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.068) (0.005)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.030∗∗∗ 0.007 0.083∗ 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.049) (0.006)
Female -0.195∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -1.281∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.089) (0.005)
Secondary education 0.043∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.140 0.038∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.108) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.064∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.156) (0.010)
Participated in integration course 0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.043∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.109) (0.006)
German skills before emigration 0.051 -0.006 0.207 0.066∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.045) (0.379) (0.018)
Help finding a job 0.178∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1.355∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.179)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.031
∗ -0.023 -0.299∗∗ -0.000
(0.018) (0.018) (0.126) (0.007)
Children in household -0.071∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.019) (0.018) (0.134) (0.009)
Married/ In partnership -0.043∗∗ 0.020 0.063 -0.026∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.150) (0.008)
Satisfactory health status 0.063∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.128) (0.010)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.218 0.183 0.215 0.219
N 3170 2434 3013 2477
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are clus-
tered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey years
2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to indi-
viduals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employment
or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome variable
“Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time employment.
Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Table 2.31 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes,
some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows: primary education, aged
18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of residence in Germany, positive
asylum decision, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social
Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year
of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Table 2.32: Determinants of refugees’ labor market outcomes in states with strict resi-
dency requirements









b/se b/se b/se b/se
Unemployment rate t-2 std. -0.031∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.188∗ -0.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.103) (0.008)
Migrant Acceptance Index std. 0.062∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.114) (0.008)
Female -0.211∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -1.318∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.117) (0.007)
Secondary education 0.032∗ 0.023 0.037 0.037∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.129) (0.009)
Tertiary education 0.045∗ 0.033 0.199 0.045∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.184) (0.012)
Participated in integration course -0.015 -0.017 -0.052 0.042∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.154) (0.008)
German skills before emigration 0.167∗∗ 0.048 0.879 0.075∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.059) (0.552) (0.024)
Help finding a job 0.199∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.029) (0.219)
Support from family & friends
before emigration -0.018 -0.001 -0.195 0.009
(0.024) (0.023) (0.164) (0.009)
Children in household -0.060∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.026) (0.027) (0.181) (0.011)
Married/ In partnership -0.062∗∗ -0.019 -0.139 -0.037∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.209) (0.011)
Satisfactory health status 0.054∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.285∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.028) (0.024) (0.170) (0.014)
Interview year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nuts-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.242 0.228 0.247 0.243
N 1889 1476 1792 1496
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard levels are clus-
tered on the county level and are displayed in parentheses. We pool observations from survey years
2016 to 2018 keeping only the most recent survey information. The sample is restricted to indi-
viduals with a minimum of two years of residence in Germany. Outcome variable “In employment
or education” is one for refugees who report being in employment or education. Outcome variable
“Full- or part-time employed” is one for refugees who report being in full- or part-time employment.
Outcome “Net monthly wages” are net monthly wages, in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Table 2.32 includes the full set of covariates, as described in Section 2.4. For illustrative purposes,
some control variables are not shown. Reference categories are as follows: primary education, aged
18-24 (aged 25-29 for full- or part-time employment), two years of residence in Germany, positive
asylum decision, and Syrian origin. Information on attitudes stems from the European Social
Survey. We merge natives’ mean values on attitudes towards immigrants based on refugees’ year
of arrival and first state of residence in Germany. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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2.7.2 Figures

























Note: Panels a to d in Figure 2.2 display the number of refugees per county, disaggregated by
country of origin. Similarly to our main analysis, we pool observations over years to increase the
sample size. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018).
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(l) In need of protection,
2018
Note: Panels a to l in Figure 2.3 display the number of refugees per county, disaggregated by country
of origin and year. Some counties do not publish the number of people in protection. These are
classified as “No data”. Source: Destatis (2016-2018).
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Note: Panels a to c in Figure 2.4 displays the county-level unemployment rates from 2016 to 2018.
Source: Destatis (2016-2018).
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Note: Figure 2.5 plots the factors and the corresponding eigenvalues after a principle component
analysis of the eight migrant subscales, which are used to build the Migrant Acceptance Index.
The red horizontal line corresponds to Eigenvalues of one. Figure 2.5 shows that the first factor
(MAI) has the highest predictive power. Source: European Social Survey (2014).
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(d) Share of votes to AfD
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 2.6 displays the correlation between the Migrant Acceptance Index
and alternative measures of attitudes towards immigration at the state-level. Correlations are
based on the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees,
v35 (2016-2018), Gallup World Polls (2014) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Note: Figure 2.7 plots the Gallup diversity index at state level. Source: Gallup World Polls (2014).
Abbreviations are as follows: SH – Schleswig Holstein; HH – Hamburg; NS – Lower Saxony; HB
– Bremen; NW – North Rhine-Westphalia; HE – Hessen; RP – Rhineland Palatine; BW – Baden
Wurttemberg; BY – Bavaria; SL – Saarland; BE – Berlin; BB – Brandenburg; MV – Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania; SN – Saxony; SA – Saxony Anhalt; TH – Thuringia. .
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(b) Treatment: Unemployment rate t-2 std.
Note: Panels a and b in Figure 2.8 display the conditional treatment effects for “being in employment
or education” based on generalized random forest estimation (N=20,000 trees). The red vertical
line indicates the level of the treatment effect in the baseline model. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP
Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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Figure 2.9: Variable Importance
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(b) Treatment: Unemployment rate t-2 std.
Note: Panels a and b in Figure 2.9 illustrate the variable importance for “being in employment or
education” in a generalized random forest framework (N=20,000 trees). The variable importance
plot provides a simple weighted sum of how many times a feature was split at each depth in
the forest. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social
Survey (2014). 140
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Figure 2.10: Robustness of alternative lags of unemployment
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(a) In employment or education
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(c) Net monthly wages
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(d) Multi-dimensional Integration Index
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 2.10 display the robustness of our estimation results to alternative lags
of unemployment. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European
Social Survey (2014).
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Figure 2.11: Robustness to using alternative measures of attitudes towards immigrants
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Model 1 Model 2
(d) Multi-dimensional Integration Index
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 2.11 display the robustness of our estimation results to alternative
measures of attitudes towards immigrants at the county level. Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey
of Refugees, v35 (2016-2018) and European Social Survey (2014).
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3 Hate is too great a burden to bear: Hate
crimes and the mental health of refugees
We are grateful for valuable feedback from Eli Berman, Gordon Dahl, Katrine Løken
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3.1 Introduction
In the 2010s, the world witnessed two global phenomena: First, forced migration
increased dramatically. The number of displaced persons almost doubled from about
42 million in 2008 to 75 million in 2018 (UNHCR 2019). Second, the prevalence of
hate crimes increased markedly. For example, the Center for the Study of Hate and
Extremism (2018) reports that hate crime rose by 22 percent in the United States’ six
largest cities between 2016 and 2017.1 This marks the third consecutive annual increase
for the U.S., a pattern that has not been observed since 2004. We further observe an
immense acceleration of violence against immigrants in Europe (The Council of Europe
2016). The arrival of about 800,000 refugees in Germany in 2015 was accompanied by
a sudden increase in hate crimes against refugees.2
In the economic literature on migration, refugees are considered “permanent” mi-
grants. They remain in their destination country for a long period of time, unable or
unwilling to return to their home country, where they are at risk of persecution or con-
flict. Given that permanent migrants can expect to accrue the returns to integration
over longer time horizons than temporary migrants (Dustmann and Glitz 2011), their
lifetime utility strongly depends on their initial integration success. For this reason,
the potential consequences of adverse experiences due to hate crime are particularly
1The increase for all thirteen surveyed cities was 19.9 percent for the period under consideration.
2A hate crime is defined as a crime against a specific group of individuals. Typically, hate crimes
are committed because of the victim’s race, gender, sexuality, color or ancestry (Gale et al. 2002).
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consequential for refugees. Therefore, we answer the important question, what are the
mental health costs of hate crimes for refugees?
To the best of our knowledge, this question is not answered in the existing literature.
There are two reasons for this short-coming: First, we need data that combines both
representative information on refugees’ mental health and their place of residence as
well as information on a wide range of individual characteristics. Second, unobservable
variables potentially bias the relationship between the occurrence of a hate crime and
refugees’ mental health. For instance, refugees may choose their place of residence
endogenously based on regional characteristics, such as favorable economic conditions
or existing ethnic networks, which may jointly determine both refugees’ mental health
and the occurrence of hate crime. Thus, it is essential to rely on an identification
strategy that allows for the consistent estimation of the effect of hate crime on refugees’
mental health. We advance the literature by solving these two problems.
To estimate the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, we rely on a
regression-discontinuity-in-time design (Hausman and Rapson 2018).Using German
counties that experience at least one hate crime against a refugee shelter, we assign
each refugee the closest hate crime in the respective county measured in days elapsed
since this focal hate crime. We then compare refugees’ mental health immediately
before and after an attack on the county level. Thus, the identification of our effect
relies on the assumption that refugees’ mental health is a continuous function of the
number of elapsed days since the focal hate crime. We find strong support for this
assumption, emphasizing the credibility of our research design.
Our empirical analysis relies on the unique IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees
in Germany as well as geo-referenced administrative data on hate crimes from the
Federal Criminal Office (BKA). The IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees is a rep-
resentative survey of refugees who arrived in Germany between 2013 and 2016.3 The
data provides information on refugees’ migration histories, background characteristics
as well as overall living conditions and integration outcomes. Most importantly, it
includes information on the exact interview date, the place of residence, and high qual-
ity information on refugees’ mental health. Our two mental health measures included
in the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees are the Mental Component Summary
(MCS) score and the Patient Health Questionnaire-4 (PHQ-4) score. In order to link
3The IAB-BAMF-SOEP Sample of Refugees in Germany is part of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP). We use version 34 of the SOEP. DOI: 10.5684/soep.v34.
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our analysis to related studies, including Deole (2019) and Steinhardt (2018), we also
investigate the effect of hate crime on refugees’ life satisfaction or intention to stay at
the extensive margin.
Our second source of information is the BKA data, which reports hate crimes
against refugee shelters. The BKA data contains time, place, the type of crime, and
the crime’s political motivation. This allows us to geo-reference the information and
combine the administrative data on hate crimes with the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of
Refugees. The advantage of the administrative BKA data is that it contains informa-
tion on hate crime directed toward refugees’ shelters, which unambiguously represent
hate crimes. This is an advantage over other data sources that do not differentiate
between hate crime directed toward refugees or other residents with a migration back-
ground. Thus, we focus on refugee shelters since these are very salient forms of hate
crime. In addition, data from non-administrative sources, such as newspapers, could
suffer from endogenous coverage (Entorf and Lange 2019).
Our results indicate that the experience of a hate crime reduces refugees’ MCS
score by 37 percent of a standard deviation. Similarly, hate crimes reduce refugees’
PHQ-4 score by 28 percent of a standard deviation. In contrast to existing studies
that focus on economic migrants in Germany, such as Deole (2019) and Steinhardt
(2018), we find no effect on refugees’ life satisfaction. A potential reason for this may
be the fact that refugees draw from different segments of the population in their home
country than do economic migrants.4 For instance, Deole (2019) and Steinhardt (2018)
focus on the population of migrants who moved to Germany in the late 1960s to meet
the shortage of labor that was prevalent in Germany at that time. These migrants
were actively recruited, either by the German government or the sending countries’
government. Furthermore, we find no effect on refugees’ intention to stay (ITS) in
Germany at the extensive margin. This is an important result. Existing research
shows that the time horizon over which migrants can accrue returns to investments in
country-specific human capital is positively associated with the gradient in their age-
earnings profile (Dustmann 1993, 1997, 2000). With hate crimes having little effect on
the refugees’ ITS, we conclude that a change in the ITS can be ruled out as a mediator
between hate crime and the accumulation of country-specific human capital.
4Economic migrants normally leave their country of origin because of pull rather than push factors.
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We also find strong suggestive evidence that our effects are mostly driven by
refugees living in close proximity to the focal hate crime. Our data allows us to
calculate geographical distances between the location of the focal hate crime, e.g., city,
town or municipality, and the refugees’ place of residence. We then perform a median
split distinguishing between refugees who live close to the hate crime and refugees who
live further away. We find that refugees living closer to the respective hate crime have
also stronger adverse mental health effects, while the effects are considerably smaller
and insignificant for refugees living further away. Thus, this finding shows that the
mental health effects reflect a response to a more direct exposure to hate crime.
In a second part, we show that refugees who are better integrated within their host
country’s society–e.g., those who have frequent contact with German natives or possess
higher language proficiency levels–are less severely affected if they experienced a hate
crime. This effect is most prevalent for the PHQ-4 score: While the estimated effect
amounts to roughly 45 percent of a standard deviation for respondents who report low
levels of German language proficiency, the effect size is halved for refugees with high
country-specific human capital and statistically insignificant. Hence, we conclude that
country-specific human capital has the potential to protect refugees against external
negative shocks.
Moreover, while our empirical results indicate that the effect dissipates after ap-
proximately three months, we argue that those shocks have considerable long-term con-
sequences. For instance, research on the psychological foundations of poverty stresses
that reduced mental bandwidth increases the likelihood of worse economic choices.
In turn, these worse economic choices also reduce mental bandwidth, resulting in a
downward spiral (Schilbach et al. 2016). Similarly, we propose that hate crimes cause
mental stress, which in turn may reduce refugees’ mental bandwidth. This reduction
in their mental bandwidth could impair the refugees’ economic decision-making ability.
This could be particularly detrimental for refugees who fled severe conditions and are
at the start of a life in a new country. In addition, a broad literature shows the ad-
verse consequences of childhood exposure to stress and adverse conditions, including
in-utero exposure, on an individual’s long-term life outcomes (Almond and Currie 2011;
Almond et al. 2018). This possibly impairs the life-trajectories of the next generation.5
5For instance, Persson and Rossin-Slater (2018) show that prenatal exposure to stress increases
take-up of ADHD medications during childhood and take up of depression medication later in life.
Further, the infants’ indirect in utero exposure to the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. caused their birth
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Our paper relates to five branches of the literature. Abstaining from immigration,
previous papers unanimously conclude that terrorist attacks have substantial negative
effects on individuals’ life satisfaction that persist, albeit, only temporarily (Akay et
al. 2020; Clark et al. 2020). Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a quasi-experiment,
Metcalfe et al. (2011) further shows that there are spillover effects to other countries
such as the United Kingdom (U.K.).
Second, we also contribute to the literature on the effect of hate crimes on immi-
grants’ health and integration within the host society. For the U.S., Gould and Klor
(2014) show that the 9/11 attacks induced a backlash against Muslim immigrants,
which in turn increased the opportunity costs of assimilation. For instance, in re-
sponse to the 9/11 attack, Muslim immigrants in the U.S. were more likely to marry
someone with the same ethnic background than before. Further, they also experienced
lower rates of labor force participation (Gould and Klor 2014). For Germany, there
is evidence that hate crimes reduce integration outcomes as well as life and health
satisfaction for immigrants with a Turkish background. Steinhardt (2018) shows that
macro exposure to anti-immigrant attacks in the early 1990s in West Germany reduces
the Turkish migrants’ life satisfaction, increases their return intentions, and slows lan-
guage acquisition. Further, Deole (2019) studies the revelation crimes directed toward
Turkish residents in Germany in 2011. Deole (2019) finds that these revelations re-
duced the Turkish immigrants’ life satisfaction.
We also relate to the literature focusing on the causes of hate crime. For Germany,
Krueger and Pischke (1997), Falk et al. (2011) and Entorf and Lange (2019) analyze
which socio-demographic characteristics predict hate crimes on the county level. More-
over, the literature is investigating how social media can predict hate crime (Bursztyn
et al. 2019; Müller and Schwarz 2018a; Müller and Schwarz 2018b). We add to this
literature by turning to the effect of hate crime on the most vulnerable group among
those targeted: refugees. Lastly, we also contribute to a larger more general litera-
ture about the socio-economic determinants of mental health (Adhvaryu et al. 2019;
Fruewirth et al. 2019).
Our contribution to the literature is twofold: First, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to analyze the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health. This is
weight to decrease by 15 grams, the likelihood of being born weighting less than 1,500 grams by
14 percent, and the likelihood of being born at less than 37 gestational weeks by 9 percent (Brown
2020).
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surprising, given the stark increase in forced migration, which is expected to increase
further given the economic and environmental changes worldwide (UNHCR 2019), and
the fact that mental illnesses has the highest prevalence of all non-communicable dis-
eases (Bloom et al. 2011). Our results further suggest the importance of mental health
for (labor market) integration and the subsequent long-term consequences for refugees
in Germany. Second, we show that human capital has the potential to protect refugees
against negative external shocks. Refugee migration is increasing across Europe and
we contribute by providing a new mechanism that explains heterogeneities in refugee
integration outcomes.
3.2 Forced migration and hate crime
In the 2010s, environmental deterioration and political upheavals in many African and
Asian countries caused a stark increase in the number of refugees worldwide. Figure 3.1
shows that the trend accelerated starting in 2013, following the outbreak of the Arab
spring. Among refugees, the vast majority typically migrates either within their coun-
try of origin or settles down in a neighboring country (UNHCR 2019). However, as the
supply conditions deteriorated rapidly in the neighboring countries’ refugee camps and
intermediary states like Libya collapsed, large numbers of refugees began to migrate
to Central Europe in 2014 and 2015 (Luft 2016).
In Europe, the Dublin-regulation stipulates that an application for asylum must be
processed by the first Dublin country the asylum seeker enters. This is why, European
Union (EU) members closest to the refugees’ countries of origin–normally at the edge
of the EU–were disproportionately affected by the number of refugees migrating to
Europe. As the number of refugees increased in these countries, the local conditions
deteriorated quickly. Initially, the European countries tried to negotiate a new scheme
to distribute refugees across the European Union’s member countries. However, these
negotiations were unsuccessful and, finally, in light of the inhumane situation of the
refugees in some of the EU’s host countries, the German government suspended the
Dublin regulation in fall 2015 (BAMF 2015a). This triggered a large influx of refugees
to Germany. Consequently, in 2015 Germany received the largest number of refugees in
absolute terms, ranking third after Austria and Sweden in relative terms (Organization
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for Economic Co-operation and Development 2017, p.17ff). Subsequently, however, the
number of refugees in Germany decreased to pre-2015 levels (Figure 3.2).
Turning to the refugees’ demographics, the majority of refugees in Germany origi-
nate from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In 2016, the Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees (BAMF) reported the share of first-time asylum applications was 36.9 percent
Syrian, 17.6 percent Afghan, and 13.3 percent Iraqi (BAMF 2016b). In addition, these
refugees tend to be very young with 73.8 percent of these refugees younger than 30
(BAMF 2016b).
Associated with the stark increase in the number of refugees, Germany experienced
a strong increase in xenophobic sentiments directed against immigrants and refugees.
For instance, using data from the Federal Criminal Office, we observe a strong increase
in hate crimes against refugee shelters around the time when large number of refugees
entered Germany (Figure 3.3). The number of attacks increased strongly from 2014
to 2015, remained on an elevated level in 2016, and then returned to initial levels as
the number of foreigners arriving in Germany fell. For instance, while our data shows
971 hate crimes in 2016, it declines to 303 hate crimes in 2017 and 170 in 2018.
Figure 3.4 provides a more detailed picture, displaying the number of attacks
on refugee shelters per 100,000 residents at county-level per year.6 We make two
observations from this figure. First, as described before, the intensity of hate crimes
declines over time. Second, although hate crime is always more prevalent in Eastern
German states, it is dispersed across Germany.
3.3 Data
We use two datasets to estimate the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health:
The first dataset incorporates administrative information on hate crime against refugee
shelters. The second dataset is the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany,
which provides us with detailed information on refugees’ mental health as well as a
wide range of socio-economic characteristics. In what follows, we describe these two
datasets in detail.
6We resort to hate crimes per capita in these figures since the initial distribution of refugees
within states relies on the counties’ share of the population within each state. Consequently, a cross-
sectional regression of the counties’ share of the states’ intake of refugees on the counties population
share within the respective state and state fixed effects results in an estimated OLS coefficient of one.
Results are available on request.
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3.3.1 Administrative data on hate crime against refugee shelters
Our comprehensive data on hate crime against refugee shelters stems from the German
Federal Criminal Police Office (“Bundeskriminalamt”).7 Each entry includes informa-
tion on the date of the attack, the state, the locality, the type of crime, and the
crime’s political motivation. For illustrative purposes, Table 3.4 illustrates an excerpt
of the data for January 1, 2016. The major advantage of this dataset is that it reports
hate crimes that target refugees specifically rather than an aggregate measure of hate
crimes that would have precluded the ability to distinguish between crimes targeting
economic migrants and those targeting refugees. Second, hate crime against refugee
shelters are much more salient than individual incidents like refugees being attacked
on the street. Finally, the BKA data is less likely to suffer from endogenous coverage,
which could be, for instance, the case for newspaper data (Entorf and Lange 2019).
As such, it is an ideal source of information on hate crime against refugees for this
analysis.
In a first step, we collected all information on hate crime against refugee shelters
from the small inquiries and digitized the BKA information accordingly. In a second
step, we geo-referenced the data based on information on the state and the exact
location, e.g., the name of the city or municipality.8 Overall, our data records 1,444
events between 2016 and 2018. As displayed in Section 3.2, the incidence of hate
crimes against refugee shelters substantially decreased over time.
3.3.2 IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees
The IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees comprises information on refugees’ men-
tal health and their socio-economic characteristics. The IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey
of Refugees was introduced in 2016, in response to the major influx of migrants to
Germany in 2015 (Brücker et al. 2016; DIW 2017). This novel survey is part of the
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, Goebel et al. (2019)) and, hitherto, is the only database
that allows for quantitative and empirical social research on refugees in Germany over
this time frame. In addition to information on refugees’ migration histories, back-
7The information was compiled by the German Federal Government in response to small inquiries
(“kleine Anfrage”) by the parliamentary group “DIE LINKE” and is published on a quarterly basis.
8In less than five cases, we were not able to determine the exact GPS location since the respective
location existed several times in the respective state.
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ground characteristics, overall living conditions, and integration outcomes in Germany,
the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees provides detailed information on refugees’
mental health and their exact place of residence.
In our analysis, we use a single cross-section from 2016 due to two reasons: First,
2016 is the year when hate crimes were most prevalent in Germany during the 2010s.
Second, information on the PHQ-4 score is only available in 2016. The interviews in the
IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees typically take place from June to December in
each year. Consequently, our period of observation is the second half of 2016. We merge
each observation in the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees to the respective hate
crimes, based on the information on the exact interview date and the location. For each
survey respondent, we then calculate the number of elapsed days since the most recent
hate crime–the focal hate crime–in the county of residence. This running variable then
governs the treatment status. The running variable is negative for refugees who were
interviewed before a hate crime occurred. If, on the other hand, the focal hate crime
took place before the refugee was interviewed, the running variable is positive thereby
marking the respondent as a treated individual.
3.3.3 Measuring refugees’ mental health
We measure the refugees’ mental health using the two mental health measures available
in the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees: the MCS and the PHQ-4 score. The
MCS score is based on the Short-Form 12 questionnaire (SF-12), which contains twelve
health-related items inferring the respondent’s physical and mental health over the 30
days preceding the interview (Andersen et al. 2007). The MCS score is shown to be
highly predictive for mental illnesses in the European population (Vilagut et al. 2013)
and is an established measure of mental health in the economic literature (Eibich 2015;
Hofmann and Mühlenweg 2018; Marcus 2013).9
For the principal component analysis, we combine the twelve health items in eight
subscales and normalize these subscales to have mean zero and a standard deviation of
one. Subsequently, we perform a principal component analysis of these eight subscales
for all first-time respondents in 2016 and 2017. The eight subscales of the SF-12
9We apply the algorithm of Andersen et al. (2007) to the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees.
The number of factors as well as the factor loadings are very similar to those of the SOEP norm
population in Andersen et al. (2007).
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questionnaire load exactly on two factors. Figure 3.5, which plots the factors against
the respective Eigenvalues, shows that the first two factors have Eigenvalues greater
than or equal to one. We conclude that the first two factors are the only significant
factors. In a last step, we perform a varimax rotation. The resulting factor loadings
are displayed in Table 3.5.
Clearly, the factor loadings of the second factor in column (2) of Table 3.5 load
very high on the subscales that are associated with mental health. The respective
factor loadings for the mental health subscales range from 0.577 to 0.823, whereas the
remainder factor loadings range from 0.084 to 0.313. In what follows, we refer to this
factor as the MCS score.
Along with the MCS score, we also employ a mental health measure based on the
PHQ-4 inventory (Kroenke et al. 2009). The scores based on the PHQ-4 inventory
are shown to have high reliability and validity (Kroenke et al. 2009; Loewe et al.
2010) as well as, importantly, to have good psychometric properties in a representative
survey of Arab refugees (Kliem et al. 2016). The PHQ-4 inventory consists of four
items, including the frequency of feeling little interest or pleasure in one’s activities,
melancholy, anxiety, and the inability to stop worrying. Responses to the four items
are given on a four-point Likert-scale, ranging from one “Not at all” to four “(Almost)
every day”. In what follows, we proceed similarly to the construction of the MCS score
and perform a principal component analysis of the PHQ-4 inventory.10 Figure 3.6
shows that the Eigenvalue of the first factor is 2.40. In contrast, the second eigenvalue
is 0.76. Consequently, we use the first factor as the only significant factor. Additionally,
the factor loadings of the first and only factor, depicted in Table 3.6, range from 0.598
to 0.845. We label this factor PHQ-4 score. Initially, higher scores indicate worse
mental health. However, to ease interpretation, we inverted the scale. In this study,
higher values are indicative of better mental health.
3.3.4 Additional outcomes and covariates
Additional outcome variables are life satisfaction and the respondents’ intention to stay
in Germany. Life satisfaction is inferred by the answer to the question “How satisfied
10Often, researchers just use the sum of the four items, implying equal weighting of each factor.
However, we decided to use an equal procedure as with the SF-12 questionnaire to remain consistent
across mental health measurements.
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are you with your life, all things considered?”. The answer to this question is given
on an eleven-point Likert-scale, ranging from zero, “Completely dissatisfied,” to ten,
“Completely satisfied.” The respondents’ intention to stay is inferred from the answer
to the question “Do you want to stay in Germany forever?”. Based on responses to
this item, we construct an indicator that is equal to one if a respondent wants to stay
in Germany forever and zero otherwise.
Additionally, we use the command of the German language as well as the number of
contacts with Germans as proxies for country-specific human capital. The respondents
are asked how well they can speak, read, or write in German. Answers are given on a
five-point Likert-scale ranging from one “Very well” to five “Not at all”. We construct
an indicator that is equal to one if respondents state that they can speak, read, or
write German at least averagely. The number of contacts with Germans is inferred by
the question “How many German people have you met since your arrival in Germany
with whom you have regular contact?” Here, we construct an indicator that is equal
to one if the respondents’ answer is above the median number. The final summary
characteristics, together with further predetermined characteristics, of our working
sample are displayed in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Mean S.D. Min. Max. N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes:
MCS score 49.357 10.471 15.075 74.147 1215
PHQ-4 score 0.010 1.031 -1.098 3.150 1215
Life satisfaction 7.280 2.326 0.000 10.000 1215
Intention to stay 0.947 0.225 0.000 1.000 1215
Refugee’s characteristics:
Female 0.388 0.488 0.000 1.000 1215
Year of birth 1981.821 10.376 1940.000 1998.000 1215
MENA origin 0.769 0.422 0.000 1.000 1215
Child present 0.674 0.469 0.000 1.000 1215
Married 0.686 0.464 0.000 1.000 1215
Characteristics of counties (2014):
GDP per capita (in 1000) 35.939 12.876 20.373 93.773 1215
Average age 44.644 1.801 41.100 49.700 1215
Share of foreigners 0.085 0.050 0.013 0.240 1215
Note: Table 3.1 displays summary statistics for the outcome variables, individual level characteristics
and county level characteristics in 2014. Column (1) displays means. Column (2) displays the
corresponding standard deviations. Columns (3) and (4) display the minimum and the maximum;
column (5) displays the number of observations. The sample is restricted to a bandwidth of 90
days around the cutoff. Source: SOEP, v34.
3.4 Empirical Method
We estimate the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health using a regression
discontinuity design that compares refugees who were interviewed shortly before and
after the occurrence of a hate crime in their county of residence. Thus, we estimate
the following weighted local linear regression:
Yicmd = α + βDicmd +γDaysicmd + δDicmd ×Daysicmd + ζmonthi +θdowi + εicmd .
(3.1)
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In Equation 3.1, Yicmd is the mental health outcome of interest, i.e. the MCS or the
PHQ-4 score for respondent i in county c, in monthm and day of week d. The indicator
Dicmd is equal to one if the refugee was interviewed after a hate crime happened in their
county of residence and zero otherwise. The running variable Daysicmd captures the
number of days elapsed since the focal hate crime occurred. We allow for differential
linear trends before and after the focal hate crime.11 Consequently, we include the
interaction term Dicmd × Daysicmd in Equation 3.1.12 In addition, we account for
potential seasonality in the mental health outcomes by including indicators for the
month when respondents were interviewed monthi . Further, we account for potential
discontinuities in mental health and the likelihood that a hate crime takes place, which
are associated with the day of week, dowi . For instance, perpetrators could be more
active on weekends than on weekdays. At the same time, refugees’ mental health
could be better on weekends compared to weekdays. In this case, we potentially
underestimate the true effect of hate crimes. We use a triangular kernel and cluster
the standard errors on the running variable level, because our running variable is
discrete (Lee and Card 2010).13
It is notable that in some counties, hate crimes are clustered in time. Thus, it
could be the case that refugees in the control group are treated as if they were subject
to a hate crime that took place before the focal hate crime, e.g., the actual relative
distance plus one day. Similarly, treated refugees could have been subject to an addi-
tional hate crime before the focal hate crime. If this happens randomly, e.g., if these
confounding attacks are independent and identically distributed, this would result in
an attenuation bias. This attenuation bias potentially causes our estimates to be at-
tenuated toward zero. Therefore, in the robustness section, we carry out a careful test
gauging the relevance of this bias. We carefully drop observations that are multiply
treated within various bandwidths and observe that the estimates tend to increase as
we drop observations that are treated multiple times. Indeed, we find evidence for our
conjecture. Thus, as precautionary measure and to optimally utilize the number of
observations, we drop refugees who experienced a hate crime within 30 days before the
focal hate crime.
11We also allow for more flexible trends in the robustness section.
12In the robustness section, we also allow for quadratic trends in the running variable. Our
conclusions remain unaltered.
13We also base our inference on standard errors clustered on the county level in the robustness
section. Our conclusions remain unchanged.
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Based on this empirical specification, we choose the bandwidth to be ±90 days.14
Continuity assumption
Our identification assumption is based on the premise that, in absence of the treat-
ment, the population mean in mental health is a continuous function of the running
variable (Hahn et al. 2001). Another way to think about this is by means of selection
on observables (Lee and Lemieux 2010). In our case, the number of days elapsed since
the focal hate crime governs the treatment assignment. Refugees who were interviewed
before the focal hate crime are part of the control and refugees interviewed after the
focal hate crime are considered part of the treatment group. Strictly speaking, the
common support in the running variable is not guaranteed in this setting. This is why
we require the continuity assumption to finally ensure the overlap condition.
Under this assumption, the estimate of γ can be interpreted as the causal effect of
hate crime on refugees’ mental health. However, we cannot directly test the continuity
assumption because it involves a counterfactual situation, i.e., we would be able to
observe the population mean through the cutoff in absence of the treatment. Yet, we
provide evidence that the continuity assumption holds. If predetermined individual
and county level characteristics evolve continuously around the focal hate crime, we
may interpret this as empirical evidence that the continuity assumption is valid. Any
significant discontinuity in the mental health outcomes around the focal hate crime can
then be fully attributed to the focal hate crime. To test this, we apply our empirical
specification to various predetermined characteristics on the individual and county
levels.
Our estimates reveal no discontinuity in the predetermined individual and county
level characteristics around the focal hate crime. Figure 3.7 displays regression discon-
tinuity plots for various predetermined individual and county characteristics. Overall,
we find little visual evidence for discontinuities around the focal hate crime. Table 3.2
summarizes the results formally. Column (1) displays the point estimates, column (2)
displays the corresponding standard errors, and column (3) displays the p-values asso-
ciated with the coefficient estimates. Throughout, the majority of the estimates are
14Following Calonico et al. (2014), we find that the asymptotically MSE-optimal bandwidths for
the PHQ-4 and MCS score as well as life satisfaction are 113.1, 77.0, and 103.8, respectively. For
expositional clarity, we choose a bandwidth of 90 days or 3 months, which is close to the average of
the three respective bandwidths. However, we show that our results are robust to a wide range of
bandwidth choices in Section 3.5.3.
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small in relative terms. Further, all estimates are statistically insignificant. Thus, this
test provides suggestive evidence that the continuity assumption is warranted.
Table 3.2: Testing the continuity assumption
Point estimate Standard error P-value
(1) (2) (3)
Child present -0.081 0.059 0.168
MENA origin 0.050 0.052 0.328
Female 0.007 0.042 0.874
Married 0.033 0.065 0.606
Year of birth -0.560 1.021 0.583
Average age in county 0.105 0.255 0.679
GDP per capita in county 0.243 1.886 0.897
Share of foreigners in county -0.004 0.008 0.612
Note: Table 3.2 displays the results for a test of the continuity assumption for predetermined
individual and county level characteristics. Column (1) displays point estimates. Column (2)
displays standard errors corresponding to point estimates. Column (3) displays p-values. The
results are based on a local linear regression, using triangular kernels and a bandwidth of 90 days.
The outcomes are standardized to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one. Standard
errors are clustered on the running variable level (e.g., distance in days to the focal hate crime)
and are displayed in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: SOEP, v34.
Precise manipulation around the cutoff
A potential threat to our regression discontinuity design could be the precise ma-
nipulation around the cutoff (Lee and Card 2010; McCrary 2008). If selection into
or out of the treatment would be possible based on expected gains, our estimate of γ
would suffer from selection bias and may be inconsistent. In our context, individuals
would want to select out of treatment. The more vulnerable the refugees are, the more
likely they desire to select out of the treatment group. This would bias our estimate
of the effect downwards.
Since our data on hate crimes is based on official crime statistics, we assert that
strategic manipulation around the cutoff is difficult, if not impossible. This conjecture
is based on the assumption that these hate crimes are typically not known to the
public beforehand. In addition, the SOEP interviews are usually scheduled well in
advance. The reason is that the interviews usually take some time, especially if a
household consists of multiple individuals. Thus, it is very unlikely that selection
based on expected gains is prevalent.
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However, if exposure to hate crimes decreases the likelihood that respondents thor-
oughly reply to all questions in an interview, our estimates would be biased downward
since only the most robust respondents would reply. However, this results in a testable
assumption. If exposure to a hate crime is associated with a lower likelihood that
refugees provide information in their SOEP-interviews, we would observe a discontinu-
ity in the empirical distribution of observations around the cutoff.
A density test around the cutoff, proposed by McCrary (2008), suggests that nei-
ther of two phenomena are relevant in our case. If individuals were able to select
into or out of the treatment or if fewer respondents provided information about their
mental health in response to the hate crime, we would detect a discontinuity in the
empirical probability density function of interviews around the focal hate crime. Fig-
ure 3.8 displays the empirical distribution of observations against the running variable.
The vertical line indicates the day of the focal hate crime. Based on the inspection of
the empirical distribution function, we find no evidence of a discontinuity around the
focal hate crime. A p-value of 0.660 of a formal manipulation test, based on local poly-
nomial regressions of order two (Cattaneo et al. 2019), indicates that there exists no
discontinuity around the focal hate crime. Thus, we confidently rule out manipulation
or differential response behavior around the cutoff.
3.5 Results
In this section, we report our estimation results as well as additional robustness checks.
Thereafter, we report heterogeneity analysis with respect to the refugees’ country-
specific human capital and the geographic proximity to the focal hate crime.
3.5.1 The effect of hate crime on mental health
Panels a and b in Figure 3.9 illustrate the main results for the refugees’ MCS and
PHQ-4 score, whereby each figure displays a local linear fit on either side of the cutoff,
with bandwidths of 90 and triangular kernels. In both figures, the dots correspond to
binned scatterplots, with the number of bins being equal to ten on each side of the
cutoff (the focal hate crime). Both mental health outcomes are standardized to have
mean zero and standard deviation one.
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We find a strong discontinuity around the cutoff in both figures suggesting that
being a victim to a hate crime reduces the refugees’ mental health outcomes. Table 3.3
displays effect sizes corresponding to Equation 3.1. Columns (1) and (2) display the
point estimates for the MCS and PHQ-4 score along with the standard errors, respec-
tively. Based on these results, the effect sizes correspond to 37 percent of a standard
deviation for the MCS score and 28 percent of a standard deviation for the PHQ-4
score. As a comparison, Clark et al. (2020) finds that the Boston marathon bombing
reduced the nearby resident’s subjective well-being by a third of a standard deviation.
In addition, Metcalfe et al. (2011) find that the 9/11 attack in the U.S. decreases men-
tal distress in the U.K. population by about 7 to 14 percent of a standard deviation.
Thus, our estimates are of comparable size of studies such as (Clark et al. 2020).
Table 3.3: The effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, life satisfaction and
intention to stay
MCS PHQ-4 LS ITS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect of hate crime -0.368*** -0.284*** -0.040 0.023
(0.118) (0.104) (0.103) (0.022)
Number of observations 1215 1215 1215 1215
Note: Table 3.3 displays the effect of hate crimes on refugees’ mental health, life satisfaction and in-
tention to stay. Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) display point estimates and corresponding standard
errors for the MCS score, the PHQ-4 score as well as life satisfaction and refugees’ intention to
stay, respectively. The coefficients are based on a local linear regression, using triangular kernels
and a bandwidth of 90 days. The outcomes are standardized to have mean zero and a standard
deviation of one. Standard errors are clustered on the running variable level (e.g., distance in days
to the focal hate crime) and are displayed in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP, v34.
While the estimated effects are sizable, the fact that mental health outcomes trend-
ing toward pre-treatment level indicates that the effect is transitory. The mental health
outcomes reach their pre-treatment level after three months. Yet, the literature shows
that such shocks can impair decision making and alter long-term outcomes, especially
for the refugees’ children. Thus, negative health shocks have the potential to nega-
tively affect the trajectory of refugees, especially since they must navigate through
many uncertainties shortly after arrival.
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3.5.2 The effect of hate crime on life satisfaction and ITS
Panels c and d in Figure 3.9 illustrate the main results for refugees’ life satisfaction
and ITS. The corresponding estimation results are displayed in columns (3) and (4)
of Table 3.3. In contrast to mental health, hate crime has no effect on refugees’ life
satisfaction and their intention to stay in Germany. These are remarkable results,
which stand in clear contrast to the findings of Deole (2019) and Steinhardt (2018).
It must be emphasized that life satisfaction is a multi-dimensional concept that
measures the overall quality of life. As such, measures of life satisfaction are clearly
distinct but associated with measures of symptoms of common mental disorders, e.g.,
depression (Keyes 2006). To put it differently, having impaired mental health is not a
sufficient condition for decreased life satisfaction. Furthermore, we argue that this em-
phasizes the difference in the perception of hate crime between refugees and economic
migrants. Refugees are typically unable or unwilling to return to their home countries
for fear of violent conflict or persecution. This is particularly true for the refugee
population in our sample, who were mainly displaced because of civil wars. Thus,
strong push factors caused these refugees to search refuge in Europe. In contrast to
refugees, the composition of economic migrants is the result of an interaction of pull
and push factors (Lazear 2020). Consequently, a hypothesis consistent with our em-
pirical observations is that the threshold that causes economic migrants to reconsider
their time horizon in the host country is lower. In addition, Steinhardt (2018) focuses
on the intention to return within the next five years. Therefore, our study and that of
Steinhardt (2018) compare the return intentions at different margins, e.g., extensive
versus intensive margin.
The observation that hate crimes do not alter the refugees’ intention to stay has
an additional implication: With hate crimes not altering the time horizon over which
refugees accrue returns to country-specific human capital, this cannot be considered
an important mediator in our analyses.
3.5.3 Additional robustness checks
The previous section shows that hate crime has a strong negative effect on refugees’
mental health, i.e., the MCS and the PHQ-4 score, and no effect on the refugees’ life
satisfaction and ITS. In this section, we provide additional robustness checks support-
ing the credibility of our estimates.
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Choice of bandwidth
Our results are robust to a wide range of bandwidth choices. Panels a to d in Fig-
ure 3.10 display the coefficient estimates of equation 3.1 and associated the 95 percent
confidence intervals as a function of the bandwidth for the MCS and PHQ-4 score as
well as life satisfaction and ITS. Varying the bandwidth from 10 to 150 days in incre-
ments of 10 days, we see that the coefficient estimates for the MCS and the PHQ-4
score are similar to the main results and statistically significant for a wide range of
bandwidths surrounding the respective MSE-optimal bandwidth. In contrast, for all
bandwidths, point estimates for life satisfaction and the refugees’ ITS are close to zero
and statistically insignificant.
Inclusion of covariates
The results are also robust to the inclusion of a wide set of predetermined covariates
on the individual and county levels. In Section 3.4, we argue that identification stems
from the assumption that–in absence of the focal hate crime–the population mean
of our outcome is a continuous function of the running variable. Alternatively, one
can also think of the identification stemming from local randomization around the
focal hate crime (Hausman and Rapson 2018; Lee and Lemieux 2010). We provide
evidence for this by including predetermined individual and county level characteristics
in Equation 3.1. The results are displayed in Table 3.7, where each row displays
coefficients and standard errors for another outcome. We subsequently add different
covariates to the regression: Column (1) adds individuals characteristics, column (2)
includes only county level characteristics, and column (3) includes both. Throughout,
we observe that the coefficients remain remarkable stable and significant. We consider
this as evidence that the local randomization was indeed successful.
Clustering of hate crimes in time
In Section 3.4, we argue that the clustering of hate crimes within counties in time
may bias our results downwards. If individuals are multiply treated, i.e., if they experi-
ence several hate crimes preceding the interview, refugees’ mental health may decrease
and our estimates would be attenuated. Therefore, we exclude those individuals who
experience a second hate crime within a thirty day window before the interview. One
may, however, argue that this is a selective choice. Hence, as a robustness check, we sub-
sequently exclude different time frames and estimate our treatment effect. Table 3.8
illustrates estimation results. Overall, we find hate crimes to substantially impair
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refugees’ mental health. In line with our argument, the estimates increase in size the
more strictly we ban multiple treated. For instance, while the MCS score decreases by
37 percent of a standard deviation in our baseline specification, this value increases to
71 percent of a standard deviation if we exclude observations who experience a second
hate crime in a ninety day window before the interview.
More flexible specification
Furthermore, our results are robust to alternative and more flexible specifications.
The main specification in Equation 3.1 is linear. In general, there is no reason to
believe that the true model is indeed linear. If we misspecify our model, our estimate
could be potentially biased. Therefore, we also allow for a quadratic trend in the run-
ning variable following the recommendation of Gelman and Imbens (2019). Table 3.9
displays the results for specifications with a quadratic trend. For each outcome, we
separately calculated asymptotically MSE-optimal bandwidths (Calonico et al. 2014).
Again, the effects point toward a sizable negative effect of hate crimes on refugees’
mental health. While the effect size for the MCS score remains relatively stable, the
effect size for the PHQ-4 score increases from about 28 percent of a standard deviation
to 32 percent of a standard deviation.
Inference
In our main specification, we followed the literature and clustered on the level of
the running variable. However, we show that our results are robust to clustering on
the county level instead. This implies serial correlation of the regressor or error term
within the cluster. The results are displayed in Table 3.10. Table 3.10 displays the
respective coefficient estimates with the standard errors, clustered on the county level.
Placebo estimates
If we assume that the event happened either thirty days before or after the focal
hate crime our estimation results become null. Figure 3.11 shows coefficient estimates
for each of these specifications along with the accompanying 95 percent confidence
intervals. Throughout, the coefficients are small and close to zero. Further, the confi-
dence intervals suggest that we cannot reject the absence of any effect.
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3.5.4 Interaction with geographical distance
The previous results rely on the county of residence as the relevant geographical unit.
We chose this in order to avoid ad hoc assumptions about the relevant distance in,
for instance, radius matching. However, a natural question that arises is, whether it
is actual hearsay or the fact that the refugees are directly affected by the respective
hate crime. To further characterize our estimates, we calculate the actual geographic
distance between the place where the actual hate crime took place and the refugees’
place of residence. For the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, the exact geo-
location is available within a specialized secure setting at the Research Data Center of
the SOEP. Unfortunately, we do not have the exact GPS data of the refugee shelters
that were attacked. We only have the location, e.g., city or municipality. We assign
each attack the centroid of the respective location. However, in some cases, it is
the district of a city. Thus, some measurement error is associated with the distance
calculation. To minimize concerns, we distinguish between refugees living close by and
further away by means of a median split.
The results clearly indicate that those refugees living closer to the focal hate crime
show greater effects than those living further away. Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 visu-
alize the results. The left column displays the results for those refugees living nearby.
The right column for those living further away. Clearly, for the mental health outcomes,
the discontinuity is larger for refugees living closer to the focal hate crime. We see no
such differences for life satisfaction or the refugees’ ITS. Table 3.11 shows the exact
point estimates. For those refugees closer to the hate crime, the effect sizes are more
than twice as large as for those living further away. In addition, the estimate becomes
insignificant for refugees living further away. However, our estimates are not precise
enough to formally reject the null hypothesis of no difference. Overall, our conclusions
are similar to the conclusions drawn by Clark et al. (2020), who also find that residents
who live more closely to the Boston Marathon Bombing are more severely affected.
3.5.5 Country-specific human capital as a mediator
In the following section, we provide suggestive evidence that country-specific human
capital is a potential mediator between hate crimes and the refugees’ mental health.
We consider the refugees’ command of German and their social capital, measured by
the frequency of contact with German natives, as proxies for country-specific human
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capital. We distinguish between refugees who speak, read, and write German at least
averagely from those who report lower levels of language proficiency. With respect
to social capital, we distinguish between refugees who have at least weekly contact
with German natives and those who have less contact.15 Additionally, we distinguish
between human capital that is difficult–more costly–to acquire and low cost human
capital. We argue that reading German and having frequent contact with Germans are
easier to acquire (low cost) dimensions of country-specific human capital than writing
and speaking German (high cost).
Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 display the results for the stock of low and high cost
country-specific human capital, respectively. In Table 3.12, columns (1) and (2) show
the results for having at least weekly contact with Germans versus less frequent contact.
Columns (3) and (4) display the results for being able to read German at least averagely
versus worse than averagely. The results in Table 3.12 suggest a lower effect of hate
crime on the mental health of refugees who have frequent contact with Germans and
are better able to read German. In effect sizes, the difference between refugees with
low versus high country-specific human capital is 6.6 percentage points of a standard
deviation for the MCS score. This corresponds to a difference of 15.9 percent relative
to the effect size for those who have less frequent contact with Germans. On the other
hand, the difference is 15.1 percentage points for between those who read German
at least averagely and those who read German below averagely for the PHQ-4 score.
This is equivalent to 42.5 percent relative to the effect size for those who read less than
averagely German. However, the difference between those who read German at least
averagely and those who read German less than the average is smaller and points in
the opposite direction.
In Table 3.13, columns (1) and (2) display results for individuals who write German
at least averagely and less than averagely, while columns (3) and (4) display the results
for individuals who speak German at least averagely and less than averagely. Here,
the pattern is even more pronounced. The differences uniformly suggest that effect
sizes are considerably smaller for refugees with high levels of country-specific human
capital. For the PHQ-4 score, results suggest that we can not reject the absence of
an effect of hate crime on the refugees’ mental health for those who write and speak
15Note that the frequency of having contact with German natives may change as a result of the
hate crimes. However, we theorize that this may not be the case regarding the command over the
German language.
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German at least averagely. Moreover, the difference in effect sizes amounts to 30.8
percentage points of a standard deviation for the PHQ-4 score between those who
speak German at least averagely and those who speak German less than averagely.
This corresponds to 69 percent relative to the effect size for those who speak German
less than averagely. On the other hand, the difference in effect sizes is 14.7 percentage
points for the MCS score between those who speak German at least averagely and
those who speak German less than averagely. This is equal to 34.2 percent relative to
the baseline.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that hate crimes have a strong and negative effect on refugees’ mental
health, as measured by the MCS and PHQ-4 score. Effects are stronger for refugees
living in close geographic proximity to the focal hate crime and refugees with low
levels of country-specific human capital: Refugees who are better integrated are less
prone to the adverse effects of hate crime on mental health. This moderating effect is
stronger, the higher the opportunity costs of acquiring country-specific human capital.
The results are robust to various robustness checks and specifications, for instance
alternative choices of bandwidth or the inclusion of individual and regional level control
variables.
In contrast to mental health, we find no effect of hate crime on refugees’ life
satisfaction or intention to stay in Germany. This result stands in clear contrast to the
previous literature, which considers the effect of hate crime on economic immigrants’
integration (Deole 2019; Steinhardt 2018). The contrasting results may be explained
by the inherent differences between refugees and economic migrants, thus reinforcing
the importance of distinguishing between these groups.
While the negative effects of hate crime on refugee mental health are transitory,
we argue that hate crimes happening to refugees during a critical stage, for example
right after arriving in the host society, may impair decision making and alter life-time
trajectories in the host society in the long-run.
The results have very important policy implications. Mental health is a central
determinant of individual’s well-being, and physical integrity is a basic constitutional
right. Impaired mental health as a result of perceived hate crimes may therefore
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have substantial negative effects for refugees that may harm integration in the host
country in the long-run. Besides this first-order effect, slow integration of refugees
creates substantial negative externalities and fiscal costs for the host societies. As a
consequence, our results ask for increased attention towards the mental health needs of
refugees being victims of hate crime. In addition, refugees’ integration success depends
on the host societies’ attitudes towards refugees (Ther 2017) and hate crimes are the
most severe form of refusal. If host countries wish to integrate refugees, they should
make every effort to create equal opportunities and social cohesion.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Tables
Table 3.4: Attacks against refugee shelters
No. Date Place State Type of crime Right-wing
1 01.01.2016 Nienburg/Saale ST Insult §185 StGB x
2 01.01.2016 Merseburg/Saale ST Sedition §130 StGB x
3 01.01.2016 Wernigerode ST Property damage
§304 StGB
x
4 01.01.2016 Assamstadt BW Grievous bodily harm
§224 StGB
x




6 01.01.2016 Ruppertshofen BW Use of symbols of uncon-
stitutional organizations
§86a StGB
7 01.01.2016 Zeven NI Grievous bodily harm
§224 StGB
8 01.01.2016 Leverkusen NW Grievous bodily harm
§224 StGB
x
Notes: This table is based on administrative data on hate crimes against refugee shelters (all entries
for January 1, 2016), which is published by the German federal government on a quarterly basis.
Source: BKA data (2016-2018).
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Physical Fitness 0.791 0.084
General Health 0.740 0.281
Bodily Pain 0.831 0.194
Role Physical 0.823 0.313
Mental Health 0.155 0.823
Role Emotional 0.544 0.605
Social Functioning 0.494 0.577
Vitality 0.108 0.700
Note: Table 3.5 displays the factor loadings of a principal component analysis on the subscales
of the Short-Form 12 questionnaire. The factor analysis has been performed on all first-time
respondents of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey in 2016 and 2017. Column (1) displays
the corresponding factor loadings for the first factor, the Physical Component Summary score.
Column (2) displays the factor loadings of the second factor, the MCS. Source: SOEP, v34.







Note: Table 3.6 displays the factor loadings of a principal component analysis on the items of the
PHQ-4 inventory. The factor analysis has been performed on the first-time respondents of the
IAB-SOEP-BAMF Refugee Survey in 2016. Column (1) displays the corresponding factor loadings
for the first factor. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Table 3.7: The effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, life satisfaction and
intention to stay
(1) (2) (3)
MCS -0.337*** -0.361*** -0.329***
(0.118) (0.119) (0.119)
PHQ-4 -0.291*** -0.284*** -0.290***
(0.107) (0.102) (0.105)
Life satisfaction -0.030 -0.031 -0.023
(0.097) (0.103) (0.097)
Intention to stay 0.029 0.023 0.030
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Refugees’ predetermined characteristics X X
Regional predetermined characteristics X X
Number of observations 1215 1215 1215
Note: Table 3.7 displays the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, life satisfaction and
intention to stay, controlling for individual or county level characteristics. Columns (1), (2),
(3), and (4) display point estimates and corresponding standard errors for estimations including
predetermined individual, regional as well as individual and regional characteristics, respectively.
The coefficients are based on a local linear regression, using triangular kernels and a bandwidth
of 90 days. The outcomes are standardized to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one.
Standard errors are clustered on the running variable level (e.g., distance in days to the focal hate
crime) and are displayed in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Table 3.8: The effect of xenophobic attacks on refugees’ mental health, accounting for
multiply treated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
14 days 30 days 45 days 60 days 90 days
MCS -0.280*** -0.369*** -0.422*** -0.636*** -0.713***
(0.099) (0.118) (0.143) (0.131) (0.145)
PHQ-4 -0.268*** -0.285*** -0.331*** -0.483*** -0.550***
(0.100) (0.104) (0.125) (0.110) (0.121)
Life satisfaction -0.153* -0.040 -0.081 -0.063 -0.078
(0.086) (0.102) (0.127) (0.129) (0.142)
Intention to stay 0.011 0.023 0.037 0.041 0.030
(0.023) (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) (0.026)
Number of observations 1133 1215 1098 982 770
Note: Table 3.8 displays the effect of xenophobic attacks on refugees’ mental health. We argue
that estimates may be downward biased if gate crimes are clustered in time. Therefore, we drop
observations who experienced a second hate crime shortly before the focal hate crime for different
time periods. Column (1) drops observations who experience a second hate crime in a fourteen
day period preceding the focal hate crime. Columns (2), (3), (4), and (5) display the results for a
thirty (baseline estimation), forty-five, sixty, and ninety day period, respectively. The coefficients
are based on a local linear regression, using triangular kernels and a bandwidth of 90 days. The
outcomes are standardized to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one. Standard errors
are clustered on the running variable level (e.g., distance in days to the focal hate crime) and are
displayed in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Table 3.9: The effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, allowing for a quadratic
trend in the running variable
MCS PHQ-4 LS ITS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect of hate crime -0.363** -0.324** 0.082 0.028
(0.157) (0.132) (0.153) (0.030)
Number of observations 1383 1371 1215 1390
MSERD optimal bandwidth 111.860 109.559 89.686 113.941
Note: Table 3.9 displays the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, life satisfaction and
intention to stay allowing for a quadratic trend. Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) display point
estimates and corresponding standard errors for the MCS score, the PHQ-4 score as well as life
satisfaction and refugees’ intention to stay, respectively. The coefficients are based on a local linear
regression, using triangular kernels and a bandwidth of 90 days. The outcomes are standardized
to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one. Standard errors are clustered on the running
variable level (e.g., distance in days to the focal hate crime) and are displayed in parenthesis. * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: SOEP, v34.
Table 3.10: Different level of clustering
MCS PHQ-4 LS ITS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect of hate crime -0.368* -0.284** -0.040 0.023
(0.192) (0.130) (0.116) (0.023)
Number of observations 1215 1215 1215 1215
Note: Table 3.10 displays the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, life satisfaction and
intention to stay, clustering the standard errors on the level of the county. Columns (1), (2), (3),
and (4) display point estimates and corresponding standard errors for the MCS score, the PHQ-4
score as well as life satisfaction and refugees’ intention to stay, respectively. The coefficients are
based on a local linear regression, using triangular kernels and a bandwidth of 90 days. The
outcomes are standardized to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one. Standard errors
are clustered on the county level and are displayed in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Table 3.11: The effect of xenophobic attacks on refugees’ mental health, accounting for
geographic distance to hate crime
(1) (2)





Life satisfaction -0.109 0.021
(0.140) (0.148)
Intention to stay 0.035 0.015
(0.038) (0.028)
Number of observations 585 620
Note: Table 3.11 displays the effect of xenophobic attacks on refugees’ mental health, disaggregated
by geographic distance to the focal hate crime. Column (1) displays point estimates for refugees
with low geographic distance to the focal hate crime, while column (2) displays results for refugees
with high geographic distance. The coefficients are based on a local linear regression, using
triangular kernels and a bandwidth of 90 days. The outcomes are standardized to have mean zero
and a standard deviation of one. Standard errors are clustered on the running variable level (e.g.,
distance in days to the focal hate crime) and are displayed in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Source: SOEP, v34.
172
Hate crimes and the mental health of refugees
Table 3.12: The effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, conditioning on low
cost country-specific human capital
Contact with Germans Reading German
Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MCS -0.349** -0.415*** -0.410*** -0.369**
(0.169) (0.152) (0.135) (0.164)
PHQ-4 -0.250* -0.344** -0.204* -0.355*
(0.149) (0.168) (0.116) (0.186)
Number of observations 654 550 622 582
Note: Table 3.12 displays the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental for refugees commanding
over low-cost country-specific human capital. We conjecture that “Contact with Germans” and
“Reading German” are low cost country-specific human capital. We distinguish between refugees
that command over the country specific human capital (“Yes”) or not (“No”). Refugees have
contact with frequent contact Germans if they have contact with Germans on a weekly basis.
Refugees command about the skill “Reading German” if they read German at least averagely.
The coefficients are based on a local linear regression, using triangular kernels and a bandwidth
of 90 days. The outcomes are standardized to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one.
Standard errors are clustered on the running variable level (e.g., distance in days to the focal hate
crime) and are displayed in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Table 3.13: The effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health, conditioning on high
cost country-specific human capital
Writing German Speaking German
Yes No Yes No
(5) (6) (7) (8)
MCS -0.277** -0.449*** -0.283** -0.430**
(0.123) (0.169) (0.121) (0.175)
PHQ-4 -0.133 -0.420** -0.139 -0.447**
(0.121) (0.187) (0.113) (0.188)
Number of observations 603 601 647 557
Note: Table 3.13 displays the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental for refugees commanding over
high-cost country-specific human capital. We conjecture that “Speaking German” and “Writing
German” are high cost country-specific human capital. We distinguish between refugees that
command over the country specific human capital (“Yes”) or not (“No”). Refugees command about
the skill “Reading German” or “Writing German” if they reply that they speak or read German
at least averagely. The coefficients are based on a local linear regression, using triangular kernels
and a bandwidth of 90 days. The outcomes are standardized to have mean zero and a standard
deviation of one. Standard errors are clustered on the running variable level (e.g., distance in days
to the focal hate crime) and are displayed in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP, v34.
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3.7.2 Figures
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Note: Figure 3.1 plots the number of displaced persons worldwide from 2008 to 2018. Source:
UNHCR 2009 to UNHCR 2019.
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Note: Figure 3.2 plots the number asylum seekers from 2010 to 2017. Source: Destatis 2019.
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Note: Figure 3.3 plots the number of attacks against refugee shelters. Source: Bundestag 2016.
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Note: Panels a to c in Figure 3.4 display the number of attacks on refugee shelters per 100,000
inhabitants and county from 2016 until 2018, respectively. Source: BKA data.
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Note: Figure 3.5 plots the factors and the corresponding Eigenvalues after a principal component
analysis of the Short-Form 12 questionnaire. The horizontal red line corresponds to Eigenvalues
of one. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Note: Figure 3.6 plots the factors and the corresponding Eigenvalues after a principal component
analysis of items of the PHQ-4 inventory. The horizontal red line corresponds to Eigenvalues of
one. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Note: Panels a to h in Figure 3.7 display visual results for covariate balance across the cutoff.
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P-value of null of no discontinuity of manipulation test: 0.660
Note: Figure 3.8 displays the empirical pdf of observations around the cutoff. A bandwidth of
90 days is chosen. Each bin corresponds to one day. Each par corresponds to the density of
observations at each day. The vertical bar indicates the day of the xenophobic attack. The p-
value corresponds to a p-value of a manipulation test based on local polynomial regressions of
order two. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Note: Panels a to d in Figure 3.9 display the effect of xenophobic attacks on migrants’ mental
health. Source: SOEP, v34.
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(d) ITS
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 3.10 display the effect of xenophobic attacks on the MCS and
PHQ-4 score, life satisfaction as well as intention to stay conditional on the bandwidth choice,
respectively. In each figure, a dot corresponds to a point estimate corresponding to bandwidth
choice each. The estimates correspond stem from a local linear regression of the respective mental
health outcome on an indicator for xenophobic attacks and a linear trend in the running variable,
which is allowed to vary before and after the cutoff. We used triangular kernels. The red bars
display 95% confidence bands. Throughout, we clustered standard errors on the relative distance
to the xenophobic attack. Source: SOEP, v34.
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Figure 3.11: Placebo estimates
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Note: Figure 3.11 displays the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of placebo tests. For
each mental health outcome, the left estimates correspond to point estimates of placebo regressions,
pretending the xenophobic attack happened 30 days before the actual xenophobic attack. The
right estimates display the respective estimates pretending the xenophobic attack happened 30
days after the actual xenophobic attack. Source: SOEP, v34.
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(d) PHQ-4, high geographic distance
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 3.12 display visual results for households with low versus high
geographic distance to the focal hate crime. Source: SOEP, v34.
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(d) ITS, high geographic distance
Note: Panels a to d in Figure 3.13 display visual results for households with low versus high
geographic distance to the focal hate crime. Source: SOEP, v34.
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4.1 Introduction
Migration is a global phenomenon that is continuously increasing and has reached
272 million people or 3.5 percent of the world’s population (UN DESA 2019). Migra-
tion flows are highly asymmetric and certain countries, including China, India, and
many Central and Eastern European countries, experience large outflows. There is a
substantial economic literature focusing on the effects of emigration on origin countries,
mostly focusing on brain drain versus brain gain concerns and remittances. Political
effects, especially the effects on voting, have received less attention. High emigration
rates can, however, have a substantial impact on election results in the origin country
if emigrants are a selected group and are less likely to cast their votes from abroad.
For governments facing a close race for reelection, the votes from abroad can be
decisive. Many governments have therefore started to run election campaigns in coun-
tries that have a large diaspora, a controversial example being the Turkish president
Erdogan campaigning in Germany in 2018. Depending on the political preferences of
the diaspora, governments can also strategically facilitate or complicate voting from
abroad, therefore receiving more or less votes from abroad. For instance, there exists
anecdotal evidence from the Polish diaspora that the recent government has made
voting from abroad more difficult as the diaspora is more likely to vote for the oppo-




The case of Poland is an interesting setting to study the effects of emigration
on election results. Especially after the accession to the European Union (EU) and
the subsequent introduction of free labor mobility to other EU countries, Poland has
seen large emigration rates, resulting in 4.4 million Polish citizens currently living
abroad (11.4 percent of the total population according to UN DESA, 2019). This is
not surprising, given the huge wage differentials within the EU. Polish citizens who
are living abroad, are much less likely to participate in elections in Poland. Across
different destinations and years, turnout of Polish citizens abroad is rarely larger than
10 percent, as opposed to an average of 50 percent in Poland. In addition, Polish
citizens residing abroad also vote very differently. They are a selected group of citizens,
distinct in education and age, and they also differ in political preferences (Berlinschi
and Harutyunyan 2019). Emigration thus changes the structure of the population
remaining in the home country, which has important consequences for voting.
This paper analyzes the causal effects of emigration on election outcomes in Poland.
We use detailed administrative emigration data and merge it with official election re-
sults of all elections between 2000 and 2019 at the county level. To account for en-
dogeneity, for instance resulting from unobserved economic conditions, we instrument
emigration with distance to the closest EU border and add time variation by exploit-
ing the gradual opening of different EU labor markets. The instrument is a strong
predictor of emigration, both when we measure distance in kilometers and when we
use travel time. Our results consistently show that larger emigration rates increase the
vote share for the right-wing party (PiS, PO or earlier existing right-wing parties and
coalitions), while decreasing the vote share for left-wing parties. These findings hold
when using either an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) or relying on the instru-
mental variable (IV) approach outlined above. In general, the effects of emigration on
voters’ preferences are stronger using an IV approach.
The results are robust to including county-level controls such as the number of un-
employed, GDP per capita, average incomes, the industry, age or education structure
as well as time and region fixed effects. Moreover, our findings remain robust to using
an alternative party classification system as well as alternative specifications of the
instrument. In a second step, we provide suggestive evidence that social norms and
preferences, in particular trust, can at least partially explain our results. We comple-
ment our analysis with the Life in Transition Survey, conducted by the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank in 2006, 2010 and
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2016 in Poland. It provides information on values and attitudes for Polish citizens at
the county-level, and shows that emigrants have less trust in right-wing parties than
stayers.
As it is the case in many European countries, populist parties of the right-wing
spectrum have increased their vote share in Poland in recent years. In particular, the
PiS is gaining in importance and forms the government since 2015. While it is hard to
find a consistent classification of “populist parties”, there exist also left-wing populist
parties. Overall, our results are more robust if we differentiate between right- and
left-wing parties than if we analyze populist parties.
As additional outcomes, we analyze voting for parties with pro-European positions
and voting for the incumbent. We find that emigration increases voting for parties with
pro-European positions. Given that emigrants are more likely to be pro-European, one
could have expected that those left-behind are less likely to vote pro-European. There
are several potential explanations for this counter-intuitive result, including increased
incentives and intentions to migrate in the future, reduced labor market competition,
and remittances. Furthermore, we do not find any robust and significant effects for
vote shares for the incumbent parties.1
There are different reasons why emigration affects voting outcomes at the origin.
The first reason is the direct effect of a selected group of voters being absent. If Polish
emigrants are more likely to vote for a specific type of party and are less likely to vote
from abroad, then this party is missing votes due to emigration. In addition, emigration
can have effects on the economy that result in different voting patterns. Dustmann
et al. (2015) reveal that wages in Poland increased as a result of increasing emigration
and Giesing and Laurentsyeva (2017) show that emigration led to a decline in total
factor productivity in new EU member states. Furthermore, emigrants interact with
their countrymen back home and remit money, knowledge and social norms to their
origin. Fackler et al. (2020), for instance, find that emigration increases knowledge
transfer and thus innovation in the home country. Sardoschau et al. (2020) show that
migrants disseminate cultural values and norms from destination to origin countries.
All the above mentioned reasons can have different implications for voting. Due to
1One may expect that those who disagree with the current government are more likely to emigrate,
leading to increased vote shares for the incumbent. This effect seems to be prevalent in developing




data limitations, we are not able to disentangle the effects but provide estimates of
the overall effect.
The most closely related paper is by Anelli and Peri (2017). Similar to us, they
find evidence for the so-called “exit effect”, i.e., the departure of liberal-minded voters
decreases their influence on politics at home (Hirschman 1993). Anelli and Peri (2017)
show that emigration from Italy in the aftermath of the financial crisis hindered polit-
ical change as local elected officials were less likely to be young, college-educated, and
female. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only other paper that analyzes the
causal effects of emigration on election outcomes for a democratic country. In contrast
to us, their main outcomes of interest are characteristics of local elected politicians. We
instead focus on national parliamentary election outcomes, use a different instrumental
variable and the emigrants in our context are not fleeing from a recession, which might
make them being differently self-selected.
There is a larger economic literature that analyzes the effects of emigration on
democratization.2 This literature typically highlights the existence of political remit-
tances, i.e., the spillover of political norms and values that emigrants to democratic
countries transfer to their network in the home country. Cross-country comparisons
show that emigration can promote democracy and advances political quality at the ori-
gin for a large set of countries (Docquier et al. 2016; Spilimbergo 2009). Mercier (2016)
studies the migration experience of political leaders across different countries between
1960 and 2004 and concludes that leaders who studied abroad and come to power in
autocratic settings have a positive influence on democratic development in their home
country. This strand of research is complemented by specific country studies that
focus on the precise mechanism that links emigration to democracy. Barsbai et al.
(2017) illustrate that Moldovan emigrants to democratic countries had political norm
spillovers to their network and inspired them to vote more democratic. Pfutze (2012)
shows that the larger the proportion of migrant households in Mexican municipalities,
the larger the vote share for the opposition party in 2000-2002. Karadja and Prawitz
(2019) analyze historical Swedish data and find that the mass emigration to the U.S.
in the nineteenth century increased labor movement membership, strike participation
and voting for left-wing parties. Batista and Vicente (2011) and Chauvet and Mercier
2Lodigiani (2016) provides an informative overview of this literature.
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(2014) study the effects of return migrants and show that return migrants promote
political accountability in Cape Verde and political participation in Mali, respectively.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to document an increase in right-wing voting resulting from emigration.
Populist right-wing parties are on the rise all over Europe and we contribute by pro-
viding a new reason that can explain their increasing importance.3 Second, we look at
a developed and democratic EU member state. The results from most of the previous
literature are based on autocratic countries and highlight progress in democratization.
In a country that is already democratic, expected results will be different. We show
that there is no effect on the incumbent government. Therefore, we contribute by
showing that the effect between emigration and democratization is non-existent for
a developed country such as Poland. Third, we show a causal effect based on an in-
strumental variable strategy that has not been used before in this literature. We thus
contribute by strengthening the causal interpretation of the effect.
The paper has important implications beyond elections in Poland. Several other
Central and Eastern European countries that have joined the EU since 2004 are expe-
riencing similar emigration rates and a rise in right-wing governments. The paper also
has implications for the creation of fair voting systems in the context of globalization.
As migration is increasing, so is the number of citizens that are casting their vote
from abroad. The rules for citizens residing abroad vary over time and by country of
origin but in general voting from abroad is more costly in terms of effort and time. In
many cases one needs to travel to the closest embassy or consulate, which might be
several hours away. Voting by letter from abroad has only recently been introduced in
most countries. In addition, one typically needs to pre-register, which is an additional
administrative burden. These difficulties lead to very low turnout rates of migrants,
effectively disenfranchising parts of the population. Governments should therefore en-
sure that citizens with foreign residence can cast their vote in an easy way. Voting by
letter and increasing the locations where one can cast a vote are simple measures. One
has to keep in mind, however, that the incumbent does not always have incentives to
facilitate voting from abroad. Typically, governments know if citizens residing abroad
3There is a large literature that explains right-wing voting with increasing immigration (for ex-
ample, Barone et al. (2016), Edo et al. (2019), and Halla et al. (2017)) but so far no one has linked
right-wing voting to emigration.
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are voting in their favor or not and can therefore strategically facilitate or hinder the
voting process abroad.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section describes Poland’s institu-
tional background. In Section 4.3, we introduce the datasets and provide descriptive
statistics. Section 4.4 outlines the empirical strategy, including the construction of
the instrumental variable. Section 4.5 presents the main results and Section 4.6 pro-
vides guidance on the underlying mechanisms. Section 4.7 shows the implemented
robustness checks. Section 4.8 concludes with policy implications.
4.2 Institutional Background
4.2.1 Background on the electoral system
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the so-called “Third Polish Republic” organized
the first partially free elections in 1989 (Kancelaria Sejmu (2020), Polish National
Electoral Office (2020)). Since then the Polish government consists of two chambers,
the parliament (sejm) and the senate, which jointly take the responsibility for Poland’s
legislative power: the parliament drafts legislative proposals, whereby the senate has
consulting competencies and may propose changes before sending a proposal to the
Polish president.
Both chambers are elected with a system of proportional representation in a four
year cycle, in which every Polish citizen aged 18 or above is eligible to cast a vote. In
total, 460 deputies to the parliament and 100 senators are elected. To lower the risk of
fragmentation and increase the work ability of the parliament, parties that reach a vote
share below five percent are not represented in the parliament. Likewise, coalitions of
parties have to reach a minimum vote share of eight percent. National minorities are
excluded from this rule and therefore the German minority party (MN) is represented
in the parliament.
After the eastward enlargement of the European Union in 2004, Polish citizens
are further allowed to vote for representatives in the European parliament. The first
European parliament (EP) election took place in 2004, three consecutive EP elections
followed in 2009, 2014 and 2019. Similarly to national parliamentary elections, national
parties (coalition of parties) have to reach a minimum vote share of five (eight) percent
in order to be represented in the EP (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2020).
191
Migrants’ Missing Votes
If Polish citizens who reside abroad want to cast their vote, they need to register
as voters at a Polish consulate or embassy before the election. This registration can be
made online, by e-mail, post, fax, telephone or in person. Until 2013, voters needed to
cast their vote in person on election day. The number of embassies and consulates that
were available for voting has increased over time. For instance, in 2007 there were 20
polling stations in the U.K., 21 in the U.S. and six in Germany. In 2015 there were 40
in the U.K., 31 in the U.S. and 17 in Germany. In 2019 there were 52 in the U.K., 48
in the U.S. and 23 polling places in Germany.4 Since 2014, it was no longer necessary
to appear in person at the polling station. One could also apply for a postal vote at
the consulate or embassy. In 2018, this right was withdrawn by the Polish government
and postal voting is now only available to people with a qualified disability (Korzek
and Pudzianowska 2018). According to Korzek and Pudzianowska (2018), it remains
unclear why the option of postal voting was abolished in 2018. However, the question
arises whether one goal was to reduce votes for the opposition. In the first round
of 2015 presidential elections, the PiS candidate Duda won only 24.6 percent of all
votes coming from abroad, less than if the Polish mainland is included (34.8 percent).
Postal voting has been shown to increase participation in voting from abroad (Ciornei
and Østergaard-Nielsen 2015). Since the distance to the nearest polling station is
typically much greater for Poles abroad than at home, the abolition of postal voting is
particularly detrimental to these voters, who predominantly support the opposition.
4.2.2 Background on the political party landscape
Poland has experienced substantial changes in the lead of government in recent decades.
Following its communist legacy, the government was composed of left-wing and socialist
parties after the collapse of the Soviet Union until the early 2000s. Starting with the
national parliamentary elections in 2005 the government shifted to a center, more
conservative position, and since 2015, the government is primarily formed by the right-
wing populist Law and Justice (PiS) party. The following gives a brief chronological
overview of the respective governments.
4Source: National Electoral Commission, Polling District Search Engine Abroad, Retrieved July




The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) has been the dominant player in the Polish
party landscape for many years. In 2001, the largest left-wing party in Poland formed
a coalition with the smaller social-democratic Union of Labour (UP) and won the
2001 parliamentary elections by a large majority. SLD promotes equal opportunities,
e.g., through free education, and fights for employees’ rights to reduce unemployment
(Materska-Sosnowska 2010). However, some of SLD’s very own issues are now also
represented by PiS or Civic Platform (PO). The dominance of the Democratic Left
Alliance ended in 2007, when SLD won only about a quarter of the seats that the
party had won in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Finally, in 2015 SLD was without
parliamentary representation for the first time.
The Law and Justice (PiS) party can be classified as populist right-wing. On the
one hand, the party stands for a strong welfare state that seeks to distribute the na-
tional product more evenly among the population (Pankowski 2010). Exemplary of
this are the reduction of the retirement age and the increase in the tax-free income limit
(Markowski 2019). On the other hand, the party stands for a pronounced euroscepti-
cism, especially as an opponent of the admission quota for Syrian refugees demanded
by the EU Commission, and a culturally anti-liberal policy. Fomina and Kucharczyk
(2016) therefore classify the PiS, which began as a center-right party in 2001, as an
authoritarian-populist party of the right political spectrum. Following their election
victory in 2005, Law and Justice formed a coalition with the Eurosceptic party League
of Polish Families (LPR) and the right-wing Self-Defense of the Polish Republic (SRP).
After eight years of opposition (2007-2015), PiS has been in a majority government
since 2015.
The PO, meanwhile, positions itself as an alternative to PiS. PO represents the
mainstream of European politics (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016), is economically more
liberal and pursues a more future-oriented course (Harper 2010). Nevertheless, its
social values are close to Catholic conservatism and are therefore no alternative to the
PiS in this respect. Accordingly, PO voters are typically better educated winners of
the post-communist era, while PiS attracts voters from the poorer and less successful
part of society (Dziȩciołowski 2017).
Table 4.8 shows all Polish elections taking place from 1997 to 2019, including
both national parliament and European parliament elections. For each election, the




4.3 Data and descriptive statistics
4.3.1 Migration data
The migration data in our analysis stems from administrative records by Statistics
Poland, which are published annually for all years since 1995. It is based on offi-
cial registrations of permanent emigrants and immigrants, i.e., persons registering for
permanent departure (or residence in Poland respectively) for a minimum duration
of 12 months.5 We focus on the years 1997 up to 2019, which corresponds to the
time frame in our electoral data. Unfortunately, Statistics Poland does not provide
information for 2015. To circumvent this limitation, we therefore take the average
values for county-level migration between 2014 and 2016. Considering that migration
is relatively stable across both years, we consider this a suitable proxy.
The great advantage of this dataset is that it captures the aggregate number of
permanent international migrants per county (powiat) over an extensive time period.
Each county (total of 380 counties) is assigned a unique numeric identifier using the
official teryt-classification. As such, it is an ideal source of information to address our
research question.
4.3.2 Voting data
To capture voters’ preferences, we use information on official electoral results at the
county level for all parliamentary elections from 2001 to 2019 and the European parlia-
ment elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 (see Table 4.8). For each county, these include
the number of valid votes per electoral committee in absolute numbers and the electoral
district of the county. Because, similar to the migration data, this dataset contains 3-
or 4-digit teryt codes, we merge information of the two datasets using official district
5Statistics Poland defines a permanent emigrant as a person registering for permanent departure
to abroad in the PESEL register (migration for a minimum duration of 12 months). An immigrant
is a person registering for permanent residence in Poland from abroad. Information on permanent
migration is therefore based on administrative data. Data on temporary migration (migration <
12 months) is available at the state level based on a statistical survey conducted by the Statistics
Poland as of December 31 each year. Throughout the observation period, permanent emigration
accounts only for a small fraction of overall emigration in Poland, which is not surprising given the
magnitude of seasonal workers and nursing staff leaving Poland on a three to six months basis (Figure
4.5). In principle, it is possible that permanent emigrants have become naturalized in their country
of destination. Since Polish emigrants with a double nationality may still cast their vote in Polish
elections, this is no important limitation in our setting.
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codes. For this purpose, we collapse the migration data based on legislative periods in
a first step, using the total number of emigrants per county in year t of the preceding
election up to year t-1 of the respective election. We then merge both datasets using
information on county and election year.
Given the minimum voting shares outlined above, we consider only parties or
coalitions of parties who pass this threshold and classify them into a right-middle-
left scheme based on the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2020)
for our main results. Table 4.1 lists all parties or coalitions of parties who pass the
respective threshold in at least one of the relevant national parliament and European
parliament elections. Subsequently, we calculate the share of votes for right-wing (left-
wing) parties in each county and election year.
Table 4.1: List of Polish Parties
Name Abbreviation Type Classification
Left and Democrats LiD coalition left
Coalion of the Democratic Left Alliance SLD-UP coalition left
and the Union of Labour
Law and Justice PiS party right
League of Polish Families LPR party right
Civic Platform PO party right
Polish Peasants’ Party PSL party center
Self-Defence of the Polish Republic SRP party left
Palikot Movement Election Committee/Twój Ruch RP party left
Democratic Left Alliance SLD party left
German Minority MN party center
Electoral Committee of Voters of Kukiz 15 Kukiz party right
The Ryszard Petru’s Election Committee Modern party center
KORWiN Electoral Committee KORwin party right
European Coalition KE coalition center
Spring Wiosna party left
The New Right Election Committee KNP party right
Social Democracy of Poland SDPL party left
Freedom Union UW party right
Note: Table 4.1 lists all parties and coalitions of parties who were elected into the national or the
European parliament during the observation period (2001-2019). Party classification is based on




4.3.3 Data on party classification
To ensure a consistent classification of political parties in Poland and to emphasize the
robustness of our results, we rely on three alternative party classifications, which have
been developed by political scientist and have been used in the empirical literature
before (De Sio et al. 2016; Döring and Hellström 2013; Döring and Manow 2017;
Huysmans 2019; Medeiros et al. 2019; Potrafke 2017; Whitefield et al. 2007).
For our main results, we rely on the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et
al. 2020). It consists of annual data for 36 democratic countries for the period of 1960
to 2018 and classifies political parties into left-wing, center, and right-wing (cf. Ta-
ble 4.1). Second, the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov)6
contains data on party positions for all EU and most OECD members for the entire
post-war period and provides information on political parties’ position on the right-
center-left scheme7 and party families (Döring and Manow 2011). These include, for
example, conservative, liberal, agrarian, and socio-democratic parties and may serve
as an alternative classification scheme. Third, to estimate the effect of emigration on
party positioning on European integration, we rely on the Chapel Hill expert surveys
(CHES) from 2002 to 2019 (Polk et al. 2017). To make the results comparable across
years and survey items, we rescale expert opinions such that higher values indicate
pro-European attitudes, standardize variables, and compute means for each item and
party. We use these means to build weighted averages of party positions in each county
and election year.
Most party classifications are straightforward. However, there is some controversy
about the classification of the PO. The Comparative Political Data Set classifies PO
as right-wing party. In the provided context this classification may be considered
controversial. Yet, ParlGov classifies PO as a conservative party as well. The Chapel
6The ParlGov database classifies parties, which received a minimal voting share of 1.0 percent,
and electoral committees with minimum two election results. While it is impossible to classify the
universe of parties in our electoral data, it covers all parties (coalitions of parties) that reached the
required minimal threshold (cf. Section 4.2) and are therefore included in our initial estimations.
7The ParlGov dataset classifies parties’ position in the left-right position on a scale from 0 “left”
to 10 “right” with data from Castles and Mair (1983), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and Laver
(2006), and CHES (2010). To utilize this scale, we generate the average position in each county
using weighted averages. Considering a county with three parties in a given election, we compute
county i’s stand in election year t on the left-right position as LRit = ShareP arty1it ∗P ositionP arty1+
ShareP arty2it ∗ P ositionP arty2+ ShareP arty3it ∗ P ositionP arty3 . The higher the weighted average
of the left-right dimension, the higher the support for right-wing parties.
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Hill Expert Survey further assigns the PO a mean value of 6 on the left-right ideological
stance scale (PiS 8), while center parties are assigned values well below 6. For the sake
of consistency across party classifications, we consequently subsume the PO as a right-
wing party.
4.3.4 Data on values and attitudes
To compare differences in attitudes and values across Polish counties, we rely on in-
formation from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS). Under the lead of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, the LiTS
focuses on transition countries in central and eastern Europe to foster the transition
to an open market-oriented economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. As
of now, there exist three repeated cross sections in 2006, 2010, and 2016. Each survey
wave contains roughly 1,000 observations per country.
The LiTS is a repeated cross-sectional, nationally representative household and atti-
tudinal survey. Besides information on respondents’ demographic and socio-economic
characteristics, it collects a wide range of additional variables, including preferences,
attitudes, and values. In contrast to similar survey datasets, such as the European
Values Study or the European Social Survey, the LiTS provides geographically disag-
gregated information that can be related to the county level.8 Considering that the
administrative data provide migration and voting data at the county level as well, this
is a great advantage in our setting.
4.3.5 Descriptive statistics
Figure 4.1 displays that emigration increased strongly in Poland in the last thirty years,
and in particular after Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. While on average 50 Polish
citizens per county registered their emigration in 2004, this number almost tripled
to 124 emigrants per county in 2006 (Panel b in Figure 4.1). Nevertheless, average
emigration rates differ greatly across counties in Poland (see Figure 4.2). Moreover,
Figure 4.1 underlines that emigration per county is more prevalent in some years than
in others. This pattern may be partly explained by the transitional provisions, which
8The LiTS dataset samples roughly 1,000 observations per country and wave. While the data




allowed pre-2004 EU member states to unilaterally restrict labor market access for a
limited period of time (Kahanec et al. 2014). For instance, while the U.K., Ireland,
and Sweden opened their labor markets in 2004, Germany and Austria kept these
restrictions for immigrants from Poland until 2011. In contrast to emigration, the
average immigration rate per county has increased by roughly 10 additional immigrants
from 2004 to 2017.9 In addition, Panels a and b in Figure 4.4 show the education levels
of residents in Poland and Polish emigrants respectively, highlighting positive selection
in terms of education.
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Note: Figure 4.1 displays migration patterns of emigrants and immigrants from 1995 to 2018. Panel
a in Figure 4.1 sums the stock of emigrants/immigrants in Poland since 1995 and Panel b in Figure
4.1 displays the average number of emigrants and immigrants per county each year. The red line
marks the year or Poland’s accession to the EU (2004). Source: Statistics PL.
Turning to electoral results, Figure 4.6 illustrates that voting patterns changed
considerably over the respective observation period. This is true in particular with
regard to the share of right-wing votes in national parliament elections: While approx-
imately 17 percent of citizens voted for right-wing parties in 2001, their share rose to
roughly 50 percent in recent elections. On the other hand, the share of left-wing votes
has almost continuously decreased from 51 percent in 2001 to 8 percent in 2015.
The aforementioned patterns, including increasing emigration rates per county and
rising voting shares for right-wing parties, are validated in Table 4.2, which demon-










Note: Figure 4.2 displays emigration per county in 2006, which is characterized by a particularly
large outflow of emigrants after accession to the EU in 2004. Yet, the overall emigration patterns
are stable over the observation period. Emigration is defined as the number of persons registering
their departure to abroad. Source: Statistics PL.
strates regional characteristics including all years (column 1), for years preceding the
eastward enlargement of the EU (column 2), and post-2004 (column 3). This table
further suggests that Poland has benefited from its EU-membership in economic terms:
the average number of registered unemployed persons per county has decreased from
6,130 to 5,765. Likewise, average annual gross domestic product per capita in current
prices has increased by 76 percent from 19,031 to 33,570 Złoty per state (voivodship).10
Furthermore, educational outcomes, such as the number of graduates of higher educa-
tion institutions, have increased over time.
Correlations between voting patterns and emigration rates are shown in Figure 4.7.
It plots the relationship between the share of right-wing votes per county and the
number of emigrants in a county. The graph shows a strong positive correlation,
indicating that over all years counties that experience higher rates of emigration, are
also prone to a higher share of right-wing votes. Figure 4.8 further demonstrates that
this pattern holds for all election years separately. Likewise, emigration is somewhat
negatively correlated with the share of left-wing votes (Figure 4.9).
10Złoty represents the current local currency in Poland. This finding holds if we compare the










Share right-wing votes 0.635 0.279 0.678
(0.174) (0.104) (0.124)
Share left-wing votes 0.202 0.585 0.155
(0.175) (0.107) (0.113)
Share of incumbent parties 0.381 . 0.381
(0.226) (.) (0.226)
Mean emigration per county 63.322 59.542 63.785
(110.893) (163.876) (102.586)
Mean immigration per county 30.935 19.759 32.302
(60.892) (30.369) (63.495)
Mean net migration per county 32.387 39.783 31.483
(95.438) (153.078) (85.773)
Mean population per county 100791.807 99152.434 100992.204
(113796.798) (84216.096) (116909.893)
Registered unemployed persons 5804.860 6130.366 5765.070
(4636.503) (3792.782) (4728.321)
GDP per capita 31955.385 19030.684 33570.973
(13039.581) (4468.770) (12856.990)
Average monthly per capita income 995.144 578.563 1047.217
(335.650) (65.465) (319.064)
Share of female residents 0.511 0.510 0.511
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Percentage working in argricultural sector 15.120 18.195 14.735
(8.354) (8.874) (8.207)
Percentage working in industrial sector 30.466 31.139 30.382
(5.558) (6.272) (5.458)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 0.226 0.234 0.225
(0.024) (0.012) (0.025)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 0.283 0.291 0.282
(0.014) (0.018) (0.013)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.187 0.140 0.192
(0.029) (0.014) (0.025)
Graduates of higher education institutions 28911.405 17533.029 30333.702
(18651.956) (10973.578) (18925.290)
N 3420 380 3040
Note: This table displays descriptive statistics on voting and migration patterns, and regional
covariates. Voting data has limitations for electoral results in 2001 and does not report voting
shares for parties below the 5 percent threshold, including information on AWS and UW, that
formed the government in 1997. Hence, it is only possible to compute the share of incumbent
votes for elections from 2001 onward. Source: Statistics PL.
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Figure 4.10 provides descriptive evidence that emigrants participate less in elec-
tions. As outlined above, this can be due to a lack of interest or to larger hurdles.
While turnout of voters in Poland averages around 50 percent, Polish citizens residing
abroad have turnout rates below 5 percent. We can therefore claim that the votes of
emigrants are “missing”. This is important because Polish citizens residing abroad are
voting differently. Figure 4.11 shows the voting results for Polish citizens that cast
their vote in Poland versus those that cast their vote abroad. Votes casted abroad are
less likely to support right-wing parties.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
4.4.1 Estimated regressions
To quantify how emigration alters electoral outcomes in Poland, we estimate the fol-
lowing equation,
Yt,i = α + β
4∑
k=1
emigt−k,i +γXt−1,i + δt + τs + εt,i (4.1)
In Equation 4.1, Yt,i is the outcome variable for county i in year t. We have
three different outcome variables, measured in logs: the share of votes for right-wing
parties, the share of left-wing votes, and the share of votes for the incumbent parties.∑4
k=1 emigt−k,i measures the number of emigrants per county for all years since the
preceding election up to the current election in logs.11 Xt,i is a vector of regional
characteristics in county i in year t, including the number of unemployed persons,
GDP per capita and average monthly per capita income (measured at the state rather
than the county level), the share of female residents, the share of people working in the
agricultural and industrial sector, the share of residents aged 15-29, 30-49, and 50-64
years old, and the number of graduates from higher education institutions. To avoid
capturing effects of current emigration in period t on those control variables, we lag
all control variables one period.12 δt and τs are time and state fixed effects. The term
11For instance, if we consider the parliament elections in 2019, emigration in this parliamentary
term includes the years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. In most cases, these are four consecutive years.
12Results are robust to using a two-year lag or fixing all control variables to the year 2000. In this
way, we avoid the problem of including “bad controls” in the regression.
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εt,i is the residual picking up other time-varying factors affecting electoral outcomes
across counties.
The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect of a one percent increase in
emigrants per parliamentary term t on political preferences in county i. If emigration
is uncorrelated with the error term εt,i , Equation 4.1 provides a consistent estimate.
Considering the presence of potential omitted variables, which may jointly determine
both emigration and political preferences, OLS regressions will be biased. Furthermore,
reverse causation is a potential problem: Changes in political outcomes at the county
level can affect emigration rates. This is why we use an instrumental variable approach,
which addresses both of these issues and enables us to estimate the causal effect of
emigration on voting outcomes in Poland.
4.4.2 Construction of the IV
The main reason why we cannot run simple OLS regressions is that there exist eco-
nomic, political, and demographic changes that influence both emigration rates and
voting patterns. For instance, declining economic conditions may increase emigration
and likewise change political preferences. If this is the case, εt,i and emigt−k,i are
correlated and the OLS estimates are biased. To address these concerns, we are im-
plementing an IV estimation strategy. We extend an instrument for emigration that
has already been validated in the economic literature (e.g., Dustmann et al. (2016)):
distance to border. The main idea is that the closer a county is to an open border,
the more likely it is that emigration is taking place. We expand this instrument in
two dimensions to increase its exogeneity and relevance. First, we introduce a time
dimension by only considering those borders to countries that allowed free labor mobil-
ity with Poland. This implies that borders to EU countries are closed before Poland’s
accession to the EU in 2004. Starting in 2004 the borders to Sweden (sea ports in
the North), Lithuania, Czech Republic, and Slovakia are open and from 2011, we also
consider the German-Polish border. Thus, the different timing for the introduction of
free labor mobility adds time variation to the instrument. Second, we add distance to
an international airport in Poland.13 For airport openings, we use 2004, which is when
13The opening of airports after Poland’s accession to the EU could be endogenous to migration
decisions. We therefore exclude international airports that have been opened after 2004 to account
for this kind of endogeneity (N=3, opening dates in 2012 and 2014).
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Poland first had access to several EU labor markets, most notably, Ireland, Sweden
and the U.K.
The instrument needs to meet two conditions. First, it needs to be relevant, i.e.,
there needs to be a significant correlation between distance to open border or airport
and emigration at the county level. Distance can be measured in travel time (duration
in hours) or in geographical distance (measured in kilometers). Figure 4.12 illustrates
the relationship between the travel distance in hours to the closest border crossing
point or airport and the number of emigrants in a county, while Figure 4.13 shows
the same when we measure distance in kilometers. In both graphs, one can see a
clear negative relationship, showing that emigration is highest for counties that have
a short distance or duration to the next border crossing of airport. Table 4.3 shows
the corresponding first stage regressions. The F-Statistic is well above 10. Therefore
we conclude that the instrument is relevant.
Table 4.3: First stage: County-level emigration and distance to border or airport
(1) (2) (3)
b/se b/se b/se
Distance in km, in logs -0.094∗∗∗ 0.201∗
(0.030) (0.103)
Duration in hours, in logs -0.143∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.119)
Constant -2.793 -1.522 -2.322
(23.229) (23.149) (23.003)
Regional characteristics X X X
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
N 2955 2955 2955
R-Squared 0.702 0.703 0.703
F-Stat 32.112 51.527 30.612
Note: Table 4.3 reports the coefficients from the first stage regression of the number of emigrants
per county, measured in logs, on distance to the next border crossing or airport, measured as the
duration in hours or the distance in kilometer, respectively. Source: Statistics Poland.
In addition, the instrument needs to satisfy the exclusion restriction. In our context
this means that, once we control for emigration and our other control variables, there
is no direct influence of distance to border or airport on voting outcomes. Given that
we control for the number of unemployed persons, GDP per capita, average monthly
per capita income, the share of female residents, sector structure, age, and the number
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of graduates from higher education institutions, we do not see any connection between
distance and election outcomes. We also conduct a large number of robustness checks
to corroborate the validity of the exclusion restriction, such as adding immigration or
temporary emigration as additional control variables.
The distance instrument has been successfully used by several other papers in the
literature. Card (1993) and Kane and Rouse (1995) made this approach popular by
estimating the returns to schooling by using the distance to a college as an instrument
for choosing education levels. While they were not the first to use this type of distance
instrument (e.g., Mallar 1979), the distance instrument is being introduced in a growing
number of studies not only in the context of education economics but also in other
fields such as migration economics. The IV approach is particularly prevalent in studies
that estimate the effect of migration on the labor market in the host country. Del
Carpio and Wagner (2015) use distance from border as an instrument for the inflow of
Syrian refugees to Turkey, Peri (2012) use it for the immigration status of Mexicans
to the U.S., and Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2015) measure the proximity of the borders
to Rwanda and Burundi to instrument for the intensity of the forced migration shock.
In a comparative approach, McKenzie et al. (2010) contrast the results of a natural
experiment with estimates using distance to the immigration office as an instrument
for migration of Tongans to New Zealand. They find that the IV estimates are within
1% of the experimental estimates which they assume to be unbiased.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Main results
This section examines the effect of emigration from Poland on voters’ support for right-
wing and left-wing parties using both an OLS and an IV estimation strategy. Table 4.9
indicates that an increase in the county-level emigration rate is positively correlated
with the vote share for right-wing parties, such as PiS. The relationship is robust
to including different types of fixed effects and is statistically significant at the one
percent level. The most conservative specification in column (5) (including state*time
fixed effects) indicates that a one percent increase in the county-level emigration rate
increases the share of right-wing parties by 0.030 percent.
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Table 4.4: Effect of emigration on the share of right-wing votes
















b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county 0.294∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.051) (0.053) (0.061)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Share of female residents -6.793∗∗∗ -6.545∗∗∗ -2.328 -2.573 -3.460
(1.912) (1.978) (1.871) (1.947) (2.314)
Percentage working in agricultural sector -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024)
Percentage working in industrial sector -0.024∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗ 0.093∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.052)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 -0.662 1.708∗∗∗ 2.158∗∗∗ 2.630∗∗∗ 2.361∗∗∗
(0.703) (0.522) (0.628) (0.483) (0.541)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -5.006∗∗∗ -8.301∗∗∗ -2.792∗∗ -4.105∗∗∗ -4.633∗∗∗
(1.250) (1.552) (1.194) (1.537) (1.716)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 -0.708 1.214∗∗ 0.305 0.664∗ 0.524
(0.503) (0.504) (0.563) (0.357) (0.371)
Graduates from tertiary education 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 4.380∗∗∗ 4.860∗∗∗ 2.203 1.236 -6.392∗∗
(1.449) (1.369) (1.621) (1.390) (3.020)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No
State FE No No Yes Yes No
State*Time FE No No No No Yes
Mean 0.635 0.635 0.635 0.635 0.635
N 2955 2955 2955 2955 2955
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number of
emigrants per county in logs. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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In contrast to the OLS results, we may interpret IV estimation results in Table 4.4
causally. The results consistently show that increasing emigration leads to rising vote
shares for right-wing parties. We can interpret the coefficient in the following way: A
one percent increase in the number of emigrants in a given county increases the vote
share for the right-wing parties by 0.249 percent. Control variables go in the intuitive
direction.
With respect to voters’ preferences to left-wing parties, the OLS regressions in
Table 4.10 illustrate that a higher level of county-level emigration is correlated with
a statistically significant decline in votes to the left-wing parties, whereby estimates
range from 0.049 to 0.154 percentage points. Similarly to previous results, estimates
increase substantially if we use the IV approach. A one percent increase in the number
of emigrants in a given county decreases the vote share for the left-wing parties by
0.569 percent. These results are in line with the arguments of missing votes due to the
emigration of a selected group of citizens. If emigrants are more likely to be left-wing
voters, then their emigration would create this pattern.
There are at least three reasons why the IV estimates are larger than the OLS
estimates. First, there might be omitted variable bias. As the OLS seems to be biased
towards zero, we need the omitted variable to be negatively (positively) correlated
with emigration and positively (negatively) with voting for right-wing parties. One
example could be expectations for an economic boom, which would reduce emigra-
tion and could increase voting for right-wing parties. Similarly, an expected economic
downturn could lead to increasing emigration and lower voting for right-wing parties as
people hope for safety nets and employment protection provided by left-wing parties.
Another potentially important omitted variable in this setting is re-immigration. Sec-
ond, reverse causality could explain the differences between OLS and IV estimation
results. This could be the case if people who are not satisfied with election results
decide to emigrate. We think this is unlikely to drive the difference in the results
due to the time structure of our data (emigration is measured in the years preceding
the election). Third, we could have measurement error in the emigration data, for
instance unrecorded emigration, that could bias the OLS estimator towards zero. This
could also be caused by temporary migration that is not recorded in our variable of
permanent migration.
The relatively long time period is a major advantage of the data under investiga-
tion. Despite its benefits, Poland has undergone substantial changes over time that
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Table 4.5: Effect of emigration on the share of left-wing votes
















b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county -0.614∗∗∗ -0.586∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.084) (0.126) (0.132) (0.143)
Registered unemployed persons 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Share of female residents 23.165∗∗∗ 15.807∗∗∗ 16.569∗∗∗ 12.965∗∗∗ 14.667∗∗∗
(3.426) (4.047) (3.489) (4.659) (5.225)
Percentage working in agricultural sector -0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 0.078∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.057)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.041∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.013) (0.125)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 1.673 -1.461 -2.730∗∗ -3.003∗∗ -2.520∗
(1.418) (1.142) (1.254) (1.283) (1.375)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 16.829∗∗∗ 20.843∗∗∗ 15.310∗∗∗ 16.571∗∗∗ 17.834∗∗∗
(2.838) (3.093) (3.302) (3.696) (3.970)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 5.886∗∗∗ 7.339∗∗∗ 6.250∗∗∗ 8.457∗∗∗ 8.428∗∗∗
(1.365) (1.088) (1.857) (1.012) (1.048)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -17.591∗∗∗ -17.464∗∗∗ -17.645∗∗∗ -14.154∗∗∗ 7.580
(2.709) (2.742) (3.363) (3.384) (7.201)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No
State FE No No Yes Yes No
State*Time FE No No No No Yes
Mean 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.202
N 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of left-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number of
emigrants per county in logs. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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may have influenced both migration patterns and voters’ preferences. For instance,
casting a vote from abroad has been facilitated in 2014, which may in turn influence
electoral outcomes (see Section 4.2). Tables 4.11 and 4.12 indicate that the results
are heterogeneous over time. Overall, estimates suggest that the results are driven by
earlier periods. This is what we would expect once voting from abroad by letter was
permitted. For instance, a one percent increase in the number of emigrants per county,
decreases the share of right-wing votes by 0.269 percent for elections until 2014. For
the 2014-2019 period, the estimate drops to 0.095 percent. This pattern holds for the
share of left-wing votes, too.
4.5.2 Voting for pro-European parties
Besides analyzing votes for certain parties, it is also interesting to analyze whether
emigration causes voters to prefer parties with certain positions. One particularly
interesting party position in this context is the party stance toward the European Union
and further European integration. It is important to note that there is no clear left-
right divide on this position in Poland. Moderate conservative parties, for instance the
PO, are classified as pro-European and right-wing.14 Table 4.6 shows that emigration
causes voters to elect parties with positive attitudes towards the European Union. This
is very robust to using different indicators and different datasets. Columns (1) to (4)
use different EU-related indicators from the CHES dataset and column (5) uses an EU
indicator from the ParlGov dataset. The results show that emigration causes voters
left behind to favor further European integration, EU cohesion and an internal market.
Emigration also increases voting for parties that attach higher importance to topics of
EU integration.
This result can seem counter-intuitive at first. One could have expected that pro-
European voters are those that are more likely to emigrate, leaving behind those voters
that are more pessimistic about European integration. However, there are a number of
different reasons, why emigration could lead to increased voting for parties with pro-EU
stances. First, it could increase migration intentions of those left behind (Bertoli and
Ruyssen 2018; Piracha and Saraogi 2017). Voters with migration intentions are likely
14The respective variable is defined on a scale from 0 “anti EU” to 10 “pro EU”. For parties that
are elected to the Polish parliament the mean value is 6.6, the median value is 7.8. The PO ranges
at 9.4, the PiS–a populist right-wing party–ranges at 5.4.
208
Migrants’ Missing Votes
Table 4.6: Effect of emigration on attitudes towards Europe














b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county 0.109∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.044) (0.024) (0.050) (0.029)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of female residents 0.065 -1.303 -0.947 -1.240 -0.285
(1.472) (1.668) (0.901) (1.911) (1.093)
Percentage working in agricultural sector -0.048∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.008 -0.018 -0.011
(0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010)
Percentage working in industrial sector -0.076∗∗∗ -0.017 0.003 -0.035 -0.020
(0.029) (0.034) (0.018) (0.039) (0.021)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 -0.183 -0.201 0.567∗∗ 0.868∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.402) (0.227) (0.467) (0.264)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 0.179 -1.898 -0.919 -0.973 -0.567
(1.082) (1.220) (0.672) (1.409) (0.818)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 3.300∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 1.463∗∗∗ 3.431∗∗∗ 2.055∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.261) (0.146) (0.306) (0.177)
Graduates from tertiary education 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 5.062∗∗∗ 2.520 0.925 2.201 2.761∗∗
(1.670) (2.055) (1.108) (2.316) (1.258)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.046 -0.149 0.145 0.008 1.837
N 2955 2955 2955 2955 2955
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable “Favoring
European integration” is measured on a scale from 1 “strongly opposes” to 7 “strongly favors”. Out-
come variable “Importance European integration” is measured on a scale from 1 “no importance”
to 4 “great importance”. Outcome variable “Favoring EU cohesion” is measured on a scale from 1
“strongly opposes” to 7 “strongly favors”. Outcome variable “Favoring internal market” is measured
on a scale from 1 “strongly opposes” to 7 “strongly favors”. Outcome variables in column (1) to
(4) were standardized. Outcome variable “Favoring EU” is measured on a scale from 0 “anti EU”
to 10 “pro EU”. Emigration is measured as the number of emigrants per county in logs. Source:
Statistics PL, ParlGov, and CHES (2002-2019).
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to vote pro-European and especially in favor of the internal market, so that their in-
tentions can be realized easier.15 Second, municipalities experiencing large permanent
emigration are also likely to experience large temporary emigration and those tempo-
rary emigrants are likely to vote pro-European as they benefit from EU integration
at least temporarily. Third, those left behind benefit from remittances and increasing
wages due to reduced labor market competition (Dustmann et al. 2015). These argu-
ments can explain the surprising finding that emigration causes non-emigrants to vote
pro-European.
4.5.3 Incumbent votes
Another interesting voting outcome is the vote share that goes to the incumbent. We
define incumbent as those parties that formed the government in the preceding national
parliament election.In most election years, this is a coalition of different parties. There
are two different hypothesis about how emigration can affect the vote share of the
incumbent. First, if citizens who disagree with the government are more likely to
emigrate, we would expect that those that stay behind are more supportive of the
government and therefore expect a positive effect of emigration on voting for the
incumbent. This would be in line with Anelli and Peri (2017). Second, voters could
be influenced by changing economic conditions that result from emigration. Previous
papers have shown that emigration affects wages (Dustmann et al. 2015), productivity
(Giesing and Laurentsyeva 2017), innovation (Fackler et al. 2020), and education (Beine
et al. 2008). These economic implications of emigration are complex and the direction
depends on the circumstances, so it is not possible to derive a clear prediction of
the direction for the effect. According to Table 4.7, the effect of emigration on vote
shares for the incumbent is small and not significantly different from zero. This could
either mean that there is no effect of emigration on voting outcomes or that there
are different effects that cancel each other out. This is contradicting a result in the
previous literature for Mexico (Pfutze 2012) who found that increasing emigration
leads to more voting for the opposition and thus less voting for the incumbent.
15This argumentation is similar to the brain gain hypothesis, that finds that the education level
of non-emigrants increases as a result of high-skilled emigration due to increased incentives to invest
in education for everyone (Beine et al. 2001; Mountford 1997; Vidal 1998). Similarly, in our case, the
incentives and intentions of those left behind are changed.
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Table 4.7: Effect of emigration on the share of incumbent parties
















b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county -0.111 0.015 0.059 0.046 0.055
(0.744) (0.029) (1.092) (0.049) (0.043)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.026∗∗∗ -0.000 0.017∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Share of female residents 185.741∗∗∗ -1.928 172.687∗∗∗ -3.295∗ -4.006∗∗
(34.767) (1.250) (40.336) (1.749) (1.605)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.202∗∗∗ 0.000 0.220∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.001) (0.086) (0.003) (0.015)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.401∗∗∗ -0.002 1.919∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.003) (0.221) (0.004) (0.036)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 74.455∗∗∗ 2.654∗∗∗ 60.615∗∗∗ 2.338∗∗∗ 1.965∗∗∗
(9.107) (0.347) (9.637) (0.470) (0.397)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -87.120∗∗∗ -1.627 -63.106∗∗ -2.261∗ -2.236∗
(22.169) (0.998) (27.904) (1.355) (1.174)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 -45.357∗∗∗ 1.663∗∗∗ -62.234∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 1.628∗∗∗
(7.526) (0.339) (9.373) (0.377) (0.314)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -118.621∗∗∗ -0.101 -151.398∗∗∗ -0.147 -11.794∗∗∗
(24.585) (0.922) (34.749) (1.208) (1.815)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No
State FE No No Yes Yes No
State*Time FE No No No No Yes
Mean 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
N 1841 1841 1841 1841 1841
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the share
of votes for the incumbent parties per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the





In this section we show that emigration also affects social norms and preferences, which
could provide an underlying mechanism driving our regression results.
To test this hypothesis, we analyze whether increasing emigration affects socio-
political views and attitudes, in addition to electoral preferences. Considering that
trust is one of the most essential indicators of social preferences (Fehr 2009), we mainly
focus on LiTS survey questions on trust in people and political institutions. For the
respective analysis, we draw information from the LiTS survey data, which provides
information on values and attitudes over the entire observation period (cf. Section 4.3).
Importantly, its repeated cross-sectional design covers the different periods in the lead
of government.
We regress individuals’ social preferences, including for example trust in people
or trust in government, on an indicator variable that takes a value of one for high-
emigration counties, zero else.16 Moreover, we control for an individual’s sex, age,
and education, as well as the same set of regional-level covariates including regional
fixed effects. If social preferences work as an underlying mechanism, we would expect
that high levels of emigration have a changing effect for values and attitudes across
government periods: In 2006, when left-wing and center parties formed the govern-
ment, we expect emigration to decrease overall levels of trust in government/parties,
considering that individuals who support left-wing parties and are hence more likely
to trust the reigning authorities are leaving Poland. In 2016, when the PiS formed
the government and obtained the majority of deputies in the parliament, the effect
should be reversed, because individuals with contrasting positions to the government
are leaving their country of residence.
Figure 4.3 strongly supports our hypothesis. The respective figure illustrates the
effect of increasing emigration on trust in people, trust in government, trust in par-
liament, trust in parties, trust in courts, and trust in president. For all variables
capturing trust in authorities, we consistently find a change in trust levels over time
periods (Panels b to f in Figure 4.3). For instance, while high levels of emigration
decrease trust in government by 0.2 units in 2006, the estimate is positive and statis-
16An individual’s county of residence is marked as a high-emigration county if the number of
emigrants exceeds average emigration flows per county in a given year. Trust is measured on a 5-
point likert scale from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”. For the linear probability model,
we form a dichotomous version, where the outcome variable is equal to one if trust ≥ 4.
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Figure 4.3: The effect of emigration on social preferences
β
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
2006 2010 2016
(a) Trust in people
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(b) Trust in government
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(d) Trust in parties
β
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
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(e) Trust in courts
β
-.5 0 .5 1
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(f) Trust in president
Note: Panels a to f in Figure 4.3 display visual results for transmission channels. Trust is measured
on a 5-point likert scale from 1 “you can’t be too careful” to 5 “most people can be trusted”. Source:
Life in Transition Survey (2006, 2010, 2016).
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tically significant (+ 0.6 units) in 2016.17 In contrast to this, the effect of emigration
on trust in people is close to zero and statistically insignificant for all periods, em-
phasizing that the effect is not driven by overall changes in trust levels in the Polish
population, but in trust towards the authorities only. Hence, the findings suggest that
social preferences, in particular trust in political institutions, serve as an underlying
mechanism driving our results.
There exist several alternative transmission channels. For instance, if family mem-
bers benefit from financial remittances from a related emigrant, they may be more
likely to cast their vote to right-wing parties, if they are less likely to support redistri-
bution policies. Stayers may therefore engage in strategic voting. However, in Poland,
the right-wing parties are in favor of increasing redistribution. Therefore the remit-
tance channel seems unlikely to drive our results. Another alternative transmission
channel could be return migration. Further research is needed to disentangle the pre-
cise mechanisms. While there is literature that shows the existence of each individual
mechanism in a given context, we currently lack individual-level migration data, which
may provide further evidence on the relative importance of these channels.
4.7 Robustness checks
Our results show that a higher county-level emigration rate has a strong and positive
effect on the share of right-wing parties, while the share of left-wing votes is negatively
affected by emigration. These effects are robust to the inclusion of time and state-level
fixed effects and their interaction (cf. Tables 4.4 and 4.5). In this section, we provide
additional robustness checks to support the respective results.
Our instrument relies on the assumption that the closer a county is to the Polish
border or an international airport, the more likely emigration is taking place. For
the main specifications, we chose duration in hours as the instrument, because it pro-
vides the largest F-Statistic. Similarly, however, we may also instrument emigration
by distance in kilometers or by using an over-identified instrument (see Table 4.3). Ta-
bles 4.15 and 4.16 demonstrate that estimation results are indeed relatively robust to
the usage of alternative instruments. Compared to our baseline estimation, estimates
tend to increase in size if we instrument distance by geographical distance and de-
17The results are robust to using a linear probability model as well (Tables 4.13, 4.14).
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crease in the over-identified case. For the share of right-wing votes, the over-identified
instrument returns a statistically insignificant estimate.
We further show that our results are robust to using a “static” version of the
instrument. In contrast to our main results, this neglects the temporal variation in
free labor mobility, but allows us to include the parliamentary election in 2001, which
took place before Poland becoming an EU-member state. The results, which are
demonstrated in Table 4.17, are very robust to our main specification.
The estimation results in Section 5 use information on migration flows, capturing
the number of emigrants per county in a given year. As such, we can understand
migration patterns at a local level over the course of a specific time interval. However,
the overall quantity of emigrants may differ across counties as well: To check if our
results are robust to using information on the stock rather than the flow of emigrants,
we compute the stock of emigrants as the overall sum of emigrants per county since
1997, which represents the first year in our migration data. Table 4.18 shows respective
estimation results, whereby column (1) reports estimates for the log share of right-
wing parties and column (2) reports estimates for the log share of left-wing votes. Our
results are consistent to previous estimates: a one percent increase in the number of
emigrants increases the log share to right-wing parties by 0.187 percent. Alternatively,
we define emigration as log shares of emigrants (number of emigrants as percent of
the population in logs, cf. Table 4.19). In line with our main results, a one percent
increase in the share of emigrants increases the share of votes for right-wing parties
by 0.318 percent. The effects of emigration on the share of votes for left-wing parties
are slightly smaller compared to the main results. Furthermore, Table 4.20 shows that
the results are robust to controlling for additional types of migration, including net
internal migration (migration across counties), temporary emigration, and permanent
immigration.
The identification assumption of our instrument relies on the assumption that the
lower the opportunity costs of emigration (e.g., travel time and effort), the more likely
are individuals to emigrate from Poland. Therefore, we adapt an existing instrumental
variable method by Dustmann et al. (2016) by including travel distance to the near-
est international airport. The rational behind this is two-fold: First, Dustmann et al.
(2016) investigate the effects of travel bans on commuting behavior across borders,
which primarily takes place by car. Second, the importance of international travel by
plane has increased significantly over the years. To analyze the instrument’s sensitiv-
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ity to using distance to the nearest border versus distance to the nearest international
airport, we therefore provide estimates differentiated across type of exit points. Ta-
ble 4.21 shows the respective estimates, whereby columns (1) and (2) explicitly use
distance to nearest border crossing point, and columns (3) and (4) consider an individ-
ual’s distance to the nearest international airport. The table demonstrates that both
specifications are in line with previous specifications: larger emigration rates increase
the share of votes for right wing parties, while decreasing the vote share for left-wing
parties.
Poland has a common border with several non-European countries, including Be-
larus, Russia, and Ukraine. The accession to the EU in 2004 greatly facilitated mi-
gration to the EU member states, but did not change emigration conditions to any
other states. This suggest that the effect should be more prevalent if we consider the
distance to fellow EU member countries only. In line with our expectations, Table
4.22 illustrates that our results are robust to an alternative distance measure, which
includes border crossing points to non-European neighbors.
To account for the issue of “bad controls” in our regression, the main specification
lags all control variables by one period. One may, however, argue that this is a selective
choice. This is why, in a third specification we fix respective covariates to a pre-EU-
accession level, using information from the baseline year 2000.18 In this specification
we may argue that control variables are exogenous. Table 4.23 illustrates that a one
percent increase in the number of emigrants per country increases the vote share for
right-wing parties, while decreasing the vote share to left-wing parties at the same
time.
Our main specification classifies parties into a right-center-left scheme based on
the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2020). Similarly to the previous
argument, one may review whether this is a selective choice. Therefore, we use an
alternative party classification, the Parliament and Government Composition Database
(ParlGov, see Döring and Manow (2011)). Similar to our main results, Table 4.24
demonstrates a strong and consistent effect of emigration on the support towards
right-wing parties. A one percent increase in the number of emigrants per county
18Note that because GDP per capita and per capita average monthly income are measured at the
state level, including state fixed effects results in a collinearity problem once we fix control variables
to the baseline year 2000. To circumvent this problem, we use information on the NUTS1 level rather
than states to account for region fixed effects.
216
Migrants’ Missing Votes
increases the position on the left-right dimension by 0.129 percent (column 5, Table
4.24). Furthermore, Table 4.25 shows the respective regression results based on party
families. In line with our previous estimations, we find a strong negative effect of
emigration on the share of votes for conservative parties (column 1). Considering
that both socio-democratic and agrarian parties are classified as left-wing parties, we
further expect a negative and statistically significant effect for these two party families.
Columns 3 and 4 confirm our expectations. While increasing emigration decreases the
share of votes for socio-democratic parties by 0.399 percent, the effect is even stronger
for parties from the agrarian party family (-1.001 percent). For the share of votes for
liberal parties, however, we find no statistically significant effects.
To ensure that our results are not driven by economic, political, or demographic
patterns, we control for a variety of regional-level characteristics as well as state and
time fixed effects. As such, we account for both time-variant and time-constant charac-
teristics at the county level. Yet, Table 4.26 shows that there exist differences between
counties with low (control group) and counties with high emigration rates (treatment
group). High emigration counties are characterized by more densely populated areas
that are economically deprived and indicate lower levels of education. To prove that
estimation results are not driven by regional-level differences, we employ a matching
mechanism similar to Dustmann et al. (2016) and match treated and control counties
on a set of regional control variables (measured in 2000). Column (3) in Table 4.26
demonstrates that matched treatment counties are indeed much more comparable to
control counties in a broad range of regional-level covariates, in particular with respect
to economy and education. Subsequently, we re-estimate equation (1) using Polish
counties with common support only. Estimated results are displayed in Table 4.27.
The estimates are remarkably similar to our baseline specification proving the robust-
ness of our results.
The instrumental variable approach may suffer from bias in case of a weak instru-
ment or on the over-identified case (Poi 2006). Although none of these conditions is
met, we estimate Equation 4.1 using the jackknife re-sampling technique to strengthen
the robustness of our findings. The jackknife estimator is obtained by systematically
dropping one observation from the dataset, calculating the estimate, and finally build
the average of these calculations. Table 4.28 demonstrates that the results resemble
our main specification to a great extent.
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Finally, we show that our results are robust to an alternative definition of the
parliamentary term (see Section 4.4) including information on emigration up to the
year of the current election. For instance, if we consider the parliamentary election in
2007, we now use information on emigration in years 2006 and 2007 rather than 2005
and 2006. Estimation results are depicted in Table 4.29. For both outcomes, including
the share of votes for right-wing and left-wing parties, we find that results are very
similar to previous estimates strengthening the robustness of our estimation results.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper highlights that voting for right-wing parties increases as a result of emigra-
tion. Emigrants are selected on political preferences and typically vote less for right-
wing parties. Emigrants also participate much less in the electoral process, which can
be due to lower interest or higher hurdles to cast a vote. Therefore Polish municipali-
ties with larger emigration rates experience stronger voting for the right-wing parties.
We find that social preferences, in particular trust in political institutions, serve as
an underlying mechanism driving our results. Results are robust to estimating the
regression equation using first differences and including different controls that capture
changes in the industry, age, gender or education structure.
These insights are important beyond Poland. As migration is increasing worldwide,
more and more countries experience large emigration waves. These can be due to
economic recessions, a lack of economic opportunities, political oppression, conflict or
climate change. We highlight that this influences election outcomes and can contribute
to increasing votes for right-wing parties. Paradoxically, migrants seem to increase
voting for right-wing parties both in their origin and their destination country.19 While
the effect at the origin is mostly due to a changing composition of the voting population
at the origin, the effect at the destination is due to cultural, labor market or public
finance concerns of the hosting population.
More detailed data and further research is needed to analyze the role of cultural
change and return migration as a transmission mechanism. How do indirect effects
19Papers that show that immigration leads to increasing voting for right-wing parties are, for
instance, Barone et al. (2016), Edo et al. (2019), and Halla et al. (2017). There are, however, also
papers that show opposite effects in the special case of refugees (Steinmayr 2020) or when immigrants
can vote (Mayda et al. 2020).
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resulting from the transfer of money, knowledge, and social norms interact with our
results?
One clear policy implication from this work is that voting of emigrants from abroad
should be facilitated so that all citizens have a fair chance to cast their vote. As long
as emigrants have the citizenship of their home country and are not eligible to vote
in their destination, they should have easy access to participate in elections in their
home country. There have already been efforts that go in this direction such as the
introduction of voting by post. However, this is often not possible for all kind of
elections and for all destination and origin countries.
In the second round of the 2020 Polish presidential elections, the populist right-
wing candidate Andrzej Duda won with only 51.0 percent to the opposition candidate
Rafal Trzaskowski. The difference was just 422,385 votes. Among the Polish diaspora,
however, the opposition had a much stronger result and won 74 percent of votes.
However, turnout abroad was much lower and only 415,951 votes from abroad were
counted (there are approximately 4 million Polish citizens living abroad, see UN DESA,
2019). This corresponds to a turnout of 10.4 percent. Had the turnout among the
diaspora been close to the one of Polish citizens (68 percent), the opposition would
have won. After the election there have been numerous complaints filed with the courts
from citizens abroad that their voting documents have not arrived or arrived too late.
They accused the government of suppressing voting from abroad.20 This anecdote
illustrates that migrants matter for election outcomes and can represent the tipping
point.






Table 4.8: Elections in Poland, 1997-2019
No Year Type Elected parties Government
0 1997 SJM AWS, MN, PSL, ROP, SLD, UW AWS, UW
1 2001 SJM LPR, MN, PiS, PO, PSL, SLD-UP, SRP SLD-UP
2 2004 PUE LPR, PiS, PO, PSL, SLD, SRP, SDPL, UW .
3 2005 SJM LPR, MN, PiS, PO, PSL, SLD, SRP LPR, PiS, SRP
4 2007 SJM LiD, MN, PiS, PO, PSL PO, PSL
5 2009 PUE SLD-UP, PiS, PO, PSL .
6 2011 SJM MN, PiS, PO, PSL, RP, SLD PO, PSL
7 2014 PUE KNP, PiS, PO, PSL, SLD .
8 2015 SJM Kukiz, MN, Modern, PiS, PO, PSL PiS
9 2019 PUE European Coalition*, PiS, Wiosna .
10 2019 SJM KORWin, MN, PiS, PO, PSL, SLD PiS
Note: Table 4.8 chronologically lists all parliamentary and European parliament elections from 1997
to 2019, including the election’s year, the type of election (European parliament, sejm), a list of
parties elected into parliament, and the governing parties. Incumbent parties are parties, who were
forming the government in the preceding parliamentary election (t-1).
*The coalition European Coalition comprises the parties Modern, PO, PSL, SLD, and ZL. Source:
Polish National Electoral Commission (PKW).
AWS Solidarity Electoral Action
KORWin Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic – Liberty and Hope
KNP The New Right Election Committee
Kukiz Electoral Committee of Voters of Kukiz’15
LiD Left and Democrats
LPR League of Polish Families
MN German Minority
Modern The Ryszard Petru’s Election Committee
PiS Law and Justice
PO Civic Platform
PSL Polish Peasants’ Party
ROP Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland
RP Palikot Movement Election Committee/Twoj Ruch
SDPL Social Democracy of Poland
SLD Democratic Left Alliance
SLD-UP Coalion of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Union of Labour
SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic




Table 4.9: OLS: Relation between emigration and the share of right-wing votes











b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county 0.041∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No
State FE No No Yes Yes No
State*Time FE No No No No Yes
N 3312 3312 3312 3312 3312
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number
of emigrants per county in logs. Table 4.9 includes the full set of covariates, as described in
Section 4.4. For illustrative purposes, the control variables are excluded. Source: Statistics PL
and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
Table 4.10: OLS: Relation between emigration and the share of left-wing votes











b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county -0.154∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No
State FE No No Yes Yes No
State*Time FE No No No No Yes
N 2903 2903 2903 2903 2903
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of left-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number
of emigrants per county in logs. Table 4.10 includes the full set of covariates, as described in
Section 4.4. For illustrative purposes, the control variables are excluded. Source: Statistics PL
and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
221
Migrants’ Missing Votes
Table 4.11: Effect of emigration on the share of right-wing votes in different time peri-
ods
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Pre 2014 2014 - 2019
b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county 0.249∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.095∗
(0.061) (0.072) (0.052)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.002 -0.034∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.015) (0.001)
Share of female residents -3.460 -2.634 -2.522
(2.314) (2.642) (2.151)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.063∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.103) (0.010)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.093∗ 0.303∗∗ 0.040
(0.052) (0.130) (0.025)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 2.361∗∗∗ 1.672∗∗ 0.315
(0.541) (0.663) (0.620)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -4.633∗∗∗ -4.881∗∗ -2.097
(1.716) (2.102) (1.328)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.524 -0.190 -1.028∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.482) (0.358)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -6.392∗∗ 3.243 -3.786∗∗
(3.020) (3.849) (1.494)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.635 0.635
N 2955 2199 756
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number of
emigrants per county in logs. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Table 4.12: Effect of emigration on the share of left-wing votes in different time periods
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Pre 2014 2014 - 2019
b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county -0.569∗∗∗ -0.651∗∗∗ -0.034
(0.143) (0.179) (0.112)
Registered unemployed persons 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita -0.000 -0.003∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Per capita average income -0.007 0.078∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.038) (0.002)
Share of female residents 14.667∗∗∗ 12.737∗∗ 5.883
(5.225) (6.445) (4.126)
Percentage working in agricultural sector -0.179∗∗∗ 0.464∗ -0.175∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.254) (0.024)
Percentage working in industrial sector -0.295∗∗ -0.876∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.319) (0.057)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 -2.520∗ 0.887 -8.274∗∗∗
(1.375) (1.680) (1.886)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 17.834∗∗∗ 19.686∗∗∗ 5.146∗∗
(3.970) (5.161) (2.579)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 8.428∗∗∗ 11.184∗∗∗ 8.373∗∗∗
(1.048) (1.301) (1.422)
Graduates from tertiary education 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Net internal migration -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 7.580 -10.206 14.638∗∗∗
(7.201) (9.418) (3.578)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.202 0.202 0.202
N 2546 2168 378
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of left-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number of
emigrants per county in logs. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Table 4.13: Migration patterns and trust in political institutions













b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Above mean
emigration 0.002 0.071 -0.160 -0.185 0.268
∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.118) (0.126) (0.140) (0.131) (0.137)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 950 967 972 945 957 970
R-Squared 0.082 0.175 0.191 0.135 0.274 0.129
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Trust is measured on a
5-point likert scale from 1 “you can’t be too careful” to 5 “most people can be trusted”. Source:
Life in Transition Survey (2006, 2010, 2016).
Table 4.14: Migration patterns and trust in political institutions













b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Above mean
emigration 0.023 -0.027 -0.108
∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.009 0.169∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.067) (0.064) (0.043) (0.061) (0.060)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 950 967 972 945 957 970
R-Squared 0.079 0.110 0.193 0.123 0.186 0.099
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Trust is measured on a
5-point likert scale from 1 “you can’t be too careful” to 5 “most people can be trusted”. Outcome




Table 4.15: Effect of emigration on the share of right-wing votes using alternative in-
struments
(1) (2) (3)
Duration in h Distance in km Over-identified IV
b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county 0.249∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.061) (0.108) (0.014)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.002 0.002 0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
Share of female residents -3.460 -6.825∗ 5.004∗∗∗
(2.314) (4.030) (0.594)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.063∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.033) (0.006)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.093∗ 0.120 0.026∗∗
(0.052) (0.073) (0.012)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 2.361∗∗∗ 1.723∗ 3.966∗∗∗
(0.541) (0.881) (0.216)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -4.633∗∗∗ -7.229∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗
(1.716) (2.978) (0.461)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.524 0.378 0.892∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.502) (0.183)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -6.392∗∗ -5.005 -9.880∗∗∗
(3.020) (4.280) (0.764)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.635 0.635
N 2955 2955 2955
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number of
emigrants per county in logs. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
225
Migrants’ Missing Votes
Table 4.16: Effect of emigration on the share of left-wing votes using alternative instru-
ments
(1) (2) (3)
Duration in h Distance in km Over-identified IV
b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county -0.569∗∗∗ -0.654∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.204) (0.046)
Registered unemployed persons 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income -0.007 -0.006 -0.009∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Share of female residents 14.667∗∗∗ 17.551∗∗ 0.242
(5.225) (7.297) (1.926)
Percentage working in agricultural sector -0.179∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.064) (0.026)
Percentage working in industrial sector -0.295∗∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.145) (0.053)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 -2.520∗ -1.925 -5.495∗∗∗
(1.375) (1.791) (0.713)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 17.834∗∗∗ 20.125∗∗∗ 6.376∗∗∗
(3.970) (5.571) (1.576)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 8.428∗∗∗ 8.614∗∗∗ 7.499∗∗∗
(1.048) (1.191) (0.632)
Graduates from tertiary education 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 7.580 6.370 13.633∗∗∗
(7.201) (8.370) (3.137)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.202 0.202 0.202
N 2546 2546 2546
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of left-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number of
emigrants per county in logs. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Log emigration per county 0.242∗∗ -0.276∗∗ 0.071
(0.075) (0.103) (0.062)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income -0.001 0.001 0.023∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Share of female residents -2.644 5.870 -4.240
(2.954) (3.873) (2.348)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.040∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.195 -0.464∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.151) (0.079)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 2.587∗∗ -3.428∗∗ 1.383∗
(0.794) (1.216) (0.664)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -4.107∗ 10.131∗∗∗ -0.561
(2.016) (2.787) (1.688)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.000 7.862∗∗∗ 2.596∗∗∗
(0.480) (0.858) (0.446)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -7.962∗ 12.209∗ -7.083∗∗
(3.734) (5.161) (2.720)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202 0.216
N 3312 2903 3312
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number of
emigrants per county in logs. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Stock of emigrants since 1997 in logs 0.187∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.085)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.004)
Share of female residents -2.347 13.776∗∗∗
(1.462) (3.759)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.019 -0.076∗
(0.014) (0.043)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.119∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.101)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 2.980∗∗∗ -3.789∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.923)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -3.437∗∗∗ 16.371∗∗∗
(1.071) (2.816)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.795∗∗∗ 7.522∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.821)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)




State*Time FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202
N 3016 2605
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the share
of right-wing (left-wing) votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the stock











Share of emigrants in logs 0.318∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗
(0.064) (0.093)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita -0.000 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.005∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.104∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.041)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.074 -0.006
(0.061) (0.083)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)




State*Time FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202
N 2955 2546
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing (left-wing) votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the
number of emigrants as percent of the population in logs. We abstain from using a full set of
covariates and forgo control variates which relate to the size of the population per county (the
share of female residents, the share of respondents aged 15-29, the share of respondents aged 30-49,
and the share of respondents aged 50-64) to avoid over-identification. Source: Statistics PL and
National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Log emigration per county 0.347∗∗∗ -0.747∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.232)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.003∗ -0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Share of female residents -4.037 15.003∗∗
(3.199) (6.465)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.072∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.062)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.083∗ -0.225∗∗
(0.046) (0.103)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 1.231 -0.245
(0.974) (2.270)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -7.716∗∗ 23.230∗∗∗
(3.114) (6.532)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 -0.368 10.257∗∗∗
(0.601) (1.572)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Permanent immigration -0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)




State*Time FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202
N 2955 2546
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing (left-wing) votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the




Table 4.21: Effect of emigration on voters’ preferences, distance to border vs distance
to international airport













b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county 0.110∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ 0.439∗ -1.425∗
(0.017) (0.052) (0.228) (0.736)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.003∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
Share of female residents 1.511∗∗ 5.026∗∗ -10.250 43.974∗
(0.750) (2.127) (8.239) (25.639)
Percentage working in argricultural sector 0.055∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ 0.073∗ -0.224
(0.011) (0.034) (0.043) (0.139)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.054∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ 0.147 -0.536
(0.024) (0.072) (0.107) (0.347)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 3.304∗∗∗ -4.508∗∗∗ 1.074 3.526
(0.250) (0.767) (1.640) (5.586)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -0.798 10.176∗∗∗ -9.871 41.112∗∗
(0.546) (1.643) (6.347) (20.226)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.740∗∗∗ 7.807∗∗∗ 0.230 10.316∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.711) (0.697) (2.701)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -8.441∗∗∗ 11.625∗∗∗ -3.593 -4.718
(1.391) (4.136) (6.062) (19.753)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202 0.635 0.202
N 2955 2546 2955 2546
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the share
of right-wing (left-wing) votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number
of emigrants per county in logs. Columns (1) and (2) instrument emigration with duration to the
nearest border in hours (main specification). Columns (3) and (4) instrument emigration with
an over-identified instrument (distance in hours, duration in km) to reach a sufficient F-Statistics.
Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Log emigration per county 0.219∗∗ -0.441∗∗ 0.116
(0.097) (0.193) (0.103)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.003 -0.007∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Share of female residents -2.406 10.264 -5.484
(3.539) (6.764) (3.666)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.061∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.046) (0.021)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.085∗ -0.259∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.110) (0.053)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 2.561∗∗∗ -3.428∗∗ 1.625∗∗
(0.731) (1.603) (0.784)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -3.820 14.337∗∗∗ -1.370
(2.689) (5.336) (2.882)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.570 8.145∗∗∗ 3.021∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.946) (0.426)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -6.826∗∗ 9.427 -11.824∗∗∗
(2.962) (6.198) (2.770)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202 0.216
N 2955 2546 2955
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing (left-wing) votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the











Log emigration per county 0.799∗∗ -1.236∗∗
(0.371) (0.493)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income -0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Share of female residents -27.544∗ 44.441∗∗
(16.266) (21.051)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.000 -0.008
(0.007) (0.011)
Percentage working in industrial sector -0.033∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.018)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 -2.838 2.927
(3.628) (5.071)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -23.222∗∗ 40.553∗∗
(11.793) (15.849)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 2.770∗ 4.863∗∗
(1.656) (2.347)
Graduates from tertiary education 0.000∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)




NUTS-1*Time FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202
N 2956 2547
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the share
of right-wing (left-wing) votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the number
of emigrants per county in logs. Covariates are fixed as of 2000, before EU accession. Regional fixed
effects capture NUTS-1 level, because otherwise we loose covariates due to collinearity. Source:
Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Table 4.24: Effect of emigration on voters’ support to the left-right dimension











b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county 0.124∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.038) (0.044)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Share of female residents -2.619∗∗ -5.575∗∗∗ -0.351 -2.935∗∗ -3.390∗∗
(1.188) (1.333) (1.262) (1.389) (1.694)
Percentage working in agricultural sector -0.001 -0.001 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.004∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
Percentage working in industrial sector -0.010∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.005 0.061∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.028)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 -1.365∗∗∗ -0.286 0.465 0.409 0.307
(0.426) (0.320) (0.413) (0.334) (0.393)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -3.171∗∗∗ -5.129∗∗∗ -1.913∗∗ -2.936∗∗∗ -3.154∗∗∗
(0.723) (0.911) (0.762) (0.950) (1.074)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 -2.334∗∗∗ -0.331 -1.662∗∗∗ -0.744∗∗∗ -0.856∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.276) (0.371) (0.214) (0.217)
Graduates from tertiary education 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 4.488∗∗∗ 6.317∗∗∗ 3.205∗∗∗ 4.001∗∗∗ -0.142
(0.895) (0.918) (1.087) (0.969) (1.642)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No
State FE No No Yes Yes No
State*Time FE No No No No Yes
Mean 1.738 1.738 1.738 1.738 1.738
N 2955 2955 2955 2955 2955
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Party classifications follow
the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov, http://www.parlgov.org/).
The ParlGov dataset classifies parties position in the left-right position on a scale from 0 “left” to
10 “right” with data from Castles and Mair (1983), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and Laver
(2006), and CHES (2010). To utilize this scale, we generate the average position in each county
using weighted averages. Considering a county with three parties in a given election, we compute
county i’s stand on the left-right position as LRi = ShareP arty1i ∗P ositionP arty1+ShareP arty2i ∗
P ositionP arty2+ShareP arty3i ∗P ositionP arty3. The higher the weighted average of the left-right
dimension, the higher the support for right-wing parties. Emigration is measured as the number of
emigrants per county in logs. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Table 4.25: Effect of emigration on voters’ preferences, alternative party classification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conservative Liberal Agrarian Socio-demographic
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log emigration per county 0.258∗∗∗ -0.049 -1.001∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.120) (0.329) (0.127)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.001∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Per capita average income -0.018∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.000) (0.039) (0.016)
Share of female residents -3.824 16.660∗∗∗ 7.331 17.382∗∗∗
(2.393) (4.363) (11.660) (4.478)
Percentage working in argricultural sector -0.088 -0.031∗∗∗ 0.458∗ 0.224∗∗
(0.061) (0.006) (0.239) (0.099)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.722∗∗ -0.015 -3.177∗∗ -1.830∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.027) (1.458) (0.603)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 1.967∗∗∗ 5.527∗∗∗ 2.087 -0.549
(0.562) (1.180) (2.666) (1.332)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -4.926∗∗∗ 9.043∗∗ 17.127∗ 18.883∗∗∗
(1.779) (3.521) (8.871) (3.406)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.238 8.961∗∗∗ 1.204 9.328∗∗∗
(0.384) (1.148) (1.777) (1.144)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.001∗ -0.000 0.002∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Net internal migration 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -11.259∗ -16.116∗∗∗ 44.516∗∗ 15.420
(5.760) (3.423) (22.607) (9.503)
State*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean -0.421 -2.817 -1.849 -2.109
N 2955 1093 2638 1101
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is
the share of votes for conservative (1), liberal (2), agrarian (3), and socio-demographic parties
(4) per county and election year. Party classifications follow the Parliament and Government
Composition Database (ParlGov, http://www.parlgov.org/). Emigration is measured as the













Emigration per 10,000 inhabitants 3.100 13.393 15.175
(3.558) (14.563) (15.993)
Immigration per 10,000 inhabitants 2.213 4.352 4.523
(1.897) (2.900) (2.944)
Population per county 77059.649 174869.210 127415.333
(38842.786) (197913.583) (89672.101)
Registered unemployed persons 4806.045 7490.022 6141.520
(3189.093) (7097.900) (4216.503)
GDP per capita 34479.726 33507.652 33313.948
(14939.569) (11623.707) (11344.745)
Average monthly per capita income 1077.169 1075.901 1076.326
(397.048) (376.765) (375.318)
Share of female residents 0.509 0.518 0.515
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 16.458 10.390 10.311
(8.338) (7.463) (7.012)
Percentage working in industrial sector 29.503 34.740 34.575
(5.145) (5.351) (4.958)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 0.223 0.218 0.219
(0.025) (0.034) (0.030)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 0.283 0.293 0.292
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.182 0.193 0.189
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Graduates of higher education institutions 29426.354 26835.057 25809.118
(19832.684) (14730.978) (13750.866)
Net internal migration 13.103 -46.385 -50.963
(509.925) (830.277) (399.529)
N 6647 2093 1518
Note: Means (standard deviations). Source: Statistics PL.
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Log emigration per county 0.285∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.166)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.004∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.002) (0.005)
Share of female residents -3.053 13.473∗∗
(2.706) (5.582)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.086∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.066)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.106∗ -0.322∗∗
(0.059) (0.138)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 2.422∗∗∗ -1.413
(0.693) (1.708)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -5.744∗∗∗ 19.284∗∗∗
(2.046) (4.417)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 -0.123 10.516∗∗∗
(0.540) (1.495)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)




State*Time FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202
N 2699 2323
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the share











Log emigration per county 0.249∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.152)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Per capita average income 0.002 -0.007
(0.002) (0.005)
Share of female residents -3.460 14.667∗∗∗
(2.449) (5.537)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.063∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.060)
Percentage working in industrial sector 0.093∗ -0.295∗∗
(0.054) (0.132)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 2.361∗∗∗ -2.520∗
(0.572) (1.455)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -4.633∗∗ 17.834∗∗∗
(1.816) (4.202)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.524 8.428∗∗∗
(0.389) (1.102)
Graduates from tertiary education -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)




State*Time FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202
N 2955 2546
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing (left-wing) votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the











Log emigration per county 0.250∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.090)
Registered unemployed persons -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
GPD per capita -0.001∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Per capita average income 0.030∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.028)
Share of female residents -2.910 12.781∗∗∗
(1.928) (3.721)
Percentage working in agricultural sector 0.123∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.082)
Percentage working in industrial sector -1.859∗ 4.876∗∗
(1.011) (1.899)
Share of respondents aged 15-29 2.405∗∗∗ -1.855
(0.581) (1.200)
Share of respondents aged 30-49 -4.388∗∗∗ 14.615∗∗∗
(1.303) (2.593)
Share of respondents aged 50-64 0.193 8.209∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.965)
Graduates from tertiary education 0.001∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)




State*Time FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.635 0.202
N 3312 2903
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Outcome variable is the
share of right-wing (left-wing) votes per county and election year. Emigration is measured as the
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Primary education Secondary education
Tertiary education
(b) Educational level as a percentage of all Pol-
ish emigrants over time
Note: Panel a in Figure 4.4 displays the share of population aged 15 and above attaining primary,
secondary, and tertiary education in Poland over the period from 2000 to 2015. Panel b in Figure
4.4 illustrates the educational level as a percentage of all polish emigrants over time. Sources:
OECD (2020), Education at a Glance 2020 and Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries
(DIOC), 2000 - 2015.
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Note: Figure 4.5 illustrates the number of permanent versus temporary emigrants in Poland from




Figure 4.6: Election results in Poland, 2001-2019
Note: Figure 4.6 illustrates the share of right-wing, center, and left-wing votes in Poland across
election years from 2001 to 2019. Source: Statistics PL.
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Note: Figure 4.7 illustrates the relationship between emigration per year and county and the share
of right-wing populist votes. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Figure 4.8: Share of right-wing populist votes in counties with different emigration
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Note: Panels a to f in Figure 4.8 illustrates the relationship between emigration per year and county
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Note: Figure 4.9 illustrates the relationship between emigration per year and county and the share
of right-wing votes. Source: Statistics PL and National Electoral Commission (PKW).
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Note: Figure 4.10 illustrates the percentage of eligible voters who cast their vote for those residing
in Poland and for Polish citizens in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and the EU28
countries excluding Poland (2001-2019). It is important to note that official statistics often report
extremely high participation rates from abroad. This is due to the fact that they base eligible
voters on those that registered to vote and not on the entire eligible population of Polish citizens
residing abroad. Therefore, the numbers of eligible voters are estimated for the observed countries
using Eurostat data on population by age group and citizenship. Source: National Electoral
Commission (PKW) and Eurostat.
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Note: Figure 4.11 displays the share of votes for left-wing, center, and right-wing parties in Poland
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Note: Figure 4.12 illustrates the relationship between emigration per year and county and the
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Note: Figure 4.13 illustrates the relationship between emigration per year and county and the
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This dissertation consists of four empirical chapters in migration economics.
The first chapter analyzes the effect of a recently introduced policy reform on
participation in integration courses and refugees’ language proficiency levels in Ger-
many. The reform restricts initial residence for refugees with a permanent residence
permit. Given that treatment intensity varies distinctly across states, I use this quasi-
experiment and apply a difference-in-differences approach based on representative sur-
vey data of refugees in Germany. Despite policy makers’ intention to improve access
to integration measures, I find that residence restrictions have no impact on the prob-
ability to participate in integration courses and refugees’ language proficiency levels.
This result is robust to several robustness checks as well as the participation in any
language course. Overall, the evidence suggests that refugees were being misallocated
to counties with insufficient supply of integration courses.
Chapter 2 studies the causal effect of local labor market conditions and attitudes
towards immigrants at the time of arrival on refugees’ multi-dimensional integration
outcomes (economic, linguistic, navigational, political, psychological, and social). Us-
ing a unique dataset on refugees, we leverage a centralized allocation policy in Germany
where refugees were exogenously assigned to live in specific counties. We find that high
initial local unemployment negatively affects refugees’ economic and social integration:
they are less likely to be in education or employment and they earn less. We also show
that favorable attitudes towards immigrants promote refugees’ economic and social
integration. The results suggest that attitudes toward immigrants are as important as
local unemployment rates in shaping refugees’ integration outcomes. Using a machine
learning classifier algorithm, we find that our results are driven by older people and
those with secondary or tertiary education.
Against a background of increasing violence against non-natives, Chapter 3 esti-
mates the effect of hate crime on refugees’ mental health in Germany. For this purpose,
we combine two datasets: administrative records on xenophobic crime against refugee
shelters by the Federal Criminal Office and the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees.
We apply a regression-discontinuity-design-in-time to estimate the effect of interest.
Our results indicate that hate crime has a substantial negative effect on several men-
tal health indicators, including the Mental Component Summary score and the Pa-
tient Health Questionnaire-4 score. The effects are stronger for refugees with closer
geographic proximity to the focal hate crime and refugees with low country-specific
human capital. While the estimated effect is only transitory, we argue that negative
mental health shocks during the critical period after arrival have important long-term
consequences.
The fourth chapter focuses on political effects of emigration. Emigrants are less
likely to participate in elections in their home country. They are also self-selected in
xxvii
Summary
terms of education, gender, age, and political preferences, changing the structure of
the origin population. High emigration rates can therefore have a systematic influence
on election results. Using administrative migration and voting data, we show that high
emigration from Poland following the accession to the European Union in 2004 has
caused an increase in vote shares for right-wing parties. To account for endogenous
migration patterns, we construct an innovative instrument that measures the distance
to the closest EU border and adds time variation by exploiting the gradual opening
of different EU labor markets. Our results further highlight that emigration increases
voting for parties with pro-European positions, but has no effect on incumbent parties.
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation besteht aus vier empirischen Kapiteln aus dem Bereich der Migrati-
onsökonomik.
Kapitel 1 untersucht die Auswirkungen von Aufenthaltsbeschränkungen auf die
Teilnahme an Integrationskursen und auf die Sprachentwicklung von Geflüchteten.
Ein neu eingeführtes Gesetz, die “Wohnsitzauflage”, beschränkt Geflüchtete mit einem
längerfristigen Aufenthaltsstatus in der Wahl ihres ersten Wohnorts. Die empirische
Analyse greift auf eine repräsentative Befragung von Geflüchteten in Deutschland
zurück und nutzt die unterschiedlich strikte Ausführung der Wohnsitzauflage in deutsch-
en Bundesländern als Quasi-Experiment im Rahmen einer Difference-in-Differences
Schätzung. Die Ergebnisse unterstreichen, dass die Wohnsitzauflage keine Auswirkun-
gen auf die Teilnahme an Integrationskursen und die Sprachkenntnisse Geflüchteter
hat. Auch für die Teilnahme an anderen Sprachkursen treten keine Effekte auf. Insge-
samt deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Geflüchtete in Landkreisen mit einem zu
geringen Angebot an Sprachkursen untergebracht wurden.
Das zweite Kapitel widmet sich dem kausalen Effekt lokaler Arbeitsmarktbedingun-
gen und der Haltung der Bevölkerung gegenüber MigrantInnen bei der Ankunft von
Geflüchteten auf deren multi-dimensionale Integration. Grundlage der empirischen
Analyse ist die exogene Verteilung von Geflüchteten auf Landkreise in Deutschland.
Je höher die Arbeitslosigkeit am ersten Wohnort, desto geringer ist die Wahrschein-
lichkeit für Geflüchtete, eine Ausbildung oder Arbeit finden und umso geringer ist ihr
Verdienst. Positive Einstellungen der Bevölkerung gegenüber MigrantInnen wirken sich
jedoch positiv auf die ökonomische und soziale Integration von Geflüchteten aus. Die
Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass positive Einstellungen gegenüber MigrantInnen die
Integration Geflüchteter im gleichen Ausmaß beeinflussen, wie lokale Arbeitslosigkeit.
Basierend auf einem Machine Learning Algorithmus zeigen wir, dass die Effekte bei
älteren Personengruppen und Geflüchteten mit sekundärer bzw. tertiärer Bildung
stärker sind.
Vor dem Hintergrund steigender Gewalt gegen MigrantInnen, betrachtet Kapitel 3
die Auswirkung von Hasskriminalität auf die mentale Gesundheit von Geflüchteten.
Hierfür werden zwei Datensätze miteinander verbunden: administrative Daten des
Bundeskriminalamts über Hasskriminalität auf Flüchtlingsunterkünfte und die IAB-
BAMF-SOEP Befragung von Geflüchteten in Deutschland. Die Ergebnisse–basierend
auf einem Regression Discontinuity Design–zeigen einen starken negativen Zusam-
menhang von Hasskriminalität auf die Indikatoren der mentalen Gesundheit, den
Mental Component Summary Score und den PHQ-4 score. Die Effekte sind stärker
für Geflüchtete, die näher an einer Flüchtlingsunterkunft leben, und Geflüchtete mit
geringem landesspezifischem Humankapital. Wenngleich die negativen Auswirkungen
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mit der Zeit abklingen, können negative Schocks auf die mentale Gesundheit die Inte-
grationsleistung Geflüchteter langfristig beeinträchtigen.
Kapitel 4 untersucht die politischen Implikationen von Emigration. Emigranten
nehmen mit geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit an Wahlen im Herkunftsland teil.
Gleichzeitig unterscheiden sie sich von der Bevölkerung hinsichtlich Bildung, Geschlecht,
Alter und politischer Einstellungen. Starke Migration kann daher deutliche Auswirkun-
gen auf die politische Entwicklung im Herkunftsland entfalten. Die Untersuchung nutzt
administrative Daten zu Migration und Wahlergebnissen, um zu zeigen, dass die große
Auswanderungsbewegung nach dem EU-Beitritt Polens im Jahr 2004 zu einem Anstieg
des Stimmenanteils rechts-stehender Parteien geführt hat. Um die Endogenität von
Migration zu berücksichtigen, wird Migration durch die Distanz zur EU-Grenze–unter
Berücksichtigung der graduellen Öffnung des europäischen Arbeitsmarkt im Rahmen
der 2+3+2 Regelung–instrumentiert. Die Ergebnisse unterstreichen, dass Migration
einen Anstieg des Stimmanteils für pro-Europäische Parteien induziert, allerdings keine
Auswirkungen auf die Parteien der amtierenden Regierung hat.
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